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Stephens and Freeland: The Commissioner and the Corporation

THE COMMISSIONER AND THE CORPORATION
JAMES

J. FREELAND and RIcHARD B. STEPHENS*

A mute, invisible figure, discernible only to the mind's eye and
audible only to the mind's ear, sits at each meeting of the board of
directors. If he could be seen and were to speak aloud, he would
often advance unanswerable reasons for the doing of or refraining
from doing some proposed bit of corporate business. He leaves it to
others to speak for him, and they must read his thoughts and know
his reasons as expressed in discernible, but often nearly unintelligible,
black ink in the tax statutes, regulations and opinions. The mute invisible figure is, of course, that of the tax gatherer.
The purpose of this article in a symposium devoted to corporations is to expose some of the tax considerations that bear directly on
corporate transactions that are the subject of discussion from different
points of view in the other articles in this issue.
At the outset, the scope of this article should be made clear. Only
three areas of corporate taxation are treated: first, tax considerations
at the time of incorporation; second, the special tax circumstances of
the dose corporation; and third, tax problems in the compensation
of corporate management. Even in these limited areas the article
does not purport to be exhaustive. An effort is made to focus attention on matters of frequent and critical importance. When such
matters are treated only briefly or summarily, selective references are
included to direct the reader to more nourishing materials that
should be an aid to further detailed study.
PART I. CORPORATE FORMATION"

Should a Business Be Incorporated?
Whether incorporation holds tax advantages has been the subject
of extensive writing. 1 The simplest fact to grasp about corporations is
*James J Freeland, A.B. 1950 Duke University; LL.B. 1954, University of
Florida; Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida.
Richard B. Stephens, A.B. 1939, University of Rochester, LL.B. 1942, University
of Michigan; Professor of Law, University of Florida, and currently Visiting Pro-

fessor of Law, University of Illinois.
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that as a rule they are separate entities for tax purposes. The corporation, not the equitable owner, is taxed on corporate earnings. In
contrast, in the case of businesses operated as sole proprietorships
or partnerships, the owners, whether proprietors or partners, rather
than the business unit are generally taxed on the earnings.2
Two recent legislative developments, one in 1954 and the other in
1958, materially alter this picture. In the enactment of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, Congress adopted a provision that permits
some proprietorships and partnerships to elect to be taxed as if they
were corporations. 3 The Technical Amendments Act of 1958 brought
into the Code companion provisions that permit some corporations
to escape corporate status for tax purposes, with the effect that corporate income and losses are taxed directly to or deducted by the corporate shareholders rather than the corporation itself.4 There is a
(1957); WILLIS, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION C. 31 (1957); Driscoll, Incorporating, in Multi-corporate Form, an Existing Business, N.Y.U. 16TH INST. ON FED.
TAX. 243 (1958); Garcia, When Should a Sole Proprietor Incorporate His Business
to Save Income Taxes?, 35 TAXES 110 (1957); Kumler, Corporate Organizations and
Reorganizations, U. So. CAL. 1955 TAX INST. 311; Ray and Hammonds, Corporation
or Partnership:Tax Considerations,36 TAXES 9 (1958); Repetti, Using the Corporation to Operate a New Business, N.Y.U. 15TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 401 (1957);
Stutsman, Tax Factors in Organizing a Corporation,2 P-H TAX IDEAS f7006 (1954);
Tritt and Spencer, Current Tax Problems in Incorporation of a Going Business,
PARTNERSHIP

U. So. CAL. 10TH TAX INST. 71

(1958); Whitted, The Tax Elusiveness of Corporate

Identity, 34 TAXES 613 (1956); Partnership or Corporation Under the 1958 Tax
Law (Res. Inst. Am. 1958); Tax-Option Corporations (CCH 1958).
2See Levy, Real Estate Partnerships,N.Y.U. 16TH INST. ON FEn. TAX. 183 (1958);
Peavy, Tax Problems of Co-owners Electing to Be Treated As a Partnership Under
the New Rules, 5 J. TAXATION 290 (1956); Tax Considerations in Switching from
a Partnership to a Corporation,4 J. TAXATION 46 (1956). See also note 1 supra.
3Under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §1361, individual proprietorships and certain
partnerships not having more than 50 members and having no dominant partner
and no nonresident alien as a partner, engaged in trading or in a business in
which capital is a material income producing factor, can with certain other restrictions elect to be taxed as corporations. The artificial conversion is not complete,
however; for example, a partner or proprietor still cannot be an employee of the
business for pension trust purposes. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §1361 (d).
4Under the INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §1371, election of so-called pseudo-corporate
status can be made only if the corporation is a domestic one, not a member of an
affiliated group, and has only one class of stock outstanding; it can have no more
than 10 shareholders, all of whom must be natural persons who are citizens or
residents, or the estates of such persons. Moreover, substantial gross receipts from
foreign sources or in the form of royalties, rents, dividends, interest, annuities, or
in the nature of gains from the disposition of securities may disqualify the corporation. Id. § 1372 (e) (4), (5).
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tendency to refer to corporations that elect the new tax status as
"pseudo corporations." The term is convenient, but it should be
understood that the election does not affect the corporation's status
under state law. The new provisions on the taxation of corporate
income are not explored in detail in this article but are touched
upon briefly in the discussion of close corporations5 because they relate to businesses the ownership of which is not widely scattered. If
the elective provisions cannot be or are not used, the conventional
tax rules on partnerships, proprietorships and corporations of course
prevail.
Tax advantages of incorporating may be too readily assumed. If
the new pseudo-corporate status is not elected, an individual owner
is insulated taxwise from business profits, which may or may not be
attractive when corporate and individual tax rates are compared.
Corporate taxable income up to $25,000 is taxed at only the "normal"
rate of 30%; for taxable income above this amount the effective
corporate rate is 52%.6 The individual income tax rates range up to
91%. 7 The attraction of the corporate rates therefore depends in part
upon the individual's personal tax bracket. Moreover, the corporate
rates mentioned apply to the business income only as far as the corporation itself is concerned. Withdrawals of such income as dividends
will result in further taxes to the individual at ordinary income tax
rates.8 A sobering thought is that if the maximum corporate and
individual rates are applied to the income of a corporation only 6.24
9
cents is left out of each dollar of income.
Of course the apparent answer is to leave the money in the corporation, which can sometimes be done if personal financial conditions
permit. In such circumstances the ultimate individual tax may be
5See notes 136-51 infra and accompanying text.
SIrr. Ry. CoDE OF 1954, §11.
7id. §1 (a); however, the tax cannot exceed 87% of taxable income. Id. §1 (c).
SINT. REv. CODE OF

1954, §61 (a) (7).

952% of $1.00 equals 520, leaving 480 for distribution as a dividend after the
corporate tax; 91% of the remaining 480 is 43.680, which leaves only 4.320 after
both corporate and individual taxes. Taking into account the full 4% dividend
credit of 1.920 provided in §34 (but disregarding the inconsequential $50 dividend
exdusion under §116), the net individual tax is 41.760, which leaves the individual
6.240 to spend or save out of $1.00 of corporate earnings. The net receipt is only
approximately two thirds of what it would be if the $1.00 were earned in a proprietorship or partnership; that is, 91% of $1.00 is 910, leaving the individual with
90 as compared with 6.240 if the $I.00 is earned and then distributed by a corporation.
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reduced to capital gains rates ° if, for example, the corporation is
dissolved" or the shareholder sells his stock before the distribution
of dividends.12 The stepped-up basis obtained upon the death of a
shareholder 1 may eliminate even the moderate capital gains tax.
But several hidden perils that lie in the path of such a course of action
should be briefly noted here even though their discussion is deferred
to a later point in this article.' 4 First, corporate accumulation of
earnings in excess of the reasonable needs of the business may invoke
a penalty tax on the corporation in the amount of 27Y25% of accumulated taxable income up to $100,000 and 3812% of such income in
excess of this amount.' 5 Second, if the corporation falls into the category of a personal holding company the tax penalty for accumulation
is even more severe.1 6 Third, the liquidation of a corporation or the
sale of its stock can have surprisingly unpleasant consequences to the
shareholders if the corporation is a "collapsible" that has been used
as a device for attempting to convert ordinary income into capital
gain.' 7 Statutory guards such as these illustrate the continuing effort
of Congress to keep pace with the fertile imagination of the taxpayer.
The recognition of a corporation as a separate entity carries with
it easily identified tax disadvantages. If a corporation that has not
elected pseudo-corporate status has losses, they are losses of the corporate taxpayer, not deductible by the equitable owners of the business.
Accordingly, if a new business anticipates early losses there may be
loMaximum rate on long-term capital gain is 25%. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§1201 (b).
'lINT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§331 (a), 1201 et seq.
121d. §§1221 et seq.
"Id. §1014. For federal tax purposes, the basis of property is determined by
the manner in which the property was acquired. (1) If acquired by purchase, the
basis is cost, id. §1012, in general increased by the cost of improvements and decreased by amounts allowed or allowable for depreciation. Id. §1016. (2) Property
acquired by gift has the same cost basis in the hands of the donee as it had in the
hands of the donor, possibly increased by tax paid on the gift, for purposes of any
subsequent determination of gain to the donee. Id. §1015 (a), (d), as amended in
1958. (3) In general, property acquired from a decedent takes a basis equal to
its fair market value at the date of death. Id. §1014.
24See Green and Palmer, Tax Traps and Danger Signals in the Life of a Small
Corporation, 7 J. TAXATION 130 (1957).
1SINT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§531 et seq.; see notes 238-66 infra and accompanying text.
GIrNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§541 et seq.; see notes 182-89 infra and accompanying
text.
17INT. REV. CODE OF

1954, §341; see notes 217-37 infra and accompanying text.
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advantages in choosing a proprietorship or partnership as a form of
business organization rather than the corporate form so that the
owners can charge such losses against other personal income. A taxfree incorporation can be accomplished later if desired.' 8 It is early
to attempt to say with assurance how far the new elective provisions
may affect this choice. 19
In like vein, a deduction for intangible drilling costs 20 might be
worthless taxwise to a corporation set up for the purpose of an oil
venture but highly useful to the business owners having other personal
income. Such businesses have usually been careful to avoid the status
2
of "associations," which are taxable as corporations. '
Can the Business Owners Afford to Incorporate?
This preliminary question should obviously be raised in each
instance before the wheels of incorporation start to roll. 22 It is raised
here with respect to the immediate tax cost. The general answer is
that it is not expensive taxwise to incorporate; that is, a business can
usually be incorporated without immediate adverse tax consequences. 23
The problem is viewed first from the point of view of the shareholders
and then from that of the corporation.
The Shareholder. If a new business is simply started from scratch
and each shareholder acquires stock for cash, such acquisitions have
no immediate tax consequences; ordinarily, the mere purchase of
property does not give rise to taxable gain. 24 But of course this is not
usually the case; incorporation may involve the conversion of a going
REV. CODE OF 1954, §351 (a).
'OSee notes 136-51 infra and accompanying text.
20INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §263 (c). See also id. §§612-13, relating to depletion
allowance.
2
lINT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §7701 (a) (3).
22
See, e.g., Kumler, Contributions and Distributionsof Property in Kind to and
by Corporations, 33 TAxEs 938 (1955); Pennell, Tax Planning at the Time of Incorporation, 35 TAxEs 927 (1957); Stutsman, supra note 1; Young, Problems in
Organizing and Capitalizing New Organizations, N.Y.U. 14TH INsT. ON FED. TAx.
ISINT.

613 (1956).
2

CODE OF 1954, §351; for an elementary discussion see STANLEY and
GumE TO THE LAw 144-49 (3d ed. 1955).
24Compare Palmer v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 63 (1937), and Fred Pellar, 25
T.C. 299 (1955), acq., 1956-1 CuM. BuLL. 5, with Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S.
243 (1956). See also 1 MErTENs, FEDaERAL INCOME TAXATION §5.13 (rev. ed. 1956).
3INT.

REV.

KiLuLLEN, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX-A
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partnership or sole proprietorship to the corporate form or the transfer of property other than money to the new corporation. Such transactions involve transfers of property in exchange for stock, and this
raises a red flag, for an exchange is likely to be a taxable event producing realized and recognized gain.25 Would X transfer property
with a basis of $10,000, but now worth $100,000, to a corporation in
exchange for stock if he were to be taxed on $90,000 gain? He would
want to think that over. Fortunately, however, a basic nonrecognition section of the Code provides against the recognition of gain (or
loss) upon such transfers solely in exchange for stock or securities if
26
immediately after the transfer the transferors control the corporation.
As regards formation of a new corporation, the control requirement is
met if the several incorporators, that is, all those transferring property27 to the corporation, receive collectively at least 80% of the
stock. The transfers need not be simultaneous if they are all a part
s
of an integrated transaction.2
The 1954 Code simplifies the rules for tax-free incorporation by
eliminating a proportionate interest requirement imposed by the
predecessor provision of the 1939 Code. 29 The stock issued to each
transferor need not, under present law, be in direct proportion to
the value of the property interests he transferred to the corporation.30
However, even though the basic nonrecognition provision permits
the creation of disproportionate interests, the legislative history of
the new provision cautions that if an interest in the corporation disproportionate to the value of the property transferred to the corporation is acquired by any shareholder, immediate gift or income tax
liability can result from the application of other principles of tax
law. 3 1 Here is an illustration from the Report of the Senate Finance
2
Committee:
25E.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§61, 1001-02; Treas. Reg. §§1.61-6, 1.1001-1 (a);
Regals Realty Co., 43 B.T.A. 194 (1940), aff'd, 127 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1942).
26INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §351. The term control is defined to mean ownership of 80% of the combined voting power and 80% of all other classes of stock.
Id. §368 (c).
27Stock issued for services is not issued for "property." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,

§351 (a).
2STreas. Reg. §1.351-1 (a) (1), e.g., R. M. Gunn, 25 T.C. 424 (1955).
29Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §112(b) (5).
3OTreas. Reg. §1.351-1 (b) (1).
31S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 264 (1954).
321bid.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol11/iss4/4

6

Stephens and Freeland: The Commissioner and the Corporation
THE COMMISSIONER AND THE CORPORATION 515
"For example, if individuals A and B, father and son, organize
a corporation with 100 shares of common stock and A transfers
property worth $80 in exchange for 20 shares of stock, while
B transfers property worth $20 to the corporation in exchange
for 80 shares of stock, no gain or loss will be recognized under
section 351. If, however, it is determined that in fact A has
made a gift to B, it is your committee's intention that such
gift would be subject to tax under the provisions of section
2501 and following. Similarly, if, in the preceding example, B
had rendered services to A and the disproportion in the amount
of stock received constituted, in effect, the payment of compensation by A to B, it is your committee's intention that such
compensation will be appropriately taxed. B will be taxable
upon the fair market value of the 60 shares of stock received
in excess of that received in exchange for his property as an
amount received as compensation for services rendered, and
A will realize gain or loss upon the difference between the
basis of the 60 shares of stock in his hands and its fair market
value."
These principles are echoed in the regulations. 83
The general effect of this change may be summarized by saying
that under prior law a disproportionate distribution of stock rendered the nonrecognition provisions and their related basis rules
wholly inapplicable to the incorporation;34 under the present law the
nonrecognition provisions remain generally applicable despite a disproportionate distribution. However, the new provision is interpreted to mean that one who receives less than his proportionate interest in the corporation may have made a gift 5 or may have realized gain as on a disposition of some of his shares, 3 and one who
receives more than his proportionate interest may actually be receiving
37
a nontaxable gift or taxable compensation.
A so-called tax-free incorporation, such as we have been discussing,
may have some immediate tax impact upon the shareholders beyond
33Treas. Reg. §1.351-1 (b) (1), (2).
34E.g., Sparks v. United States, 55 F.Supp. 941 (M.D. Ga. 1944); see STANLEY
and KILcULLEN, THE FEDERAL INcoME TAX-A GuME TO THE LAw 171-76 (2d ed.

1951).
5

1954, §2511.
3STreas. Reg. §1.351-1 (b) (2), Example (1).
S37bid.
3 INT. REV. CODE OF
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the consequences that attend a disproportionate distribution of the
stock. For example, if A owns a valuable manufacturing business including plant and equipment and B, who is in no way related to A,
has substantial cash, they may decide for legitimate business reasons
to pool their assets and incorporate the business. If A's building
and equipment are worth $200,000 and B will contribute only
$150,000 and they wish to be equal owners of the corporation, they
may agree that A will receive half the stock and $50,000 cash upon
incorporation, whereas B will receive only half the stock for his
$150,000. A's transfer is not "solely in exchange for stock," for he
gets stock and $50,000 to boot. If the control and other requirements
for a tax-free incorporation are satisfied, the congressional scheme
here is to tax A on any gain he realizes only to the extent of the
boot.38 Thus, for example, if the value of the shares received by A
plus the $50,000 he received in cash exceeds his basis for the property
he transferred to the corporation by $60,000, A is taxed on $50,000 of
such gain. A is taxed on his realized gain to the extent of the boot
in recognition of a sale of his interest in the property to that extent,
rather than a retention of a full equitable interest in what he transferred.
Boot need not of course be cash.39 Generally, that which can be received tax-free is only stock or securities; all other property including
money is boot, which may result in some immediate tax liability.
However, the corporation's assumption of a liability of a shareholder
is not treated as the receipt of boot, unless the purpose of such assumption is tax avoidance or at least is not a bona fide business pur40
pose.
A quasi tax-free incorporation, such as is suggested above, is il41
lustrated in the regulations as follows:
"A, an individual, transfers to a controlled corporation
property with an adjusted basis of $10,000 in exchange for
stock of the corporation with a fair market value of $8,000,
38INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §351 (b). Loss is not recognized in a boot transaction.
Id. §351 (b) (2).
39E.g., Rev. Rul. 56-303, 1956-2 Cum. BULL. 193.
4OlNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §357 (b); Treas. Reg. §1.357-1 (c).

See also INT. REV.

CODE OF 1954, §357 (c), providing a special rule for cases in which the liability assumed exceeds the basis of the property transferred.
41Treas. Reg. §1.357-1 (b), Example, which assumes an unobjectionable assumption of liabilities.
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$3,000 cash, and the assumption by the corporation of indebtedness of A amounting to $4,000. A's gain is $5,000, computed as
follows:
Stock received, fair market value
Cash received
Liability assumed by transferee
Total consideration received
Less: Adjusted basis of property transferred
Gain realized

$ 8,000
3,000
4,000
$15,000
10,000
$ 5,000

Assuming that the exchange falls within section 351 as a transaction in which the gain to be recognized is limited to 'other
property or money' received, the gain recognized to A will be
limited to the $3,000 cash received, since, under the general
rule of section 357 (a), the assumption of the $4,000 liability
does not constitute 'other property.'
A substitute basis rule accompanies the nonrecognition provisions.
If an incorporation is entirely tax free, involving no boot, each
shareholder's basis for the stock he receives is the same as the adjusted basis he had for the property he transferred in exchange for
his stock. 42 This general basis rule often converts the nonrecognition
provisions from a tax exemption to a tax deferment. The shareholder's
subsequent sale of his stock at a price in excess of his basis for the
property contributed to the corporation will result in recognized gain
4
at the time of sale. 3
Just as boot affects the possible recognition of gain, it bears also
on the determination of basis. The usual substitute basis that an
incorporator has for his stock is subject to three adjustments. First, if
he is in receipt of boot, his basis for his stock is decreased by the
amount of such boot.4 4 For example, re-examine the illustration
above of a quasi tax-free incorporation. Under the general substitute basis rule, A's basis for his stock would be $10,000. But the
$3,000 cash received will reduce A's basis by $3,000.
Second, for this purpose only, the assumption of liability by the
corporation is treated as money received by the shareholder. 45 Thus,
42

1NT. REv. CODE OF

1954, §358 (a) (1).

43But see id. §1014, providing for a tax-free change in basis upon a shareholder's death; see note 13 supra.
44
1NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §358 (a) (1) (A).
45This rule applies whether the corporation assumes a liability or takes prop-
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although he is not immediately taxed as a result of the assumption of
his obligation, such assumption does operate, as in the case of boot that
is taxed, to reduce the shareholder's basis for his stock. In the above
example, this will result in a further $4,000 reduction in the basis A
has for his stock.
Third, an upward adjustment in basis is provided. The usual
substitute basis is increased by the amount of any gain recognized in
6
connection with the shareholder's exchange upon incorporation.4
This must be viewed in the light of the recognition rules applicable
to boot and to the assumption of indebtedness. Gain is recognized
to the extent of boot, and so to that extent a shareholder's gain increases his basis for his stock; if realized gain and boot are equal, this
merely results in a wash, since the respective basis adjustments offset
each other. On the other hand, since the assumption of liabilities
generally does not result in a recognition of gain, it generally does
not result in any increase in basis to offset the downward adjustment
occasioned by treating such assumption as boot for basis purposes.
Return again to the above illustration of a quasi tax-free incorporation. The $3,000 downward adjustment in basis occasioned by
the receipt of cash and the further downward adjustment of $4,000 for
assumption of an obligation have been explained. After these adjustments to the usual substitute basis of $10,000, in this illustration
A would hold his stock with a basis of $3,000. But he is entitled to
an increase in basis in the amount of $3,000, the extent to which his
realized gain is recognized. Thus, his adjusted basis for his stock is
$6,000.47
The Corporation. When a business is incorporated the corporation,
as well as the shareholder, is a party to an exchange, since it issues
stock for property contributed by the incorporators. Nevertheless, the
Code specifically provides that gain or loss to the corporation upon
the receipt of property in exchange for its stock is not recognized.45
An accompanying basis rule should be expected and indeed is to be
erty subject to a liability.

INT. REV. CODE OF

1954, §358 (d).

46d. §358 (a) (1) (B).
47If the assumption of A's liability had been for tax avoidance purposes or
lacking a bona fide business purpose, so that it would be treated as a receipt of
money by the shareholder, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §357(b), such assumption
of liability would then support an upward adjustment in basis of $2,000, since
additional gain in that amount, the balance of the entire gain realized, would
have been recognized.
48INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1032 (a).
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found in section 362. In general the corporation gets a basis for contributed property equal to the basis it had in the hands of the con49
tributor.
Variations from the usual rule for determining the corporation's
basis arise when the incorporation is not wholly tax free to the
contributing shareholders. For example, in a "boot" situation in
which a shareholder is taxed on all or a part of his gain, the corporation's basis for contributed property is adjusted upward to the
extent of the shareholder's gain that was recognized. 50 Return once
more to the illustration above of a quasi tax-free incorporation. There
the cash received by A resulted in a recognition of $3,000 gain to him.
Thus, the $10,000 substituted basis which the corporation would
otherwise have for the contributed property is increased to $13,000.
Again, if the corporation's assumption of a shareholder's obligation
does not result in a recognition of gain, it does not call for an upward adjustment of the corporation's basis for the property acquired.
The interrelationship of the recognition and basis rules is such that
any step-up in the basis of property that passes to the corporation is
appropriately accompanied by a corresponding recognition of gain
to the transferor.
Is Tax-Free or Quasi Tax-Free IncorporationDesirable?
Strange as it may seem, incorporation under Code section 351 may
have ultimate tax disadvantages. For a decade or more we have been
prone to think largely in terms of appreciated property because of
a remorseless rising price trend. However, it may be well to emphasize that section 351 provides not only for nonrecognition of gain
but also against any recognition of loss. If X owns property with a
basis of $100,000 that is now worth only $10,000, he should think
twice before transferring it to a corporation in a section 351 tax-free
organization. Though such an exchange would ordinarily produce
a deductible loss, the nonrecognition provision will deny him this
deduction. Moreover, if the corporation should at a later date dispose of the property, any loss then recognized would not be deductible
by the individual shareholder. 51
491d. §362 (a). However, a spedal rule applies to property contributed by one
who is not a shareholder, id. §362 (c); cf. Brown Shoe Co. v. Commissioner, 339
U.S. 583 (1950); Detroit Edison Co. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 98 (1943).
5oINT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §362 (a).

5'The shareholder can in effect claim the deduction for the deferred loss upon
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There may be a way around this problem. If the depreciated asset were sold to the corporation after its formation the vendor might
secure an immediate deduction for his loss. 5 - This is not invariably
so. If he owns more than 50% of the stock of the vendee corporation
the Code disallows his loss on the sale.5 3 Furthermore, in determining
whether an individual owns more than 50% of the stock of a corporation, stock owned by his brothers, sisters, wife, ancestors and descendants is considered owned by him.54 Thus, in general, loss on a
sale to a closely held family corporation is never deductible; and
even if the 50% ownership problem can be avoided, a shareholder's
sale to a corporation shortly after its formation may under the step
transactions doctrine be viewed as an integral part of the incorporation, with a resulting disallowance of the loss under section 351. 55
If the foregoing rules with respect to the disallowance of loss on
transfers to a corporation present an obstacle, perhaps it can be
overcome by a sale to another incorporator prior to incorporation.
The vendor would contribute the cash received on the sale of the
property rather than the property itself, and the purchaser who otherwise would have contributed cash will contribute the property. The
danger of defeat here is again the possible application of the step
transactions doctrine. 56 If the steps are telescoped the supposed sale
disposition of his shares, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §165 (c), but such loss will usually
be capital loss affording only limited tax relief, id. §§1211-12, whereas loss on the
property itself probably would have given rise to an ordinary loss deduction, id.
§1231. Under §§1242 and 1244, added in 1958, loss on stock in a so-called small

business investment company and on stock in a "small business corporation" is
sometimes relieved of capital loss restrictions.
5 2
1NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 165.
53Id. §267 (a) (1), (b) (2); e.g., Moore v. Commissioner, 202 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1953);

cf. McWilliams v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 694 (1947). There is a general discussion
of this provision in Kutz, Transactions Between Related Taxpayers, N.Y.U. 13TH

INST. ON FED. TAx. 69 (1955). See also notes 154-60 infra and accompanying text.
5
41NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §267 (c). For a critical discussion of this and other
attribution rules see Schlesinger, Tax Traps and Disasters in the Ubiquitous and

Uncoordinated Attribution Rules, 8 J. TAXATION 271 (1958).
55E.g., Sylvester W. Labrot, 18 B.T.A. 332 (1929), aJ'd, 57 F.2d 413 (D.C. Cir.

1932).
56The doctrine is of judicial origin. E.g., Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.,
324 U.S. 331 (1945); Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609 (1938); United
Light & Power Co. v. Commissioner, 105 F.2d 866 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S.
574 (1939); Starr v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 964 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S.
680 (1936); Ahles Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 71 F.2d 150 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
293 U.S. 611 (1934); duPont v. Deputy, 23 F. Supp. 33 (D. Del. 1938). The doctrine
has received limited statutory recognition in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §267 (a) (1),
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may be viewed administratively or judicially as merely a facet of the
incorporation; or it may be regarded as a sale to the corporation itself
subject to the rules of section 267 on the disallowance of losses on
such sales. In an analogous situation the Treasury has recently been
57
successful in advancing the sale-to-the-corporation argument.
The 80% control requirement of section 351 may afford a means of
escape from its nonrecognition rule. If those who transfer property
to a corporation do not wind up with such control, their transfers
for stock are taxable transactions on which gain or loss is recognized
as far as that section is concerned. If some stock is to be issued for
past services, such services are not "property," 8 and if the service
shareholder acquires in excess of 20% of the stock the incorporation
is not within the scope of section 351. 59 But escape from section 351
leaves open the question of disallowance of the loss under section
267.60
A second, less dear-cut reason for not wishing to incorporate within the nonrecognition provisions can arise with regard to property
the value of which is in excess of, rather than below, its basis. Suppose that X owns a valuable hotel property that may be transferred to
a newly formed corporation. As a result of earlier low land and construction costs and depreciation allowable since the construction of
the hotel, X's basis for the property might be $500,000 and its present
value $1,000,000. The principal disadvantage in transferring the hotel
pursuant to the nonrecognition provisions is that the corporation will
acquire the property with X's low basis, which will restrict the corpowhich provides in substance that "No deduction shall be allowed .
of losses from sales or exchanges of property .

.

.

. in respect

. directly or indirectly, between"

certain persons within the specified relationships. (Emphasis supplied.) For general
discussion of the development and use of this doctrine see 3 MRTENS, FEDERAL
INcOME TAXATION, §§20.161-.166 (rev. ed. 1957); PAUL and ZMmr, SEECrED STUDIS
IN FEDERAL TAXATION 200 (2d ser. 1938); Gutkin, Step Transactions, N.Y.U. 9TH
INsT. ON FED. TAX. 1219 (1950); Mintz and Plumb, Step Transactions in Corporate
Reorganizations, N.Y.U. 12TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 247 (1954).
57Robert Boehm, 28 T.C. 407 (1957), afJ'd, 255 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1958).
5sINT. R v. CODE OF 1954, §351 (a).
59It has been suggested that issuance of a substantial portion of callable, nonvoting preferred stock to an outsider in return for services may accomplish the
objective of defeating the control requirement of §351. Teschner and Sorden,
Stepped-up Basis Assets Transferred to Newly-Formed Corporation, 5 J. TAXATION
32 (1956). But there are perils here if the transaction is a mere artifice. Cf.
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
6oCf. Prentice D. Moore, 17 T.C. 1030 (1951), aff'd, 202 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1953).
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ration to depreciation on $500,000 rather than the present value of
$1,000,00061

and burden the corporation with a substantial gain on

a future sale of the property. A fully taxable incorporation, which
may be attainable in the manner suggested above,6 2 will overcome

this disadvantage.63 On the other hand, on the facts being considered
X would have a recognized gain of $500,000; even if this received
capital gain treatment, 64 the resulting tax of $125,000 might seem too
high a price to pay for securing a stepped-up basis for the corporation. However, if X has losses that will substantially offset the $500,000 gain, there may be no tax cost. It has been suggested that such
65
an exchange might be made for short-term notes of the corporation.
66
While this presents other questions soon to be discussed, it might at
least enable X to elect the benefit of the installment sales provisions
and thus to spread the recognized gain and the resulting tax over
6
the years during which the notes are to be paid. 7
If X is of very advanced years, it may be that he should retain
title to the property in the circumstances suggested and lease the
hotel to the corporation. This might have an adverse effect on the
corporation's credit, but the tax advantages could be substantial. If
X is the owner of most of the stock of the corporation, it might be
possible to transfer the property to the corporation after X's death
in a tax-free transfer.6s However, even if the transfer at such time
were outside section 351, there probably would be no gain, because the
beneficiaries of the estate would have a new stepped-up basis for the
property equal to its fair market value at death. 69 In either event
61INT.

REV. CODE

OF

1954, §167 (f).

2

See note 59 supra; Fahs v. Florida Machine & Foundry Co., 168 F.2d 957 (5th
Cir. 1948); Mojonnier & Sons, Inc., 12 T.C. 837 (1949), nonacq., 1949-2 Cu,.1. BULL.
4.
6

6sSee Lowrimore, How to Minimize Taxes on Transfers to Controlled Corporations Under 1954 Code, 2 J. TAXATION 66 (1955).
641Nr.

REV. CODE OF

1954, §1239, sometimes converts gain to ordinary income

if the transferor owns more than 80% of the stock in the corporate transferee.
65Bittker, Thin Capitalization:Some Current Questions, 10 U. FLA. L. REV. 25,
33 (1957).
66
See "The Capital Structure," "Debt or Equity" infra.
671NT. REV. CODE OF

1954, §453. In the case of capital gain that is subject only

to the maximum 25% rate, such spreading will not reduce the tax but will defer its
payment, giving the taxpayer temporary use of the tax money.
68§351 is not limited to transfers made at the time of incorporation. Treas.
Reg. §1.351-1 (a) (1).
69INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1014 (a); see note 13 supra.
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the corporation would acquire the property with a high basis equal to
its present value, which would be advantageous to the corporation
for purposes of depreciation or determining gain or loss on a subsequent sale.
It must be recognized, of course, that, if the property had been
transferred by X in a section 351 transfer, upon his death the estate
or his beneficiaries would get a new stepped-up basis for his stock in
the corporation." But stock is not depreciable, and there may be
advantages to stepping up the basis for the hotel over advantages that
might follow from a stepped-up basis for the stock. Indeed, in the
event of a transfer to the corporation after death, both stock and
hotel would have the desired high basis.
The CapitalStructure
Debt or Equity? A question here is whether the original contributors to the enterprise should acquire in part a creditor status rather
than simply an equity interest in the corporation. One tax consideration bearing on this question is that interest paid by a corporation on
a loan is deductible by the corporation, 71 whereas no such deduction
is available for the payment of dividends on stock. 72 Shifting perspective to the shareholder, it will make comparatively little difference
to him whether he receives interest or dividends,7 3 although dividends
now qualify for a very limited exclusion 74 and a modest credit against
tax. 75 Accordingly, partial debt financing may have advantages in
reducing the corporation's taxable income without a corresponding
increase in the taxable income of the shareholders.
Other advantages of partial debt financing may be even greater.
If the corporation prospers, and hope springs eternal, the time may
come when shareholders wish to withdraw money from the corporation and, of course, to withdraw it without burdensome tax consequences. The repayment of bona fide loans involves no adverse tax
7olbid.
71INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 163 (a); see, e.g., Wilshire and Western Sandwiches,
Inc., 175 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1949).
72See The Colony, Inc., 26 T.C. 30 (1956), aff'd on other grounds, 244 F.2d 75
(6th Cir. 1957), rev'd on other grounds, 357 U.S. 28 (1958); Ryan Contracting Corp.,
15 CCII Tax Ct. Mem. 999 (1956).
73Both are taxable as ordinary income. INT. Ray. CoDE OF 1954, §61.
74INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, §116.
751d. §34.
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consequences.7 6 However, if all the corporate capital is represented by
stock interests, tax-free withdrawals from the corporation are severely hampered. The danger is that a redemption of stock by the corporation at a time when it has earnings and profits will be treated as
essentially the equivalent of a dividend and, accordingly, that the
distribution in redemption will be taxed as ordinary income. 77 It is
true that the Code specifies some circumstances in which a redemption
of stock by a prosperous corporation will not have such disastrous
consequences, 78 but none of these provisions contemplates a taxfree ratable withdrawal by shareholders of part of their initial equity
investment, such as may be possible through the repayment of loans7 9
G6The repayment of principal is simply a tax-free return of capital. In Doyle
v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185 (1918), the Court stated: "In order to determine whether there has been gain or loss, and the amount of the gain, if any,
we must withdraw from the gross proceeds an amount sufficient to restore the capital value that existed at the commencement of the period .... ." A general discussion of this fundamental concept appears in MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME C. 9 (rev.
ed. 1945).
771NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §316(a), provides: "[T]he term 'dividend' means
any distribution of property made by a corporation to its shareholders- (I) out
of its earnings and profits accumulated after February 28, 1913, or (2) out of its
earnings and profits of the taxable year . . . [and] every distribution is made out
of earnings and profits to the extent thereof ....
" Id. §317 (a) defines property
to include "money, securities, and any other property." Pursuant to id. §301 (b)(1) (A), the amount of any distribution is "the amount of money received [by an
individual shareholder], plus the fair market value of other property received."
The fair market value of such property is determined at the date of distribution.
Id. §301 (b) (3). Except for the minor dividend exclusion, the portion of every
corporate distribution that is a dividend is includible in gross income by the
shareholder-recipient. Id. §301 (c) (1). To the extent that the amount distributed,
either in money or property, exceeds the corporation's current earnings and those
accumulated since Feb. 28, 1913, the Code provides special treatment. See id.
§§301 (c) (2), (3); Treas. Reg. §§1.301-1 et seq., 1.316-1 et seq.; notes 199-216 infra
and accompanying text; Andrews, "Out of Its Earnings and Profits": Some Reflections on the Taxation of Dividends, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1403 (1956).
78E.g., disproportionate redemptions of stock, INT. REV. CODE §302 (b) (2); distributions in partial liquidation, id. §§346, 331 (a) (2); Joseph Imler, 11 T.C. 836
(1948), acq., 1949-1 CUM. BULL. 2; see notes 202-16 infra and accompanying text.
79To the deduction and withdrawal advantages that may result from recognized
partial debt financing a very speculative advantage should be added. Under 1958
amendments to INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§1242-1244, there are now some circumstances in which loss on corporate stocks or bonds are specifically accorded ordinary loss treatment. In circumstances in which these new provisions do not apply,
upon failure of a corporation an investor with a creditor status may have a slightly
better chance to claim a business bad debt deduction for his advances than an

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol11/iss4/4

16

Stephens and Freeland: The Commissioner and the Corporation
THE COMMISSIONER AND THE CORPORATION

525

None of the advantages suggested above will be achieved if what
purports to be partial debt financing is not recognized as such. The
commissioner and the courts have shown remarkable perspicacity in
identifying the equity wolf that hides under the creditor mantle.80
There are several approaches to official frustration of a seemingly well
laid plan. The doctrine of thin incorporation (an excessive ratio of
debt to stock) is apparently becoming established as an independent
ground for treating supposed indebtedness as equity capital,8' although it may never be possible to answer precisely the question: How
thin is too thin? 2 The doctrine of substance-versus-form reflects another approach. If, after all is said, the court remains "unpersuaded
8
that ... [the taxpayers] became . . . [the corporation's] creditors," 3
their alleged creditor interest will be classified as a shareholder interest. Finally, the intention of the parties has been used as a test to
determine whether an alleged debt is a debt. 4 This elusive triumvirate of principles, each of which seems to be gaining in stature, preinvestor who is only a shareholder. Id.. §166 (a); compare Giblin v. Commissioner,
227 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1955), reversing 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1009 (1954), with
Commissioner v. Smith, 203 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1953), reversing 17 T.C. 135 (1951).
If successful, the loss of the investment will be deductible from ordinary income,
whereas a nonbusiness bad debt, Ir. REv. CODE OF 1954, §166(d), or a loss from
securities becoming worthless, id. §165 (g), gives rise only to a capital loss. The
nature of the deduction should turn on whether the taxpayer has merely made
a loan to the corporation or whether he is engaged in the business of making loans
to corporations.
80A determination that an arrangement does not create a bona fide indebtedness
but reflect instead an equity interest produces a double tax disadvantage. Not only
will the alleged repayment of principal be treated as essentially the equivalent of
a dividend but the corporation will be denied a deduction for supposed interest
payments. E.g., Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir.
1956), affirming 23 T.C. 408 (1954); 1432 Broadway Corp., 4 T.C. 1158 (1945),
aff'd, 160 F.2d 885 (2d Cir. 1947). For a general discussion of the Gooding Amusement case see Rabin, The "Clifford Case" of the Thin Corporation, 34 TAxES 282
(1956).
siSee, e.g., Erard Matthiessen, 16 T.C. 781 (1951), aff'd, 194 F.2d 659 (2d Cir.
1952); Isidor Dobkin, 15 T.C. 31 (1950), aff'd, 192 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 911 (1951); The Colony, Inc., supra note 72; Robert L. Osborne,
13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 428 (1954).
S2See Schlesinger, Acceptable Capital Structures: How Thin Is Too Thin?, 5
U. FLA. L. Rav. 355 (1952).
83Kolkey v. Commissioner, 254 F.2d 51, 54 (7th Cir. 1958), affirming 27 T.C.
37 (1956).
84Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 80; Sam Schnitzer, 13
T.C. 43 (1949), aff'd, 183 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1950).
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sents formidable obstacles in the path of one who seeks to achieve tax
advantage by way of loans to a corporation in lieu of equity investment in the enterprise. A safe path through these obstacles remains
to be charted. The problem has captured the fancy of legal scholars
85
and authors
and has in recent years been the subject of two penetrating articles in this Review.6 Accordingly, it is left with no more
than brief reference in this article.
Capitalization of a corporation presents problems beyond the
question of equity or debt financing; thought must be given as well
to the nature of the stock that is to be issued. For example, in Florida
the state capital stock tax may differ in amount and complexity of
computation depending on whether par or no-par value stock is
issued.87
Preferred Stock.

The incorporators should consider an initial

issuance of some preferred stock. 88 A nontax reason would be the
desire of the principal incorporators to bring in outside capital
without substantially diluting their own equity interests, in which
case such stock might be sold to outsiders at the time of formation
or later. However, the point made here is that tax reasons may
suggest an initial issuance of preferred to the principal incorporators
themselves. This does not disturb the tax-free nature of the incorporation. s 9 More important, it creates a class of stock that the incorpo85E.g., Anderson, "Thin" Corporate Capitalizations, U. So. CAL. 9TH TAX INST.
35 (1957); Kahn, How to Plan a Safely Thin Corporation in the Face of Today's
Obstacles, 8 J. TAXATION 341 (1958); Manly, What to Do About the New Intent
Test in Thin Incorporations;More on Gooding, 5 J. TAXATION 379 (1956); Rabin,
Fat Advantages of the Thin Corporation, 32 TAXS 572 (1954); Spanbock, Carro

and Katz, Nourishing the Thin Corporation, 34 TAXES 687 (1956); Weyher and
Weithorn, Capital Structure of New Corporations, N.Y.U. 16TH INST. ON FED. TAX.
277 (1958); Note, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 1054 (1955). A summary of the problem
appears in Note, 35 TAXEs 880 (1957).
86Bittker, supra note 65; Schlesinger, supra note 82.
S7FLA. STAT. §608.33 (1) (1957) provides a schedule of taxes with respect to the
value of capital stock outstanding. Usage and construction of the statute indicate
that "value" refers to par value, which may be only a nominal amount per share,
whereas no-par value stock is presumed to have a value of at least $100 per share.
The presumption may be overcome only by attaching a summary financial statement to the capital stock tax return, by which proof is adduced that the intrinsic
value of such stock is less than $100 per share. Id. §608.33 (4).
SSThis will, however, preclude election of pseudo-corporate status. See note 4
supra.
89INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §351; see "Can the Business Owners Afford to In-
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rators may subsequently sell to outsiders (1) without upsetting control and (2) at capital gains rates. As regards common stock initially
issued, its sale to outsiders generally benefits from capital gain treatment too, but its sale may alter the shareholders' controlling interests
in the corporation. Preferred stock distributed after incorporation
when the corporation has earnings and profits may be subject to
special rules under section 306, explained below, which sometimes
denies capital gains treatment of gain realized on its disposition.
While this appears to raise problems concerning the operation rather
than formation of the corporation, they are problems that should be
anticipated at the time of formation. Therefore, a digression is made
here for the purpose of a brief discussion of sections 305 and 306,
which contain the principal statutory rules on stock dividends.
The basic question here is whether, after successful operation resulting in the accumulation of substantial earnings and profits, a
corporation can protect its shareholders from burdensome taxes that
would fall upon a cash distribution by distributing instead a dividend in its own stock. Until recently there has been considerable uncertainty as to whether or when a stock dividend could be taxed. In
general, the courts sought to deal with the problem by adoption of
the principle that a stock dividend that altered the proportionate
interests of the shareholders resulted in a realization of taxable income,90 but the principle was not easy to apply.9
corporate?" supra.
90S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 241 (1954).
9OThe taxation of stock dividends has had a long history. The beginning was
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), in which the Supreme Court held that
a dividend of common stock on common stock did not constitute taxable income
within the meaning of the 16th amendment, for the reason that such a dividend did
not alter the stockholder's intrinsic proportionate interest in the corporation. In
1986 Congress enacted §115(f) (see Int. Rev. Code of 1939), which in substance
provided that a stock dividend constituted taxable income to the extent that such
distribution was income within the meaning of the 16th amendment. In Helvering
v. Griffiths, 818 US. 871 (1943), the Court had occasion to consider the effect of
§115 (f) with respect to a dividend of common stock declared on outstanding common, the only stock outstanding; and, interpreting the statute in the light of the
Macomber case instead of reconsidering that decision, held that such a dividend
was not taxable to the recipient. See also the companion cases of Helvering v.
Sprouse and Strassburger v. Commissioner, 818 U.S. 604 (1943), holding nontaxable, respectively, dividend of non-voting on voting and nonvoting common,
and dividend of preferred on outstanding common when only common stock was
outstanding. But see Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441 (1936), involving basis
for determination of gain upon redemption of preferred stock on which dividend

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1958

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 4 [1958], Art. 4
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
Under prior law, if a stock dividend could be distributed tax-free,
the dividend stock could probably be disposed of later at capital
gains rates. Of course the recipient of a tax-free dividend must allocate a portion of his basis for the underlying stock to the dividend
stock,92 which will ultimately affect his gain or loss on the sale of
the stock on which the dividend was issued.
The use of preferred stock as a nontaxable dividend by which the
earnings and profits of the corporation could be siphoned off or
bailed out at capital gains rates met with surprising success prior to
the enactment of the 1954 Code.9 3 The new Code plugs the gap by
taking a fresh approach to an old problem. The circumstances in
which preferred stock can be issued as a tax-free stock dividend are
broadened, 94 but onerous tax consequences attend the disposition or
redemption of such stock if it is so-called section 306 stock. Generally,
section 306 stock is preferred stock issued as a nontaxable stock diviof common had been issued when both preferred and common were outstanding.
The Court held that because the issuance of the common was a taxable dividend
no part of the basis of the underlying preferred could be allocated to the common.
92INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §307; Treas. Reg. §1.307-1 (a). The allocation is
made as follows: A owns one share of common stock with a cost basis of $150 and
receives one share of preferred stock of the same corporation as a stock dividend.
Assume that immediately after issuance of the stock dividend the fair market
value of the common stock is $240 and of the preferred is $120. The basis of
the existing common stock is allocated between the existing stock and the new
stock in proportion to the fair market values of each on the date of distribution.
The basis of the new preferred stock is $50, computed as follows:
$120 (FMV pfd. stock)
x $150 (basis) =$50
$360 (FMV all stock)
The basis of the share of common stock is $100, computed as follows:
$240 (FMV common stock) x $150 (basis) = $100
$360 (FMV all stock)
31n Chamberlin v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1953), reversing 18
T.C. 164 (1952), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 918 (1954), stockholders of a corporation
obtained capital gains treatment upon the sale of preferred stock issued to them
as a nontaxable stock dividend at a time when the issuing corporation had sizable
earnings and profits. The sale of the stock was negotiated prior to the dividend
and occurred three days after its distribution.
941NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §305 (a). Stock dividends are taxed only if "the distribution is made in discharge of preference dividends for the taxable year of the
corporation in which the distribution is made or for the preceding taxable year;
or if the distribution is, at the election of any of the shareholders ....
payable"
in stock or property. Id. §305(b). See id. §301; the corporation recognizes neither
gain nor loss in any event upon the distribution of its stock as a dividend. Id.
9

§311 (a).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol11/iss4/4

20

Stephens and Freeland: The Commissioner and the Corporation
THE COMMISSIONER AND THE CORPORATION 529
dend 5 at a time when the issuing corporation has either current or
accumulated earnings and profits. 98 This is the reason the incorporators should consider the issuance of some preferred stock at the
time of incorporation. Stock once tainted by section 806 is difficult
to decontaminate. For example, it remains section 806 stock in the
hands of a donee; 97 and hot stock, as it has come to be called, passes
its section 306 characteristics on to other stock acquired for it in a
tax-free exchange, even if such other stock is common stock.98
Upon a sale or disposition of section 806 stock, unless the shareholder disposes of his entire interest in the corporation, 99 the proceeds
of such disposition are treated as ordinary income to the extent
that the stock sold would have been a dividend to the shareholder
when the stock was issued if the corporation had distributed cash in
lieu of the stock. 00 To this extent no allowance is made for the
basis of such stock.' ° ' The basis of section 306 stock is relevant, however, if the amount received upon a sale of the stock exceeds the
amount that would have been a dividend had the corporation distributed money in lieu of such stock. The amount of the proceeds that is
not taxed as a dividend is applied against the basis of the stock,102
and any amount in excess of such basis is treated as gain from the
sale of the stock and thus capital gain if the stock is a capital asset.10 3
The following example appears in the regulations:30 4
"On December 15, 1954, A and B owned equally all of the stock
of Corporation X which files its income tax return on a calendar.
95See note 94 supra. Common stock issued on common is expressly excluded
from the definition, but in other circumstances common can be §306 stock. Treas.
Reg. §1.306-3 (c); Rev. Rul. 57-182, 1957-1 CuM. BuLL. 115.
96INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §306 (c).

97Treas. Reg. §1.306-3 (e).
981bid.
.o9The attribution rules, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §318, artificially ascribing
ownership of stock to one who is not in fact the owner, must be carefully considered by one who claims to have disposed of his entire interest. Id. §306 (b) (1).
The central
2ooINT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §306 (a) (1); Treas. Reg. §1.306-1 (b) (1).
question here is the extent of the corporation's earnings and profits at the time the
stock dividend was distributed. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §801 (c)(1).
loiSee note 92 supra.
1O2INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §306 (a) (1) (B) (ii).
10d. § §306 (a) (1) (B), 1221-23. The holding period to determine whether gain

is long term is determined with reference to the date on which the shareholder
acquired the underlying stock. Id. §1223 (5).
IO4Treas. Reg. §1.306-1 (b) (2), Example (1).
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year basis. On that date Corporation X distributed pro rata 100
shares of preferred stock as a dividend on its outstanding common stock. On December 15, 1954, the preferred stock had a
fair market value of $10,000. On December 31, 1954, the earnings and profits of Corporation X were $20,000. The 50 shares
of preferred stock so distributed to A had an allocated basis
to him of $10 per share or a total of $500 for the 50 shares.
Such shares had a fair market value of S5,000 when issued. A
sold the 50 shares of preferred stock on July 1, 1955, for $6,000.
Of this amount $5,000 will be treated as gain from the sale of
property which is not a capital asset; $500 ($6,000 minus
$5,500)1°5 will be treated as a gain from the sale of a capital
or non-capital asset as the case may be."
If the proceeds from the sale or other disposition of section 306
stock exceed the amount treated as ordinary income but such excess
does not equal the full cost basis of the section 306 stock, then the
regulations permit the unused basis of such stock to be added back to
the basis of the underlying stock with respect to which the preferred
stock was distributed.10 6 No loss is recognized upon a sale of section
10 7
306 stock.
A redemption of section 306 stock by the distributing corporation
is the subject of a special rule that differs from the rule applied to
sales or other dispositions. The entire amount received is treated as a
dividend to the extent of current and accumulated earnings and profits
of the corporation at the time of such redemption,10 8 unless the redemption terminates the entire interest of the shareholder in the corporation. 10 9 Two differences from the treatment of other dispositions
sOSThe $5,500 figure is made up of the $5,000 taxed as ordinary income and the
$500 basis that A had for the preferred stock.
lO6Treas. Reg. §1.306-1 (b) (2), Example (2); see Bittker, Stock Dividends, Distributions in Kind, Redemptions and Liquidations Under the 1954 Code, U. So. CAL.
1955 TAX INsT. 349, 396. If the taxpayer no longer has the underlying stock, perhaps the Red Queen knows what to do with the unused basis, but the commissioner
has not said. There is, however, no §306 problem if the result of the sale is a
complete termination of the shareholder's interest in the corporation. See note 99
supra.
107INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §306 (a) (1) (C).
1081d. §306 (a)(2). "In the case of a redemption, the amount of the earnings
and profits of the distributing corporation at the time the section 306 stock was
distributed is immaterial." Treas. Reg. §1.306-1 (c).
109INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§306(b)(1)(B), 302(b)(3). There are other excep-
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should be noted. First, "dividend" treatment is provided, not merely
treatment as "ordinary income." 110 Second, the portion of the amount
received that gets dividend treatment is made dependent, not upon
the corporation's earnings and profits at the time the section 306
stock was issued, but instead upon earnings and profits at the date of
redemption.?"'
Must a shareholder owning section 806 stock resign himself to
the burdensome tax consequences? Possibly not. As previously indicated, no section 806 difficulties are encountered if the shareholder
sells or disposes of all his stock in the corporation, or if the corporation redeems all the stock of the shareholder, or if there is a redemption in partial or complete liquidation."

2

Moreover, even if

the shareholder sells or the corporation redeems the tainted stock it
may be possible for the shareholder to escape the impact of section 806
if it is established to the satisfaction of the commissioner that the
distribution and the disposition or redemption were "not in pursuance of a plan having as one of its principal purposes the avoidance
3
of Federal income tax.""
Section 806 stock may be useful for making gifts to charity. The
shareholder holding stock that is admittedly tainted may effect a
charitable gift of such stock without adverse tax consequences; a gift
tions; see id. §307 (b), concerning the issuance of stock rights.
old. §306 (a) (2). Thus §34 (dividend credit) and §116 (dividend exclusion)
may apply to some extent in the case of redemptions of §306 stock.
121See note 108 supra. This is a mixed blessing. A nominal amount of earnings
and profits upon issuance may stamp the 306 label on the stock, §306 (c) (2); then
large earnings upon the redemption date will mean a large dividend upon redemption. However, smaller earnings upon redemption (or none) can reduce (or eliminate) the amount taxed as a dividend. In contrast, the amount of ordinary income
from any other disposition of §306 stock is pegged to earnings and profits at the
time of issuance. Of course an escape from the §306 classification is not complete
assurance against dividend treatment on a redemption, §302. For more detailed
treatment of §306 and related problems see Brodsky and Pincus, The Case of
the Reappearing Basis, 34 TAXEs 675 (1956); Gelbert, Preferred Stock Bail-Outs

Under the New Law, N.Y.U. 13TH INsr. ON FED. TAx. 597 (1955); Harris, The
Status of PreferredStock Bail-Outs, 34 TAXs 403 (1956).
1121NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §306 (b).
1131d. §306 (b) (4). If there is a prior or simultaneous disposition or redemption
of the underlying stock, the shareholder need only establish that the disposition or
redemption was not in pursuance of such a plan; the motive in distributing such
stock is then not relevant. Treas. Reg. § 1.306-2 (b) (3). See also Rev. Rul. 56-223,
1956-1 CuM. ButL.. 162; Rev. Rul. 56-116, 1956-1 Cum. BuLL. 164; Rev. Rul. 57-103,
1957-1 Cum. BuLL. 113.
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of section 306 stock is not a taxable disposition. 114 By making a gift
of the stock, the shareholder will achieve a charitable deduction equal
11
to the fair market value of the stock at the time of the gift. 5 If
generosity is not the answer, the shareholder's age and patience may
suggest other escapes from section 306. One of advanced years may
desire to retain his entire interest in the corporation and pass it on
to the objects of his bounty at his death. The beneficiaries will receive the 306 stock decontaminated"" and may sell the stock without
adverse tax consequences' 1 7 But an initial issuance of some preferred
may still be the best escape or partial escape from some of the section
306 problems that have been discussed.
Deduction of OrganizationalExpenditures
Prior to the enactment of the 1954 Code, as now, state taxes incurred upon the filing of the certificate of incorporation and upon
issuance of stock or bonds were deductible as taxes by the newly formed
corporation,"1 , but there was little or no opportunity for the recovery,
immediate or otherwise, of organizational expenditures such as attorney's fees for the preparation of the certificates of incorporation" 19
l14Rev. Rul. 57-328, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 229.
§170; Treas. Reg. §1.170-1 (b); see Campbell v.
Prothro, 209 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1954); White v. Brodrick, 104 F. Supp. 213 (D.
Kans. 1952).
116"Section 306 stock ceases to be so classified if the basis of such stock is determined by reference to its fair market value on the date of the decedent-stockholder's death . . . under section 1014." Treas. Reg. § 1.306-3 (e). See also S. REP.
No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 245 (1945).
1171f stock is redeemed after a person's death to pay federal or state death
taxes and certain expenses, and if the decedent's stock in the corporation constitutes more than 35% of the gross estate or more than 50% of the taxable estate,
the redemption is treated "as a distribution in full payment in exchange for the
stock so redeemed." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §303 (a). (Emphasis added.) It has
been suggested that §306 stock, which is treated the same way, be issued to the
stockholders of a family corporation for such purposes. Harris, supra note 111.
This permits liquidity for the payment of death taxes and expenses while continuing control in the manner desired.
"LSlnt. Rev. Code of 1939, §23 (c). Under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §164 (a), this
deduction is continued. Federal stamp taxes were not and are not deductible as
taxes. Id. §164 (b); Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §23 (c). But such taxes incurred in connection with the issuance of bonds could be deducted by way of amortization, since
bonds have a determinable life. I.T. 3806, 1946-2 CuM. BULL. 41; Brown & Sons
Lumber Co., 26 B.T.A. 1192 (1932).
lx9Cf. Whitman & Sons, Inc., 11 B.T.A. 1192 (1928), acq., VII-2 Cum. BULL. 43
115INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
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or fees (as opposed to taxes) paid to the state of incorporation upon
the filing of the certificate of incorporation.120 Such expenditures are
not current expenses and must be capitalized if not expressly deductible in the manner of taxes.121 But once capitalized there was no
period over which they could be written off if the life of the corporation was perpetual, and under prior law such expenditures merely
hovered about like Peter

Pan

1 22

23
until dissolution of the corporation.1

Under the 1954 Code organizational expenditures may be treated
as deferred expenses and amortized over a period of not less than
sixty months. 124 The statute permits the election of a longer period,
which may be desirable for a new corporation that anticipates some
loss years before there will be earnings against which the deductiori
can be applied. The Treasury recognizes that the new provision applies to "legal services incident to the organization of the corporation, such as drafting the corporate charter, by-laws, minutes of
organizational meetings, terms of original stock certificates, and the
like; necessary accounting services; expenses of temporary directors
and of organizational meetings of directors or stockholders; and fees
(1928); F. Tinker & Sons Co., 1 B.T.A. 799 (1925).
12O.T. 3468, 1941-1 Cum. BuLL. 231; see FLA. STAT. §608.05 (1957).
121Southeastern Express Co., 19 B.T.A. 490 (1930), rev'd on other grounds, 56
F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1932); cf. Mid-State Products Co., 21 T.C. 696 (1954), acq., 1955-2
Cum. BuLL. 7.
122The authors acknowledge their indebtedness to Mr. Arthur B. Willis (HANDBOOK OF PARTNERsmp TAXATioN, P-H 1956) for suggesting the relationship between
Peter Pan and federal taxes. A deduction for amortization, similar to the deduction
for depreciation, proceeds upon the principle that the asset has a fixed or determinable useful or economic life. INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, §167; cf. Nachman v. Com-

missioner, 191 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1951); Adda, Inc., 9 T.C. 199 (1947), acq., 1949-1
Cum. BuLL. 1. Compare Hershey Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 43 F.2d 298 (10th Cir.
1930), allowing amortization of such expenses over the 20-year period of the corporation's charter, with Wisconsin Land & Lumber Co., 1928-1932 P-H B.T.A. Mem.
32,239 (1932), in which the Board of Tax Appeals in denying such deduction
ratably over the 30-year period of the corporation's life expressly refused to follow
the Hershey decision.
I23Shellabarger Grain Products Co. v. Commissioner, 146 F.2d 177 (7th Cir.

1944); Malta Temple Ass'n, 16 B.TA. 409 (1929), acq., XIII-2 Cum. BULL. 12 (1934).
1241NT. RFv. CODE OF 1954, §248 (a). The term organizational expenditures
means expenditures that are (1) incident to the creation of a corporation, (2)
chargeable to the capital account of the corporation, and (3)of a type which, if
expended incident to the creation of a corporation having a limited life, would be
amortizable over such life. Id. §248 (b). "An expenditure which fails to meet each
of these three tests may not be considered an organizational expenditure for purposes of section 248 ...." Treas. Reg. §1.248-1 (b) (1).
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paid to State of incorporation." 125 The election applies only to qualified expenditures paid or incurred before the end of the taxable year
in which the corporation begins business, 26 and this election must
be made in a timely return for that year."2 7 If no election is made,
the Treasury now acknowledges that organizational costs may be recovered over the period of the corporation's life in the case of a corporation having a fixed life;" 5 but if the corporation's life is perpetual
such expenditures are recoverable only upon dissolution. 29
PART

II.

CLOSE CORPORATIONS

A corporation that is owned and controlled by a single individual
or a small group of individuals is descriptively called a close corporation. The term is not recognized in the Internal Revenue Code,
but a number of important rules of tax law bear directly on and have
special significance for such corporations. There are three general
classes of such rules. Some are statutory and are expressly made applicable or not, depending upon ownership of the corporation. Others,
while statutory, are not expressly dependent upon ownership but are
nevertheless most likely to be applied to close corporations. Finally,
the close corporation encounters a number of nonstatutory rules
that have emerged from administrative action and court decisions as
130
a kind of common law of federal taxation.
Statutory Rules Depending upon Ownership
31
Comments through"Every tax is in some measure regulatory."
out this article reflect the extent to which tax considerations may dictate the form in which a business is operated. But not every tax is

125Treas. Reg. §1.248-1 (b) (2).

"Expenditures connected with the transfer of

assets to a corporation" are placed outside the provision. Id. §1.248-1 (b) (3).
126INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §248 (c). Treas. Reg. §1.248-I (a) (3) suggests the
meaning of the term begins business.
12TIbid.; Treas. Reg. §1.248-1 (c).
"2SSee note 122 supra. It appears that today the Treasury would apply the
rule of Hershey Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 122, to a fixed life corporation not making a §248 election, since Congress has apparently sub-silencio given
its approval to the rule. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §248 (b); see notes 122, 124 supra.
l29See notes 122-23 supra.
laOSee Ericksen, The Common Law of Federal Taxation, 7 U. FLA. L. REv. 178

(1954).
"3'Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937).
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deliberately regulatory and in recent years Congress has taken two
significant steps designed to permit "businesses to select the form of
business organization desired, without the necessity of taking into
account major differences in tax consequence."' 132 This statement,
quoted from the Senate Finance Committee Report, is almost incredibly naive; it is more than ever necessary to consider tax consequences. But it is true that since 1954 certain proprietorships and
partnerships have been permitted to elect to be taxed as if they were
corporations; 133 and in 1958 Congress adopted companion provisions
that relieve some corporations from conventional corporate tax treatment.1 3 4 The more recent provisions introduce what is coming to be
known as the pseudo corporation, a kind of push-me-pull-you that
can look one way to secure limited liability under the local law and
at the same time look the other way to escape burdensome corporate
taxes.
The Pseudo Corporation. The new provisions are available only
to the "small business corporation," which must meet a six-point
test. It must be (1) a domestic corporation and (2) not a member of
an affiliated group; and it must not (3) have more than ten shareholders (and thus must be a close corporation), (4) have shareholders who are other than individuals or estates, (5) have any nonresident alien shareholders, or (6) have more than one class of stock.135
Moreover, even such a corporation loses the benefits of the new provisions if in any year more than 80% of its gross receipts is from
sources without the United States or more than 20% of its gross re1 6
ceipts is from "personal holding company income."'
Pseudo corporation status is elective. Whether the election should
be made is a matter calling for careful case-by-case analysis, and a
wealth of secondary material is becoming available to aid in the
decision.137 Until the Treasury issues regulations under the new pro'32S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1958).
33
1 1NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §1361; see Brown, Electing to Be Taxed As Domestic
Corporations- Section 1361, U. So. CAL. 1955 TAx INsT. 281.
134INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§1371-77.
135Id. §1371 (a).
136Id. §1372(e)(4),(5). The term personal holding company income as used
in §1372 (e) (5) is not synonymous with "personal holding company income" under
§543.
137Meyer, Subchapter S Corporations,36 TAXEs 919 (1958); Roberts and Alpert,
Subchapter S: Semantic and Procedural Traps in Its Use; Analysis of Dangers, 10
J. TAxATION 2 (1959); Robinson, How to Make Election to Avoid Corporate Tax
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visions,1 3s which may be some time, the election may be perilous.1 3 9
Only a few possibilities of the newly recognized tax status are suggested here.
If a business that fits the pseudo corporation requirements has
been operated as a corporation only to secure limited liability, perhaps it should make the election. An effect will be to have the shareholders taxed directly on the corporate income without any intervening corporate tax. In this fashion the old double tax is avoided,140
which will probably be advantageous if all the income was going to
be distributed to shareholders in any event.
A curious feature of the new provisions seems to permit arbitrary
shifting of income between two taxable years. Dividends actually
distributed are taxed to a shareholder for the year in which he receives them.141 Shareholders are also taxed on corporate income that
is not distributed,142 but these amounts are income to shareholders
for their year "in which or with which the taxable year of the corporation ends."' 14 Thus, if the corporation and its shareholders have
different taxable years, which is not foreclosed,14 4 a limited amount
of shifting from one year to another is apparently possible by the
judicious timing of dividend distributions.
The new provisions also permit a shareholder of a pseudo corporation to treat as long-term capital gain his share of the corporation's
net long-term capital gain over short-term capital loss.14 s In contrast,

any gain of a nonelecting corporation will be taxed as ordinary in4
come when it reaches the shareholders as a dividend.1 G
Under New Subchapter S,9 J. TAXATION 264 (1958); Partnership or Corporation
Under the 1958 Tax Law (Res. Int. of Am. 1958); Tax-Option Corporations
1958); S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 87-89, 216-26 (1958).
(CCH
13 STemporary regulations indicating only "how, when, and where" to make
the election have been published. T.D. 6317, 1958-41 INT. REv. BULL. 77.
139In an analogous situation in the absence of final regulations under INT. Rv.
CODE OF 1954, § 1361, Congress has provided an escape from pre-regulation elections.
Pub. L. No. 85-866, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. §63 (1958).
14oSee note 4 supra and accompanying text.
141S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 219 (1958). Such amounts are not
"dividends" under INT. RaV. CODE OF 1954, §§34, 37, 116.
142INr. REV. CODE OF 1954, §1373 (b). Such income will not again be subjected
to tax when actually distributed, but the details are left to be worked out in the
regulations. Id. §1375(d).
1431d. §1373 (b).
144Cf. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §706 (b), relating to partners and partnerships.
1

45

INT. REv.CODE OF

1461d.

1954,

§ 1375 (a).

§301 (c).
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Perhaps the most intriguing feature of the pseudo corporation is
that its losses can be deducted by its shareholders., 7 This is a natural
corollary to the direct taxation of shareholders on the corporate
earnings. But, again, the effect of the loss pass-through provision is
to permit the shareholders to deduct business losses without foregoing desired limited liability. In the final analysis this may work a
change in the common practice of early operation of a business in
noncorporate form to secure individual deduction for initial losses,
followed by incorporation when the business becomes profitable. The
election, which might be made at first, is revocable if all the shareholders agree 4s and terminable automatically under some circum49
stances that are within the control of the directors.
In many respects the new provisions are amazingly liberal, but
there is at least one respect in which they are not. If an electing
corporation is owned by several members of a family, the commissioner is given the authority to apportion corporate income among
such family members in such a way as to reflect the value of the
services rendered to the corporation by its shareholders. 150 This restricting provision is patterned after a comparable section applicable
to family partnerships,15' but there is no corresponding statutory
provision applicable to corporations generally.
Within the scope of this article it is not possible to develop
fully the pros and cons of the new corporate provisions, but perhaps
enough has been said to suggest some of the possibilities that should
be explored. We now turn to tax principles applicable to close
corporations generally.
The Close Corporation Generally. Even if a corporation is given
general tax recognition as an entity separate and distinct from its
owners, this hardly means that a shareholder will deal with a corporation that he largely owns in the same fashion as he would deal with
strangers. 5 2 Accordingly, in some situations the tax laws take a
1471d.

§1374.

1481d. §1372 (e).
1491bid.

1sold. §1375 (c).
'511d. §704 (e).
152A closely held corporation has been characterized as "a kind of captive other
person, a sort of slave under the complete domination of its stockholder-officer
masters whose close relationship provides no barrier against corporate action
directed primarily for the benefit of the stockholders." Lourie, Using the Closely
Held Corporation for Investment Purposes, N.Y.U. 12TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1191
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second look at transactions to see whether a shareholder's interest in
a corporation is being used to give him an unintended tax advantage.
For example, if a shareholder owns property with a tax basis higher
than its market value, he may be entitled to a deduction for loss on
the sale of such property at the market price. 15 3 But should such a
loss deduction be allowed upon a sale to a corporation if the seller's
ownership of the corporation is such that it renders the transaction
little more than a sale to himself? The Code supplies a negative
answer to this question if the individual owns more than 50% in
value of the corporation's stock.15 4 For this purpose Congress has
looked beyond formal individual ownership; stock owned by members
of the shareholder's family is attributed to the shareholder in applying
the more-than-fifty-per-cent ownership test. 1 55 The section applies as

well to deny a deduction for loss on a sale by a corporation to its
shareholder 56 and for losses on sales between two corporations if the
same individual owns more than 50% in value of the stock of such
corporations and one of the corporations is a personal holding company.15 7 The proscription applies to sales made either "directly or
indirectly," and accordingly a deduction has been denied when a
taxpayer owning substantially all the stock of three corporations sold
shares of stock at a loss to her "in-laws," who in turn sold the shares
at the same price to the taxpayer's corporations 58
(1954). See also Alter, The Family Business, N.Y.U. 16TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 755
(1958); Powers, Cross Fire on the Close Corporation:Norms versus Needs, 11 U.

Ft-A. L.

REV.

433, 435-36 (1958).

S3INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §165 (c), limits the circumstances in which an in-

dividual can claim such a loss deduction.
4
15 1NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § §267 (a) (1), (b) (2). Such losses had been disallowed
prior to adoption of a specific statutory rule, Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940);
and the regulations recognize that the statutory provision is not exclusive, Treas.
Reg. §1.267 (a)-l (c). Losses may be disallowed even though §267 does not apply,
e.g., M. Greenspun, 3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 341, 356 (1944), rev'd on other grounds,
156 F.2d 917 (5th Cir. 1946).
1SSINT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §267 (c) (2); the family of an individual includes
ancestors, and lineal descendants." Id.
"his brothers and sisters .... .spouse,
§267 (c) (4). See Carson, Transactions Between Related Taxpayers, N.Y.U. 16TI
INST. ON FED. TAX. 853 (1958); Schlesinger, Tax Traps and Disasters in Ubiquitous

and Uncoordinated Attribution Rules, 8 J. TAXATION 271 (1958).
156E.g., Hosch Brothers Co., 3 T.C. 279 (1944).
157INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§267 (a) (1), (b) (3); if neither is a personal holding
company, the loss may still be disallowed if the sale lacks reality. E.g., Crown Cork
International Corp., 4 T.C. 19 (1944), aff'd, 149 F.2d 968 (3d Cir. 1945). Personal
holding companies are discussed in the text accompanying note 182 infra.
1SsRobert Boehm, 28 T.C. 407 (1957), afl'd, 255 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1958). But
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The tax basis of the property in the hands of the acquiring corporation is the purchase price of the property despite the fact that a
deduction for loss on the sale has been denied the seller-stockholder. 159
On the other hand, this seemingly harsh result is partially mitigated
by a new rule which provides in substance that gain on a subsequent
disposition of the property will be recognized only to the extent that
such gain exceeds the amount of the loss not previously allowable as
a deduction. 1 0

Expenses or interest, which would ordinarily be taken into account
in determining taxable income,1 6 1 in some circumstances are denied to
a close corporation. 162 If the corporation is on the accrual basis and
a cash method shareholder who owns

63

more than 50% of the corpo-

ration's stock is the one to whom payment is to be made, the corporate deduction is lost unless payment is made within the tax year
in which the item accrued or within two and one half months after
its close.6 4 For example, if a close corporation employs one of its
principal owners, the corporation may lose its deduction for his
salary to the extent that his salary payments are delayed. Thus, although motive is not a determining factor, the statutory provision
forecloses or penalizes manipulation of such a shareholder-employee's
salary into a more convenient tax year. But, in line with this objective, constructive receipt by the shareholder-employee within the
permitted period satisfies the statutory requirement165 And, of course,
as regards indirect sales compare Maurice B. Saul, 6 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 734
(1947), with Norton v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. La. 1956), and
McWilliams v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 694 (1947).
150S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 227 (1954).
'1OLbid.;INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §267 (d).
161Id. §§162 (a), 163, 212.
1621d. §267 (a). The section can, of course, apply, e.g., to expenses or interest
owed a corporation by its principal shareholder, but this is unlikely.
l63Attribution rules apply again. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §267 (c); see note 155
supra.

4
16 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §267 (a) (2). Even if the accrued expenses or interest
are eventually paid, once denied under §267 (a) (2) the deductions are forever lost.
Treas. Reg. §1.267 (a)-1 (b) (2).
l6sTreas. Reg. §1.451-2; see Weil v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1949);
Ross v. Commissioner, 169 F2d 483 (Ist Cir. 1948). Payment by check within the
period is sufficient, J. D. O'Connor, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 623 (1954), if not a
mere "paper transaction," H & H Drilling Co., 15 T.C. 961 (1950); and the issuance
of notes may constitute payment, Musselman Hub-Brake Co. v. Commissioner, 139
F.2d 65 (6th Cir. 1943); Rev. Rul. 55-608, 1955-2 CuM. BuLL. 546; Treas. Reg.
§1.267 (a)-1 (b) (3), if the debtor is solvent and the transaction is not a sham. Wollner
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the statute does at least permit a salary or other payment to be deducted in one year but taxed to the shareholder recipient the next
year, if payment is made within the two and one half month period.166
A shareholder's sale to a close corporation at a gain is sometimes
not accorded conventional tax treatment. Suppose, for example, a
person in his individual capacity owns a truck that he has used in his
personal business and that the truck has been fully depreciated for
tax purposes. 167 The truck may still have substantial economic value
and may be useful in the business of a corporation largely owned by
the individual. Cannot the truck owner reason that by selling the
truck to the corporation for $2000, he will have a gain of only that
amount, which gain will be subject to a maximum capital gains tax
of 25%,168 and that the corporation will then be able to claim $2000
depreciation on the truck as a deduction that will offset corporate
income otherwise taxable at 52%?169 Once again the Code provides
a negative answer. To prevent just this type of bootstrap operation restoring basis at capital gains rates so as to permit a related person
or entity to claim depreciation against ordinary income - Congress
adopted a provision that sometimes taxes the gain in such circumstances at ordinary income rates.170 But this provision is more lenient
than its counterpart concerning losses171 in three respects: (1) it applies only to the sale or exchange of property that is depreciable in the
hands of the transferee; 172 (2) it applies only if the selling shareholder owns more than 80% in value, not merely more than 50%, of
the outstanding stock;- 3 and (3) for the purpose of applying the
"more than 80% in value of the outstanding stock" test the statute
attributes to the shareholder ownership of stock owned only by his
Mfg. Co., I CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 830 (1943).
1661NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §267 (a). See Mundet Cork Corp., 7 CCH Tax Ct.

Mem. 411 (1948), afJ'd, 173 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1949).
167Under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §1016, the tax basis of depreciable property is
reduced by the amount of depreciation allowed or allowable as a deduction with
respect to such property under §167.
1681NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§1201-02. Though the truck is not a capital asset,
since it is property used in the trade or business and subject to depreciation, id.
§1221 (2), nevertheless its sale at a gain would generally produce a tax at capital
gain rates. Id. §1231.
169INT. REV. CODE OF

1954, §11.

17ld. §1239.
1711d. §267; see note 154 supra and accompanying text.
172INT. REV. CODE OF

1954, § 1239 (b).

17"Id. §1239 (a) (2).
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spouse, minor children and minor grandchildrenY74
Similarly, a transfer of a patent by a shareholder to a close corporation may be denied favorable tax treatment otherwise available
under the 1954 Code. Under prior law there was often serious question whether a patent was a capital asset and, if so, whether its
disposition constituted a sale or exchange, so as to bring into play
the capital gains provisions, or merely resulted in royalties taxable
as ordinary income." 5 In a move "to provide an incentive to inventors to contribute to the welfare of the Nation,176 Congress
adopted a new provision that will usually supply the capital gains
answer. 77 At the same time, in order to "prevent possible abuses
arising from the sale of patents within essentially the same economic
group,"' 78 the new provision is made inapplicable to a transfer between a shareholder and a corporation that he controlsY79 The fact
that the benefits of the new provisions may be denied by subsection
1235 (d) does not entirely foreclose capital gains treatment; it merely
raises the capital asset sale or exchange questions that arose under
prior law. 8 0 However, it is possible that in such circumstances section
1239 will dictate ordinary income treatment.' s
Earlier in this article references have been made to the so-called
personal holding company. The potential tax avoidance that is
thwarted by special provisions aimed at such companies relates to the
attempt by taxpayers to insulate themselves taxwise from income de174Ibid.
17sCompare, e.g., Kronner v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 730 (Ct. Cl. 1953), and
Edward C. Myers, 6 T.C. 258 (1946), nonacq., 1950-1 Cum. BULL. 7, with Mim.
6490, 1950-1 Cum. BULL. 9.
176S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 439 (1954).
'.77 Nr. REv. CODE OF 1954, §1235.
178S. RE'. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 441 (1954).
17 1Nr. REv. CODE OF 1954, §1235 (d). The control or relationship test is essen-

tially that of id. §267 (b) with a minor modification; see notes 154, 155 supra and
accompanying text.
'80Cf. Treas. Reg. §1.1235-1 (b).
'SiSee text accompanying notes 170-74 supra. There are provisions not discussed in this article that affect close corporations. E.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§1237, modifies capital gains treatment on the sale of real estate in certain instances and provides that holders of tracts of real estate will not be considered as
holding such property for sale to customers (and so to lose such favored treatment)
simply because the real estate has been subdivided, provided that among other
things the property has not been substantially improved by the taxpayer. An
improvement is deemed to have been made by the taxpayer, however, if it was
made by a corporation controlled by him. Id. § 1237 (a) (2) (A).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1958

33

Florida Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 4 [1958], Art. 4
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
rived largely from investments while maintaining economic control
of such income through a corporation owned by them. A person with
substantial investment income subject to high individual rates would
obviously like to fragmentize his income and avail himself of lower
tax rates by incorporating his pocketbook. 82 Can he then organize
a corporation, transfer to it his income-producing securities, and permit the income to accumulate in the corporation at a maximum rate of
52%? If so his economic worth will increase while he saves taxes to
the extent of the difference between the corporate rate and his personal tax bracket. Again Congress has adopted provisions intended to
prevent individual taxpayers from utilizing a close corporation as a
tax shelter. 83 Personal holding companies are defined in terms of the
character and sourc2 of their income and the nature of their ownership. Under the statutory two-fold test a corporation is a personal
holding company if: (1) 80% or more of the corporation's gross income
is derived from investments,84 and (2) more than 50% in value of
the outstanding stock of the corporation is owned, directly or indirectly, by not more than five individuals.18 5 Both tests must be met,
and the usual effect of the second is to limit the application of the
provision to close corporations. It might appear that an individual investor could achieve his insulation objective simply by causing the
stock ownership in a corporation to be diversified throughout his
family among more than five individuals, but stock ownership attribution rules again block such a course of action. For this purpose
an individual is considered to own stock that is owned directly or indirectly by or for his family, which includes his brothers, sisters,
spouse, ancestors and lineal descendants. 8 6
The statutory scheme is to subject personal holding companies to
a dividend-forcing device; so-called "undistributed personal holding
company income"' 87 suffers a near-confiscatory tax, which is in ad182See H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); 1939-1 CUM. BULL. 554,
562.
'83INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§541-47. The personal holding company provisions
are discussed in Greenfield, Personal Holding Company Dangers and How to Meet
Them, N.Y.U. 13TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 823 (1955), What to Do About Personal

Holding Companies, 2 P-H

TAX IDEAS

f70 17 (1954).

1S4 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §543. The provision is somewhat broader than this

generalization would indicate; see note 187 infra; Levine, Gross Income in the

Personal Holding Company, 9 TAX L. REV. 453 (1954).
1851NT. REV. CODE OF

1954, §542 (a) (2).

§544 (a) (2).
1SIn general, under id. § §543 (a) and 545, "undistributed personal holding com1861d.
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dition to other corporate taxes. On the first $2000 of undistributed
personal holding company income the tax rate is a flat 75%, and on
all amounts of such income in excess of $2000 the rate is 85%.1s8 The
general effect of these provisions is to pry open the pocketbook and
thus to prevent unintended tax advantages otherwise attainable by
use of the close corporation. The owners of a close corporation must
be alert, because if it meets the ownership test, unanticipated changes
in the corporation's income pattern can place it in the personal holding company category quite unexpectedly.189
Attempts at artificial tax avoidance through the use of controlled
corporations may take other forms. What if, for example, an individual owns one corporation that has a successful manufacturing business and another, perhaps a retail store, that is one of the customers
for the manufactured product; does this circumstance present an
opportunity for minimizing taxes? Absent a special statutory provision it clearly does. If the M (manufacturing) corporation's income
is realistically $50,000 and the R (retail store) corporation is operating only at the break-even point, M could make sales to R at less than
cost, thereby siphoning off a part of M's potential taxable income.
In this manner the taxable income of both M and R corporations
might be balanced at $25,000, the critical figure in excess of which
the corporate surtax of 22% becomes applicable. 190 If accounts were
adjusted so that each corporation had $25,000 of taxable income, the
combined tax at the normal 30% rate would be $15,000. But if M
corporation had taxable income of $50,000 and R corporation had
pany income" consists of (1) dividends, interest, and royalties; (2) gains from the
sale or exchange of stock or securities by a nondealer corporation; (3) gains from
future transactions; (4) amounts received from estates or trusts; (5) amounts received from personal service contracts performed or designated by a 25% shareholder; (6) amounts received from use of corporate property by a 25% shareholder;
(7) rental income, unless it constitutes 50% or more of the corporation's gross
income; and (8) income from mineral, oil, or gas royalties unless such royalties constitute 50% or more of the corporation's gross income; minus (a) specially described deductions, §§545 (b), 547, and (b) dividends paid or treated as paid
during the year, §§561-65.
lSSrNT. REV. CoDE oF 1954, §541. Compare penalty taxes on other corporations
unreasonably accumulating surplus, §§531-32; see note 240 infra and accompanying
text.
289See Greene and Palmer, Tax Traps and Danger Signals in the Life of a
Small Corporation,7 J. TAXATION 130 (1957).
290INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §11; if M's income were larger, at least full use
might be made of both surtax exemptions.
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none, the corporate tax on M would be $20,500.191 Seemingly ,5,500
in taxes could be saved to the equitable owner of the two corporations by simple bookkeeping entries. But it cannot. Section 482 gives
the commissioner an effective weapon for dealing with transactions
of this type by permitting him to distribute, apportion or allocate
gross income and deductions among any two or more businesses
(whether or not incorporated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, should he determine that such allocation is necessary to prevent tax evasion or clearly to reflect income.192
Accordingly, in the above example the commissioner could allocate
some or all of R's artificial income to M.19 3 While not restricted to

close corporations, this section, depending as it does upon stock ownership when applied to corporations, will most often be invoked in a
5
close corporation setting.' 9
As previously indicated, the corporation surtax exemption is such
a good thing that business owners can see a tax saving of as much as
$5,500 for each additional corporation. Furthermore, each additional
corporation may result in a similar multiplication of the $100,000
minimum credit against accumulated taxable income, since in general each corporation may claim the credit. 95 This would seem to
create a strong tax incentive to fragmentize successful corporations
in order to obtain the advantage of additional credits, but the pressure is not so strong as may at first appear. In order to minimize
191Id. §11; 30% of the first $25,000, or $7,500, plus 52% of the next $25,000,
or $13,000, equals $20,500.
l92This is not a new provision; Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §45, is identical.
193E.g., Birmingham Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Davis, 112 F.2d 453 (5th Cir.
1940); Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 234 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
296 U.S. 645 (1935). Despite the example used in the text, ulterior motive is not
a factor in determining the applicability of the section. Central Cuba Sugar Co.
v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 214 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 874 (1952). However, the provision does not authorize "violation of [the] corporate entity" according
to the commissioner's whim. General Industries Corp., 35 B.T.A. 615, 617 (1937),
acq., 1937-1 CuM. BULL. 10; the commissioner's power is only "to place a conCf. Treas.
trolled taxpayer on a tax parity with an uncontrolled taxpayer ......
Reg. 118, §39A5-1 (b).
194E.g, V & M Homes, Inc., 28 T.C. 1121 (1957). For a more detailed discussion
of §482 see Anderson, Reexamination of Commissioner's Powers to Reallocate Income and Expenses Among Related Entities Under Section 482, U. So. CAL. 10rH
TAX INST. 343 (1958); McCowan, Brother-Sister Corporations: Some Operational
Problems, N.Y.U. 16TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 305 (1958).
1951NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §535; an amendment in 1958 raised the minimum
from $60,000 to $100,000.
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just such intercorporate tax-saving devices, Congress has adopted a
provision that sometimes permits the disallowance of the $25,000
surtax exemption and the $100,000 accumulated earnings credit to
a new or transferee corporation that is controlled by the transferor
corporation, its stockholders, or both.19 Even if a valid business purpose may be established, the impact of section 1551 may nevertheless
be felt if the taxpayer cannot establish by a "dear preponderance of
the evidence" that the securing of the exemption or credit was not a
major purpose for the corporate divisions, 197 which makes this provision a far more potent weapon than a related provision authorizing
a denial of tax advantages when "the principal purpose" of an acquisition was tax avoidance. 1 8
The foregoing comments reflect a number of instances in which
Congress has acted to prevent the owners of a close corporation from
securing unintended tax benefits. A trouble area not yet mentioned
is that of corporate distributions, except that it has been pointed
out that a personal holding company may be under pressure to distribute dividends. In the case of a close corporation there is an obvious opportunity to tailor the method of corporate distributions to
fit the financial and tax circumstances of the business owners. This
19INrr. REv. CODE OF 1954, §1551.

The section defines control as "the owner-

ship of stock possessing at least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of
all classes of stock entitled to vote or at least 80 percent of the total value of shares
of all classes of stock of the corporation." With minor modification the attribution
rules of the personal holding company provisions, §544, apply.
1971d. §1551. Note, however, that the section uses the term corporation transfers
and does not expressly foreclose multiple incorporations accomplished other than
by corporate divisions.
'OSINT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §269. Compare Alcorn Wholesale Co., 16 T.C. 75
(1951), acq., 1952-1 CUM. BuLL. I, with Theatre Concessions, Inc., 29 T.C. 754
(1958), acq., 1958 P.H. FED. TAx SERv. 55,038. See also Rev. Rul. 57-202, 1957-1
Cum. BULL. 297. Sec. 1551 only partly overlaps the area covered by §269, which is
not discussed in this article. See Coastal Oil Storage v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 396
(4th Cir. 1957); Emmanuel, Section 15(c): New Teeth for the Reluctant Dragon,

8 TAx L. Rav. 457 (1953); ef. Alprosa Watch Corp., 11 T.C. 240 (1948). An analysis
of INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, §§482, 269, 1551, appears in Driscoll, Incorporating, in
Multi-Corporate Form, an Existing Business, N.Y.U. 16TH INST. OF Fm. TAx. 243
(1958); Kahn, Parent-Subsidiary Corporations, N.Y.U. 16TH INsr. ON F m. TAx.
315 (1958); Tritt and Spencer, Current Tax Problems in Incorporationof a Going

Business, U. So. CAL. 10TH TAx INST. 71, 111 (1958). See also Anderson, supra
note 194; Cuddihy, Tax, Legal and Practical Considerations in Acquisition of a
Loss Corporation, U. So. CAL. 10TH TAx INST. 303, 332 (1958); Hammett and
Greene, "Business Purpose" Is Emerging As Dominant Factor in Taxation of

Corporate Changes, 5 J. TAXATION 194 (1956).
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opportunity for artificial tax avoidance has also received the attention
of Congress. The part of the Code dealing with distributions, like
Gaul, falls essentially into three parts: 199
(1) In general, of course, distributions of a prosperous corporation to its shareholders as such are treated as dividends
and taxed as ordinary income. 200 Moreover, it is unnecessary that the distribution be called a dividend; for example,
even the receipt of cash or some types of property in an
otherwise tax-free reorganization can constitute a taxable
01
dividend2
(2) In contrast, however, the general rule is that a distribution
in complete liquidation or in partial liquidation of a corporation is to be treated as a sale or exchange of the shares
relinquished2- 2 and therefore not as a dividend.230 Since
the shares will ordinarily be capital assets, 20 4 capital gain
or loss generally results from such distributions.
(3) Distributions in redemption of stock that are not in partial
or complete liquidation of the corporation fall midway between the rules on ordinary dividend distributions and
liquidating distributions. 20 5 Such distributions are treated
as dividends, and thus ordinary income, unless the statu2 00
tory tests set forth in section 302 of the Code are met.
199INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §301 (distributions), §302 (distributions in redemption of stock), §§331, 346 (distributions in partial or complete liquidation).
2001d. § §316, 301 (c), 61 (a) (7). See note 77 supra.
2011d. §356 (a) (2).
2021d. §331 (a). The term partial liquidation is defined in id. §346; it does not
by any means embrace every reduction in capital. In general a partial liquidation
may occur when a phase of the corporation's operations is discontinued; see, e.g.,
J. Paul McDaniel, 25 T.C. 276 (1955), acq., 1956-1 Cum. BULL. 4; Joseph W. Imler,
11 T.C. 836 (1948), acq., 1949-1 CuM. BULL. 2; Sam Rosania, Sr., 15 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 580 (1956). For a general discussion see Owen, Stock Redemptions and
Partial Liquidations Under the 1954 Code, 32 TAXEs 979 (1954).
203INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §331 (b).
2041d. §1221. But see note 223 infra.
205INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §302; a redemption of stock is defined in id. §317 (b).
For a general discussion of dividend distributions, distributions in partial or complete liquidation of a corporation, and distributions in redemption of stock, see
Bittker, Stock Dividends, Distributions in Kind, Redemptions and Liquidations
Under the 1954 Code, U. So. CAL. 1955 TAX INST. 349.
206INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §302(d). See id. §§301, 316; S. REP. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 234 (1954). If a distribution in redemption of stock is held to
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Restated in positive fashion, the statute equates distributions in redemption of stock to sales of the stock, subject to capital gain treatment, if in substance such distributions are not dividends.

20

7

These are the bare bones of some highly intricate statutory provisions, 208 but their full discussion even as they relate to close corporations is beyond the reasonable scope of this brief article.209 Nevertheless, two statutory safeguards aimed primarily at close corporations
deserve mention; one relates to redemptions and the other to liquidations.
Under prior law, as at present, a redemption that was not the
210
equivalent of a dividend was accorded capital gain treatment.
Passing most aspects of the thorny problem of dividend equivalence,211
constitute a dividend, the shareholder's basis for the redeemed shares is added to
his basis for his remaining shares in the corporation. Treas. Reg. §1.302-2 (c).
207In general the Code provides three alternative standards for determining
whether a distribution in redemption of stock is to be treated as a dividend or a
sale. Capital gains treatment will result if the redemption (1) is not "essentially
equivalent to a dividend," INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §302 (b) (1) (see note 211 infra);
or (2) is substantially disproportionate, id. §302 (b) (2) (see Bernbach, Substantially
DisproportionateRedemptions Under the 1954 Act, 33 TAxEs 597 (1955)); or (3)
completely terminates the shareholder's interest in the corporation, INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954, §302 (b) (3) (see notes 213-16 infra).
2sThe legislative history is remarkably lucid. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. 230 (1954).
209See Greene and Hammett, Good and Bad Ways to Get Cash out of a Closely
Held Company, 8 J. TAXATION 218 (1958); Greene and Palmer, supra note 189;
Note, 2 J. TAxATION 283 (1955).
220Int. Rev. Code of 1939 §§1l5(c),(i), 117(a). See Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
§115 (g); INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§302 (b) (1), 346 (a) (2).
2"lThe question of whether a distribution in redemption of stock is essentially
equivalent to a dividend is primarily a factual inquiry, William H. Grimditch, 37
B.T.A. 402 (1938), which has given rise to no little confusion. In passing upon
cases involving this issue, the courts have developed certain indicia as an aid to
their determination. E.g., a prorata partial redemption of stock has generally been
treated as essentially the equivalent of a dividend. E.g., Samuel H. Kessner, 26 T.C.
1046 (1956); A. E. Levit, 43 B.T.A. 1077 (1941); cf. Treas. Reg. §1.302-2 (b); Commissioner v. Roberts, 203 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1953). But compare Commissioner
v. Sullivan, 210 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1954); Atlantic Nat'l Bank v. Fahs, 55-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. 9618 (S.D. Fla. 1955). If in substance the redemption is essentially
equivalent to a dividend, the recipient is treated as though he had received an
ordinary dividend. Hirsch v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1941); Hyman
v. Helvering, 71 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1934); cf. Smith v. United States, 121 F.2d 692
(3d Cir. 1941). However, a redemption for business purposes has been accorded
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it came to be established at least that "a cancellation or redemption
by a corporation of all the stock of a particular shareholder, so that
the shareholder cease[d] to be interested in the affairs of the corporation, [did] not effect a distribution of a taxable dividend." 21 2 The
idea, seemingly sound enough, was that such a distribution should be
equated to a simple sale of the shares redeemed, for the corporation
no longer belonged at all to the shareholder-distributee. However,
one possibility was overlooked; in the case of a close corporation one
might take quite a passive view of his entire loss of interest in a
corporation if full ownership continued in the members of his family.
For example, he might feel assured of a reacquisition of an interest
at will.
The 1954 Code deals with this oversight in the form of an attribution rule similar to those previously discussed in this article.
Although it expressly adopts the rule that a distribution in complete
213
termination of a shareholder's interest escapes dividend treatment,
stock owned by members of the shareholder's family is attributed to
him in determining if his interest is terminated.2 14 The broad attribution rule provided here, which has other applications as well, -15 is
capital gains treatment. E.g., Bona Allen, Jr., 41 B.T.A. 206 (1940) (improvement
of corporation's credit); Isaac C. Eberly, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1157 (1951) (elimination of unprofitable departments); Heber Scowcroft Investment Co., 4 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 755 (1945) (redemption to enable key employees to obtain shares
of stock in the corporation). See also Commissioner v. Snite, 177 F.2d 819 (7th
Cir. 1949); H. F. Asmussen, 36 B.T.A. 878 (1937), acq., 1938-1 CuM. BULL. 2.
212Treas. Reg. 118, §39.115(g)-l. This rule was applied even though other
members of the shareholder's family continued to own large amounts of stock
in the corporation. E.g., Ada Murphy McFarlane, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 467
(1954); Estate of Ira F. Searle, 9 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 957 (1950).
213INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §302 (b) (3).
2141d. §§302(c)(1), 318. The constructive ownership rules of §318 go beyond

the family to include partnerships, estates, trusts, and corporations. For discussion
see Frank, Know Thy Kin, 33 TAXES 409 (1955); Wolfman, Some of the Attributionof-Ownership Problems Involved in the Redemption of Stock Under the 1954 Code,
33 TAXES 382 (1955).
215E.g., a distribution in redemption that does not terminate the shareholder's

interest is still outside the dividend category if it is "substantially disproportionate"
and leaves the shraeholder with less than a 50% interest in the corporation. INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, §302 (b) (2). The attribution rules of §318 affect both the
termination of interest rule and the substantially disproportionate redemption
rule. Treas. Reg. §§1.302-2 (b), 1.302-3 (a) (3), 1.302-4. For more detailed discussion
of the attribution rules relating to stock redemptions see Laikin, Stock Redemptions: Sections 302 and 318, N.Y.U. 14TH INs-r. ON FED. TAx. 671 (1956); Roeder,
Distributions in Redemption of Stock, N.Y.U. 15TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 475 (1957);
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qualified in the case of a termination distribution; in general, the
rule does not apply if the shareholder did not acquire the stock from
a member of his family within ten years before the distribution and
if he does not reacquire an interest in the corporation for ten years
after the distribution.216 In such circumstances, the statute recognizes
a distribution in redemption as a bona fide termination of the
shareholder's interest regardless of a continuing interest in members
of his family.
The other provision aimed primarily at the close corporation is
not new, except for relatively minor 1954 changes designed to
2 17
It
strengthen it and 1958 changes designed to narrow its scope.
deals with the so-called collapsible corporation.
The collapsible may have been a useful device for converting
shareholders' ordinary income to capital gain.2'8 For example, several
Hollywood actors desiring to produce one movie might form a corporation for that purpose. Upon completion of the picture, but
prior to the realization of income by the corporation, the corporation
would be liquidated and the stockholder-actors would receive the
film and all rights thereto. The corporation would realize no gain
upon liquidation even though the value of the property distributed
exceeded the corporation's basis.219 The shareholders would receive
the property with a basis equal to its value upon distribution,220 and
under the general rule applicable to liquidations they would argue
Wilson, Stock Redemptions As Dividends, 32 TAXEs 718 (1954); Windhorst, Stock
Redemptions and Constructive Ownership Problems, 33 TAXEs 917 (1955); Winton
and Hoffman, A Case Study of Stock Redemptions Under Sections 302 and 318 of
the New Code, 10 TAx L. REv. 863 (1955).
216INr. REv. CODE Or 1954, §302 (c). This is the gist of the provision; it should
be closely examined for details. See also Treas. Reg. §1.302-4; Rev. Rul. 56-556,
1956-2 Cum. BULL. 177; Rev. Rul. 56-584, 1956-2 CuM. BuLL. 179; Rev. Rul. 57-387,
1957-35 ITr. REv. BuLL. 12.
21
7INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §341; see S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 260

(1954); S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1958).
22sWithin certain narrow restrictions the device may still be available notwithstanding Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §117 (m), and INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §341;
see Axelrad, Tax Advantages and Pitfalls in Collapsible Corporationsand Partnerships, 34 TAXES 841 (1956); Donaldson, Does the "Two-Shot" Corporation Escape
Collapsible Treatment Under Section 341?, 8 J. TAXATION 338 (1958); Glicksberg
and Stephens, Metaphorical Tax Legislation: The Collapsible Corporation, 8
WAsH. & LEE L. Rxv. 145 (1951).
21gINT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, §§336, 311 (a); cf. General Utilities & Operating Co.
v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
2

20INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §334 (a).
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2 2
that their gain should be taxed at favorable capital gains rates, '

which gain would have been taxed as ordinary income if the corporation had not been collapsed. The favorable tax objective may also
have been attainable without liquidating the corporation by the
shareholders' selling their stock in the corporation to a purchaser
who desired to own the corporate assets, which might be a movie film
or a housing project or other property usually held for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business. Whichever course was
followed, the attempt was to create economic gain in a corporation
but before the corporation realized such gain to collapse the corporation or sell its stock under circumstances that resulted in shareholder
realization only at capital gains rates and no tax whatever on the
corporation. 222 Such delightful shenanigans are impeded by current
statutory provisions.
The loophole closing provision taxes the gain on a sale of stock
in a collapsible corporation or the gain on liquidation of such a
corporation at ordinary income tax rates.2 23 But what is a collapsible?
2211d. §§331 (a) (1), 1001-02, 1201 et seq. E.g., Herbert V. Riddell, 103 F. Supp.
369 (S.D. Cal. 1952); Pat O'Brien, 25 T.C. 376 (1955). Both cases involved transactions that occurred prior to 1950, the effective date of the 1939 Code collapsible
provision, §117(m). A sale of the film would produce no additional tax if the
shareholders sold at a price equal to their new basis. In the event the film
rights were leased, the shareholder owners might incur no tax until the rental
payments received exceeded the cost basis of the film, after which the excess would
be treated as ordinary income. Pat O'Brien, supra. But cf. Commissioner v. Carter,
170 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1948).
'2See Bittker and Redlich, Corporate Liquidations and the Income Tax, 5
TAX L. REV. 437 (1950); DeWind and Anthoine, Collapsible Corporations, 56
COLUM. L. REV. 475 (1956); Glicksberg and Stephens, supra note 218; H.R. REP.
No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 96-99 (1950); S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
45, 88-91 (1950); Hearings Before Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue
Revision of 1950, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 70, 140 (1950).
22 3Under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §341 (a), "Gain from - (I) the sale or exchange of stock of a collapsible corporation, (2) a distribution in partial or complete liquidation of a collapsible corporation . . . [or] (3) a distribution made by
a collapsible corporation [pursuant to §301 (c) (3) (A)] which . . . is treated, to
the extent it exceeds the basis of the stock . . . as a gain from the sale or exchange
of property, to the extent that it would be considered (but for . . . this section)
as gain from the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than 6 months
shall . . . be considered as gain from the sale or exchange of property which is
not a capital asset." The gain is the amount received by the shareholder in
excess of his basis for his stock. Id. §§1001-02, 1011-12. The collapsible provision
does not simply treat the proceeds as a dividend, and therefore the shareholder is
(I) permitted to recover the basis of his stock tax-free as a return of capital but
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Unfortunately, but perhaps in keeping with the historical background
of the section, a subjective test is provided.224 The question is essentially whether the corporation was formed or availed of principally
for the manufacture, construction, or production of any property, or
for the acquisition of certain property, with a view to the sale or
exchange of stock by its shareholders, or a distribution of the property
to its shareholders, before the corporation has realized a substantial
part of its taxable income with respect to such property, and with
a view to the realization by such shareholders of the gain attributable
to the property. A corporation is also a collapsible if it was formed
or availed of to hold stock in a collapsible, at least until it disposes of
225
its collapsible stock.

Numerous complexities are presented by the definition and supporting provisions found elsewhere in section 341,226 which sometimes
take the form of definitions of terms followed by definitions of terms
used in the prior definitions. 227 These matters cannot all be dealt
with here. But, in broad outline, the statutory definition of a collapsible was strengthened in 1954 by the addition of a rebuttable presumption that if a substantial portion of a corporation's assets are
of the type useful in the old collapsible device (property that it has
made or purchased for the proscribed purpose), and if there is substantial appreciation in such assets over their cost or other basis (the
critical figure is a market value equal to 120% of basis) the corporation is a collapsible. 2 25

No negative assumption arises if these tests

(2) denied the dividends received credit, id. §34, and exclusion, id. §116.
224Compare the more mechanical approach to the collapsible partnership, INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, §751.
225Rev. Rul. 56-50, 1956-1 Cum. BULL. 174.
22E.g., a corporation is treated as having manufactured property if it acquired
the property in a tax-free exchange from one who did in fact manufacture it. INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, §341 (b) (2) (B). This prevents a transfer of inventory items to
a corporation for stock followed by a sale of the stock at capital gains rates.
22
71NT. R y. CODE OF 1954, §341 (b) (4), defines a term used in §341 (b) (3);
§341 (b) (3), itself a definition provision, defines terms used in the basic definition
of collapsibles.
2281N'r. REv. CODE OF 1954, §341 (c); Treas. Reg. §1.341-3 (b), Example. A corporation is formed or availed of with the proscribed view if such view existed at any
time prior to completion of the manufacture, production, construction, or purchase, Edward Weill, 28 T.C. 809 (1957), but not if this view arose subsequent to
such corporate activity, Treas. Reg. §1.341-2 (a) (3). The view requirement is satisfied "in any case in which such action was contemplated by those persons in a
position to determine the policies of the corporation, whether by reason of their
owning a majority of the voting stock of the corporation or otherwise." Treas.
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are not met.225

It is difficult to say when a corporation has realized "a substantial
part of the taxable income" from property made or otherwise acquired with the proscribed purpose. Such realization may remove a
corporation from the collapsible category, but the statute does not
explain the meaning of this phrase, and neither the regulations nor
0

the committee reports elucidate.23

Classification of a corporation as a collapsible does not invariably
result in ordinary income upon liquidation of the corporation or a
sale of its shares. For one thing, there may be a loss, and such loss
retains its character as a capital loss; moreover, if a shareholder has a
gain that is short-term capital gain it continues to be so treated. 23'
More important perhaps, there are four provisions limiting the applicability of the section.
Before enactment of the Technical Amendments Act of 1958, the
collapsible provisions were expressly inapplicable: (1) to a shareholder who never owned, or was treated as owning, more than 5% of
the corporation's stock; 232 (2) if not more than 70% of a shareholder's
gain was attributable to proscribed corporate property; 23 3 or (3) to

gain realized more than three years after acquisition of the proscribed property. 234 These restrictions remain in the Code, but,

be-

lieving that even with these restrictions the collapsible provisions
operated "frequently [to] impede or prevent legitimate business transactions,- 235 Congress in 1958 added a group of four more limited
Reg. §1.341-2 (a) (2). But the minds of such persons must be probed in circumstances in which the rebuttable presumption does not arise. J. D. Abbott, 28 T.C.
795, 806 (1957).
22 9See note 228 supra; S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 261 (1954).
23OAn answer has been attempted by legal scholars; see Anthoine, Recent Developments in Collapsible Corporations, N.Y.U. 14TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 761, 770
(1956); DeWind and Anthoine, supra note 222, at 489. But see Axelrad, supra
note 218, at 859. Of course the liquidation of a business because of the critical
illness of its principal owner and operator may escape collapsible treatment without
regard to realization by the corporation. Treas. Reg. §1.341-5 (d), Example (3).
231INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §341 (a), operates to convert to ordinary income only
gain that, but for §341, would be long-term capital gain. Treas. Reg. §1.341-4 (a).
3
2 2INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §341 (d) (1). With certain modifications the attribution rules applicable under the personal holding company provisions, id. §544, are
applied in determining stock ownership for this purpose.
2331NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §341 (d) (2).
2341d. §341 (d) (3).
235S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1958).
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exceptions to the collapsible provisions. 23 6 The new exceptions, stated
in more than four pages of intricate statutory text, are too detailed for
discussion here, but their purpose and effect are well explained in
23 7
the Report of the Senate Finance Committee.
Statutory Rules Not Dependingupon Ownership
A close corporation that escapes the personal holding company
classifications, as it will, for example, if its income is mostly from
the active conduct of a business, does not necessarily also escape the
pressure of statutory dividend-forcing devices. Other Code provisions
penalize the unreasonable accumulation of surplus by a corporation
without regard to the nature of the corporation's income and without
express concern for the manner in which the corporation's stock is
owned. 23 8 These provisions bear some resemblance to the collapsible
provisions just discussed in that their application depends in part
on subjective intent. On the other hand, their general purpose is
the same as that of the personal holding company provisions, 239 and
like them, and in contrast to the collapsible provisions, they impose
a penalty at the corporate rather than the shareholder level.
A tax of 27Y% on the first $100,000 of "accumulated taxable income" and at a rate of 38 % on such income in excess of that amount
is imposed, in addition to all other corporate taxes, on a corporation
formed or availed of for the purpose for screening shareholders from
individual surtaxes by the device of not declaring dividends and permitting earnings to accumulate in the corporation.24o The base to
which these rates are applied is not simply undistributed earnings;
the phrase accumulated taxable income is a term of art precisely
defined by section 535. In general, it is the corporation's taxable
2 6

3

INT.

REV. CODE OF

1954, §341 (e).

REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 32-35, 142-46 (1958).
S Nr. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§531-37; see Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §102. For

237S.
23

ARNINGS
general background discussion see HOLZMAN, THE TAX ON AccuMuLATED
(1956); 7 MERTENS, F DEAr.L INCOME TAXATION §39.01 et seq. (rev. ed. 1956); Barker,
Recent Section 102 Developments, N.Y.U. 11TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 97 (1952); Cary,
Current Reflections on Section 102, N.Y.U. 8TH INsr. ON FD. TAX. 1250 (1950).
239Since the two sets of provisions cover the same general area, it is not sur-

prising to find that a company that is a personal holding company is not subject
to the provisions relating to improper accumulation of surplus. INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, §532 (b).
24oINT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §531. The rates were the same under Int. Rev. Code
of 1939, §102.
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income for the year plus or minus certain specified adjustments, 2 4 1
minus the amount of dividends paid during the taxable year, including
those paid within two and one half months after the close of the
24
taxable year, 24 2 and minus the accumulated earnings credit. 3
The accumulated earnings credit, new in the 1954 Code, provides
two distinct taxpayer advantages that were unknown to prior law.244
First, the credit itself serves to reduce accumulated taxable income,
the base against which the penalty rates are applicable. The credit is
the greater of: (a) the portion of the profits for the taxable year that
are retained for the reasonable needs of the business 245 or (b) the
amount by which $100,000 exceeds the accumulated earnings and
profits of the corporation at the close of the preceding taxable year. 24 6
The minimum $100,000 credit, available without proof of need, reflects a congressional effort to give the small or newly formed corporation assurance of some opportunity to grow without exposure to
attack by the commissioner.2- 7 The amount of accumulated earnings
at the close of the preceding taxable year is determined after taking
into account dividends paid during, or within two and one half
241INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §535 (b). Among other things, the adjustments include a reduction for (I) federal income taxes and certain excess profits taxes accrued for the year; (2) the amount of charitable contributions disallowed as a
deduction under §170; (3) the amount of capital losses that are disallowed as deductions under §1211 (a); (4) the excess of net long-term capital gain for the
taxable year over the net short-term capital losses for such year, minus the tax
attributable to the excess (since the tax is deductible as a tax under number (1)
above). Some upward adjustments are also required; see Proposed Treas. Reg.
§1.535-2.
2421NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§561, 563.
243d. §535 (c).
244See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1954).
245See note 252 infra and accompanying text. However, the credit is reduced
by the excess of net long-term capital gain over short-term capital loss (less the
tax attributable to such excess). INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §535 (c) (1). The reason
is, of course, that this amount is not included in accumulated taxable income. See
note 241 supra.
2461NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §535 (c) (2), as amended in 1958; the amount previously was $60,000. Nonoperating companies that are not statutory personal holding
companies (see note 239 supra) are allowed only the minimum $100,000 credit. Id.
§535 (c) (3). Some corporations are denied any credit. Id. § 1551; see text accompanying note 196 supra.
247"Under present law [referring to Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §102, before the
minimum credit was added] small corporations are frequently unable to accumuS. REP.
late funds needed for expansion because of the threat of section 102 .
No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1954).
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months after the close of, the year; 248 but if such earnings amount

to $100,000 there is no minimum credit for the current year, and any
accumulation must be sustained, if it can be, upon the basis of the
24
reasonable needs of the business.

9

The second 1954 innovation in this area reflects a Mikado-like
effort to make the punishment fit the crime. Under prior law, when
the section was found applicable there was no reduction in the base
to which the penalty surtax was applied even if some of the accumulation was clearly supported by reasonable business needs.250 Now,
the penalty is reduced to the extent that an accumulation is found
reasonable even if it is in part unreasonable.2 5 1 Moreover, the new
law, in contrast to the old,252 expressly permits the reasonably anticipated needs of the business to be taken into account in determining
253
whether or to what extent an accumulation is improper.
Although as indicated above the application of section 531 depends
upon a subjective test, a corporation's accumulation of earnings has a
24 8

INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § §535 (c) (4), 563 (a).
249The Treasury recognizes that "the provision for the minimum credit shall
[not] in any way create an inference that an accumulation in excess of [$100,000]
is unreasonable." Proposed Treas. Reg. §1.535-3(b)(2); see S. REP. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 317 (1954).
250S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1954).
2SlINT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §535 (c) (1).
252In Trico Products Corp. v. McGowan, 169 F.2d 343 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 899 (1948), and Trico Products Corp. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 424 (2d
Cir.), cert denied, 320 U.S. 799 (1943), accumulations were held to be unreasonable;
and the penalty taxes were imposed notwithstanding the fact that the corporation
would lose exclusive valuable patent rights in a few years and that the corporation's accumulations were made in part to finance the introduction of a new
product as a protective measure in anticipation of reasonable business needs. The
Board of Tax Appeals in a footnote to its opinion in the earlier case, 46 B.T.A.
346, 376 (1942), cryptically stated: "This substitute product was not in existence
in the instant years, so that it really formed no premise for any accumulations
at that time." See also Kerr-Cochran, Inc. v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 121, 123 (8th
Cir. 1958), in which the court in imposing the penalty tax under §102 of the 1939
Code stated: "[T]he courts have taken the view that the term 'reasonable needs
of the business,' as used in the statute, was meant to have a practical and objective basis and so to entitle the Commissioner and the Tax Court to look only at
the immediate needs of the business- 'need associated with the business in hand'."
If there was some doubt about what constituted present needs, compare World
Publishing Co. v. United States, 169 F.2d 186 (10th Cir. 1948), with Penn Needle
Art Co., 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 504 (1958), the new provision reduces the problem
for the future.
2 53
INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, §537.
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bearing on that test. If earnings are accumulated beyond the reasonable business needs, including anticipated needs, a statutory presumption of a purpose to avoid tax on shareholders arises, which can be
overcome only by proof to the contrary by a preponderance of the
255
but the
evidence.2 ' This was also the law under the 1939 Code,

1954 Code reduces the likelihood of the statutory presumption arising by establishing a procedure under which the taxpayer can shift
to the commissioner the burden of proving that there has been an unreasonable accumulation.256 With some exceptions this rule now ap25 7
Recently it has
plies as well to cases arising under the 1939 Code.
been held that if a taxpayer shifts the burden of proof on the accumulation issue and thus avoids the statutory presumption as to
improper purpose, he still has the burden of proving that the corporation has not been formed or availed of for the condemned purpose. 258 This appears, however, to be a questionable judicial modification of a legislative relief provision included in the 1954 Code. 259
If the commissioner cannot sustain the burden on unreasonable accumulation, the new credit for amounts reasonably accumulated will
wipe out the penalty tax base and eliminate the tax regardless of any
proof of motive that might seem to make the section applicable.
2541d. §533.
255Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §102 (c).
256INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §534. The Finance Committee explained the reason
for the change. "The poor record of the Government in the litigated cases in this
area indicates that deficiencies have been asserted in many cases which were not
adequately screened or analyzed. At the same time taxpayers were put to substantial expense and effort in proving that the accumulation was for reasonable
needs of the business. Moreover, the complaints of taxpayers that the tax is used
as a threat by revenue agents to induce settlement on other issues appear to have
a connection with the burden of proof which the taxpayer is required to assume.
It also appears probable that many small taxpayers may have yielded to a proposed
deficiency because of the expense and difficulty of litigating their case under the
present rules." For recent general discussions of this area see Barker, Penalty Tax
on Corporations Improperly Accumulating Surplus, 35 TAxrs 949 (1957); Holzman,
The Accumulated Earnings Tax, 32 TAxEs 823 (1954); Kopperud and Donaldson,
The Burden of Proof in Accumulated Surplus Cases, 35 TAXES 827 (1957); Krystal,
Other Corporate Changes, U. So. CAL. 1955 TAX Its-r. 409.
25TINT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §534 (b), (e), as amended by 69 Stat. 690, 691 (1955);
see 1955-2 Cuzu. BULL. 885.
sSSPelton Steel Casting Co., 28 T.C. 153 (1957), afl'd, 251 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 958 (1958).
259See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1954); Comment, 10 ALA. L. REV. 473 (1958).
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The reasonable needs of a business are incapable of objective
definition, and the phrase has presented a difficult problem to the

26 1
courts. 260 Despite the statutory elimination of the "immediacy" test,

it appears that the Treasury will continue to press for a narrow interpretation, 26 2 perhaps in disregard of the purpose reflected in the
legislative history of the recent statutory changes.263 In determining
final action on dividends within the allotted two and one half months
after the close of a taxable year, it is obviously important for the
directors of a corporation to take care to reflect in the minutes the
264
business reasons that support any decision to retain earnings.

Theoretically, the accumulated earnings tax is applicable to publicly held corporations. 265 However, from a practical standpoint, the
close corporation, which is more likely to be utilized for the con26 6
demned purpose, is more exposed to the tax.

GeneralPrinciplesPeculiarlyApplicable to Close Corporations
The feint with the left; the hidden ball; the rabbit emerging from
the hat: each has its counterpart in the field of federal taxation. Sometimes, as the poet said, "Things are not what they seem." 267 But the

commissioner is not easily taken in, and the courts have often sup260E.g., Perry & Co. v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1941); C. H.
Spitzner & Son, Inc., 37 B.T.A. 511 (1938), nonacq., 1938-2 CUM. BULL. 58; Cecil
B. deMille, 31 B.T.A. 1161 (1935), aff'd, 90 F.2d 12 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 302
U.S. 713 (1937); Central Motors, Inc., 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 781 (1954); Shaw &
Keeter Motor Co., 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 716 (1951). Although accumulations for
prior years are not subject to the tax, such accumulations are relevant in determining whether accumulations of the current year exceed the reasonable needs
of the business. E.g., World Publishing Co. v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 886 (N.D.
Okla. 1947), aff'd, 169 F.2d 186 (10th Cir. 1948); Colonial Amusement Corp., 7 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 546 (1948).
201S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1954).
262Sce Proposed Treas. Reg. §1.537-1.
263See Note, 9 J. TAXATION 48 (1958).

264See Tarleau, The Role of Corporate Minutes in Taxation, U. So. CAL. 9TH
TAX INsr. 1 (1957).
26sSee S. RE.P. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1954). The House bill attempted to limit the application of the accumulated earnings tax to corporations
having less than 1500 shareholders, H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 54
(1954), but the Senate did not concur.
266E.g., Hedberg-Freidheim Contracting Co. v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 839 (8th
Cir. 1958), affirming 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1433 (1956).
267Longfellow, A Psalm of Life, Stanza 1.
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ported his matter-of-fact approach. "The question always is whether
... 268
the transaction under scrutiny is what it appears to be in form.
In the financial world of make-believe, general principles of administrative or judicial origin may cut across even apparently explicit
statutory language; the close corporation is often involved.269
Although the statute nowhere says so expressly, a taxpayer cannot
"exalt artifice above reality"270 to claim some tax advantage.

An

illustration will be useful. Mrs. Gregory owned all of the stock of U
Corporation, which in turn owned a block of stock of M Corporation.
She wished to acquire and sell the M stock in her individual capacity.
However, she did not want to receive the M stock as a dividend
subject to ordinary income rates, which would have been the result
27
if U Corporation had simply distributed the M stock directly to her. '
To avoid this unhappy result, she devised a scheme that carefully
tracked the statute under which she would receive the M stock with
a minimum of tax by way of a reorganization followed by a liquidation. The taxpayer caused the A Corporation to be organized by U,
and immediately U transferred the M stock to A, and all the A stock
was issued to Mrs. Gregory. At the time this was apparently a taxfree divisive reorganization within the letter of the statute, 27 2 which
put Mrs. Gregory in the position of owning all the stock of the new
corporation, which in turn owned only the M stock, which she desired.
Three days later A was dissolved, and its sole asset, the M stock, was
distributed in liquidation to Mrs. Gregory, who sold it immediately.
She acknowledged only a capital gain in the amount of the difference
between the fair market value of the M stock and her allocated basis
for the A stock. 27 3 The Supreme Court treated this transaction as a
2 74
mere ruse, a formality that should be disregarded for tax purposes.
In substance, U had distributed a dividend to Mrs. Gregory equal
to the value of the M stock as reflected in the amount realized by her
26sChisholm v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 14, 15 (2d Cir. 1935).
2

69See Case, Disregard of Corporate Entity in Federal Taxation, 30 VA. L. REV.

398 (1944); Erickson, supra note 130.
27oGregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 470 (1935).
271INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§316 (a), 301 (b), (c), compel this conclusion under
present law.
272 Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, §§112(g),(i)(1)(B), 45 Stat. 818 (1928).
273Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, §113 (a) (9), 45 Stat. 820 (1928).
274Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), affirming 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir.
1934). The opinion of the court of appeals is discussed in Hendricks, Developments in the Taxation of Reorganizations, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1198, 1205 (1934).
See also 7 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§38.10-.12 (rev. ed. 1956).
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upon the sale of the stock. Despite the formalities observed by Mrs.
Gregory's dose corporation, reality prevailed.
The doctrine of substance over form has broader application than
this illustration may suggest. The members of a close corporation may
find it expedient taxwise to borrow funds from the corporation. Although they need to withdraw cash, they may hesitate to cause the
corporation to pay dividends or to increase their salaries (if they are
also employees of the corporation) since both salaries and dividends
are taxed to recipients at ordinary income rates. 2 7 5 If dividends paid
by a close corporation will have onerous tax consequences, can the
tax burden be avoided by way of corporate loans to shareholders,
which achieve the same immediate objective? The question is whether
the shareholder withdrawals are in fact loans. Neither terminology
nor any other formality precludes a withdrawal being characterized
as a dividend276 and the absence of a formal dividend declaration is
immaterial.2 77 Whether the stockholder advance is in reality a loan
or an informal dividend is primarily a question of fact determined
from the intentions of the parties. 27 8 A withdrawal will not be recognized as a loan unless there is an intention at the time of withdrawal
that it be repaid.2 7 9 As is often true when something turns on subjective intent, a decision on the crucial issue may rest in part on the
28 0
proof of subordinate objective facts.
Other attempts by shareholders of close corporations to achieve
275INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, §§61 (a) (7), 301 (c) (1).
27GIn Ben R. Meyer, 45 B.T.A. 228 (1941), acq., 1942-1 CuM. BULL. 12, withdrawals by shareholders from the corporation were held to be dividends notwithstanding taxpayers' eventual execution of notes and partial repayment. But see
Al Goodman, Inc., 23 T.C. 288 (1954), acq., 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 4; George S. Groves,
38 B.T.A. 727 (1938), acq., 1939-1 CUM. BULL. 15.
277E.g., Christopher v. Burnet, 55 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1931), affirming 13 B.T.A.
729 (1928); M. Jackson Crispin, 82 B.T.A. 151 (1935); C. W. Murchison, 32 B.T.A.
32 (1935).
278E.g., withdrawals were held dividends in Regensburg v. Commissioner, 144
F.2d 41 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 783 (1944); W. C. Baird, 25 T.C. 387
(1955); Niederkrome, 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1312 (1956); B. F. Crabbe, 14 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 1305 (1955); but they were held loans in Victor Shaken, 21 T.C.
785 (1954), acq., 1954-2 Cum. BULL. 5; Carl L. White, 17 T.C. 1562 (1952), acq.,
1952-2 Cum. BULL. 3; Comey & Johnson Co., 8 B.T.A. 52 (1927).
279E.g., Anketell Lumber & Coal Co. v. United States, 1 F. Supp. 724 (Ct. Cl.
1932); Irving T. Bush, 45 B.T.A. 609 (1941), acq., 1942-1 CuM. BULL. 3; Moses W.
Faitoute, 38 B.TA. 32 (1938); Frank W. Sharp, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 836 (1953).
2S0See Werner, Stockholder Withdrawals-Loans or Dividends?, 10 TAx L. R.v.
569 (1955).
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tax savings may take the reverse form of loans by the shareholders to
the corporation.281 In this manner the so-called double tax cost of
doing business in corporate form may be diluted, at least to the
extent of the deduction claimed by the corporation with respect to
interest paid or accrued during the taxable year. 282 Furthermore,
the repayment of such loans has little tax effect upon the shareholdercreditors; repayment is simply a tax-free return of capital. The interest paid is, of course, taxable as ordinary income.283 Are loans by

a shareholder to a corporation really loans that justify a corporate deduction for interest paid? Once again in a close corporation setting
the courts will not be blinded by nomenclature or form. It may be
that in reality the corporation is paying dividends on an equity
interest, a debt merely in form. If so the corporate deduction will
not only be disallowed, but the entire amount of payments to the
shareholders may be characterized as dividends.2S4
Somewhat akin to the problem of shareholder loans to close corporations is the question of salary payments to the employee-shareholders of the close corporations. To be deductible, salary payments
must be reasonable in amount,2

85

and salaries paid by a close corpora-

tion may perhaps properly be suspect. Are the salary payments made
by such a corporation really in payment for services rendered, or are
such payments disguised dividends? The tax difference again lies
in the deductibility by the corporation. "An ostensible salary paid by
a corporation may be a distribution of a dividend on stock. This is
likely to occur in the case of a corporation having few shareholders,
28lThis possibility was discussed earlier in this article in another context under
"Capital Structure," "Debt or Equity?" supra.
282INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §163 (a), provides for the deduction of interest paid
or accrued during the taxable year. But see id. §267 (a)(2) relating to the denial
of a deduction for unpaid expenses, including interest, between related taxpayers

under certain circumstances, discussed at note 164 supra and accompanying text.
2S3INT. Rzv. CODE OF 1954, §61 (a) (4).
2s4E.g., Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1031

(1957); The Colony, Inc., 26 T.C. 30 (1956), afi'd on

other grounds, 244 F.2d 75 (6th Cir. 1957), rev'd on other grounds, 357 U.S. 28
(1958); Ryan Contracting Corp., 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 999 (1956); cf. The Gregg

Co. v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1956); Aqualane Shores, Inc., 30 T.C....
No. 48 (1958). But see John W. Walter, Inc., 23 T.C. 550

(1954), acq., 1955-I

Cuza. BULL. 7; 1. Unterberg & Co., 2 B.T.A. 274 (1925). In resolving the question
of debt versus equity interests in a close corporation setting the courts haxe

considered various extrinsic factors that may point a finger toward the true intent
of the parties; for recent summary discussion see Note, 41 MINN. L. REV. 691 (1956).
2S5INT. REV.

CODE

OF

1954, §162 (a) (1).
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practically all of whom draw salaries. If in such a case the salaries
are in excess of those ordinarily paid for similar services ... it would
seem likely that the salaries are not paid wholly for services rendered,
but that the excessive payments are a distribution of earnings upon
the stock."286 Accordingly, the commissioner may pay special attention

28 7
to amounts characterized as salary payments by a close corporation.
To the extent that such payments are held to be dividends, the corporation will not be entitled to a salary deduction.2ss
There are other circumstances in which the commissioner may assert that the shareholders of a close corporation have in reality been
paid dividends. For example, a corporation may make payments to
shareholders that are stated to be rent for the use of property. The
lessor-stockholder must include rental payments received in gross
income, 28 9 but there may be an advantage in the attending corporate
deduction. 290 However, if such payments are unreasonable in amount
or otherwise lacking in bona fides, the payments will be characterized

as dividends and the corporate deduction will be lost.291

The commissioner has sought to apply the form-versus-substance
weapon to close corporation use of life insurance. What if, for example, the two equitable owners of a corporation cause the corporation to pay premiums on insurance on their lives and each shareholder
2s6Treas. Reg. §1.162-7 (b) (1).
287E.g., Golden Construction Co. v. Commissioner, 228 F.2d 637 (10th Cir.
1955); Kerrigan Iron Works, Inc., 17 T.C. 566 (1951), acq., 1952-1 CuM. BuLL. 2;
The Barto Co., 21 B.T.A. 1197 (1931); Texagon Mills, Inc., 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
422 (1951); see Note, 9 J. TAXATION 120 (1958).
2s5See Long Island Drug Co. v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1940);
University Chevrolet Co., 16 T.C. 1452 (1951), aff'd, 199 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1952);
Lando Products, Inc., 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 652 (1958). But see Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. United States, 58-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9554 (D.S.D. 1958); C and C
Beverage, Inc., 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 649 (1954); Peerless Cement Products Co., 9
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 138 (1950). However, the shareholders may benefit under INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, §§34, 116, providing for the dividends received credit and the
$50 dividend exclusion, respectively.
29INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, §61 (a) (5).
2901d. §162 (a), permitting the deduction of all ordinary and necessary business
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year, includes "(3) rentals or other
payments required to be made as a condition to the continued use or possession,
for purposes of the trade or business, of property .... "
291E.g., Jolly's Motor Livery Co., 16 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1048 (1957); Charlie's
Cafe Exceptionale, Inc., 6 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 32 (1947). But see Brown Printing
Co. v. Commissioner, 58-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9534 (5th Cir. 1958), reversing and remanding 16 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 164 (1957); United States v. Kellogg, 274 Fed. 903
(2d Cir. 1921).
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is named the beneficiary of the policy on the other? Are the premium
payments made by the corporation constructive dividends to the insured shareholders?292 On the bare facts stated there is little doubt
2 93
that the premium payments would be accorded dividend treatment.
However, if the corporation is made the owner of the policy and the
actual beneficiary of the proceeds, the payment of premiums by the
corporation should not be treated as dividend distributions, even
if the proceeds must be used to purchase the stock of the deceased
shareholder, because the shareholders realize no immediate measurable benefit or enrichment from the corporation's payment of the
premiums. The corporation, a separate taxable entity, is the owner
of the policy; and, though there may be a potential benefit to the
estate of a deceased shareholder and to the surviving shareholders, no
immediate benefits redound to the shareholders that would justify
294
the imposition of tax.
292Though the term constructive dividend does not appear in the Code, it is
used in tax law to describe a result arising from the use of corporate earnings and
profits for the benefit of a shareholder. E.g., Minnie F. Lasker, I1 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 50 (1952); ci. Lewis v. O'Malley, 140 F.2d 735 (8th Cir. 1944); see 1 MERTENs,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§9.07 et seq. (rev. ed. 1956); Toll, Constructive Dividends, U. So. CAL. 1951 TAX INsT. 211.

293Paramount-Richards Theatres, Inc. v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 602 (5th Cir.
1946); Prunier v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 19, rev'd, 248 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1957);
Casper Ranger Construction Co., I B.T.A. 942 (1925). Whether premium payments
constitute additional compensation to employee-shareholders, a different but related question, is not discussed. See Yuengling v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 782
(1933), afl'd, 69 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1934); N. Loring Danforth, 18 B.T.A. 1221
(1930); George Matthew Adams, 18 B.T.A. 381 (1929); Berizzi Bros. Co., 16 B.T.A.
1307 (1929), acq., VIII-2 CUM. BULL. 5 (1929); O.D. 627, 3 CUM. BULL. 104 (1920).
29
4prunier v. Commissioner, supra note 293; accord, Sanders v. Fox, 253 F.2d
855 (10th Cir. 1958), reversing 149 F. Supp. 942 (D. Utah 1957). For a discussion
of the opinions in these cases see Lawthers, IRS Continuing Attack on Insured
Redemptions Despite Court Setbacks; Sanders Reversed, 8 J. TAXATION 322 (1958);
Mannheimer and Friedman, Stock-Retirement Agreements-The Prunier and
Sanders Cases, 35 TAXES 567 (1957), A recent comprehensive discussion of the
problem appears in Note, 71 HARV. L. REV. 687 (1958). In Casale v. Commissioner,
247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957), reversing 26 T.C. 1020 (1956), a close corporation had
used insurance to fund deferred compensation pursuant to an agreement between
the corporation and its 98% shareholder-president. The appellate court rejected
the commissioner's contention that premium payments by the corporation were
dividends to the insured shareholder. Tie opinion is discussed in Jones and
Gleason, Casale Reversed: Corporate Insurance Not Dividend to Controlling Stockholder, 7 J. TAXATION 258 (1957). Recently the commissioner has conceded in this
limited area. T.I.R. No. 115, 6 CCH 1958 STAND. FED. TAX REP. f6823.
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The remarks here have been largely negative, the purpose being to
expose pitfalls for tax plans resting on extraordinary controls that
shareholders in close corporations may have. This is not to say that
tax planning involves only the avoidance of pitfalls, but an affirmative
approach to planning for close corporations would extend this article
beyond a reasonable length.
PART III.

Tm WAGES

OF MANAGEMENT

Individuals at all economic levels are interested in their take-home
pay, and today tax attrition is an important item for almost all gainfully employed persons. However, as salaries increase the question
of what is left after taxes becomes more prominent. In some respects
the comments in this part of the article bear on compensation problems generally, but the primary emphasis is on compensation for the
important corporate executive to whom each one dollar salary increase may mean as little as nine cents that he can spend or save. It
is not surprising to find that for many years corporations have sought
means other than direct salary increases for rewarding top management.
In Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner295 a corporate officer

had received compensation in the amount of $978,725 for the year
1918 and $548,132 for the year 1919, and for those years the corporation paid federal income taxes for him in the amount of $681,169 and
$351,179, respectively. The significance of this plan in a present day
setting can best be grasped by the fact that today a salary income of
$1,000,000 after taxes would require a gross salary of more than
$7,000,000, whereas a salary of $1,000,000 on which the corporate employer paid the tax, if there were no further tax consequences to the
employee, would require a tax payment of only $870,000. In other
words, it might appear that a payment of $1,000,000 to the employee
and $870,000 to the Government could accomplish the same thing
for the employee as a direct payment to him of over $7,000,000 on
which he would pay the tax. But this is not the law.
In the Old Colony case the Supreme Court identified the corporation's payment of tax on the officer's salary as additional compensation
to the employee. "The discharge by a third person of [another's tax
obligation] is equivalent to receipt by the person taxed."296 Such pay295279 U.S. 716 (1929).
2961d. at 729; accord, Charles Bispham Levey, 26 B.T.A. 889 (1932), aff'd, 68
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ment constitutes taxable compensation to the executive.297 Therefore,
efforts to supply management with adequate compensation have had
to move in other directions.
Deferred Compensation
Qualified Plans. The high tax on large salaries prompts consideration of arrangements to pay an employee a salary somewhat less than
that which he would otherwise receive during current pay periods,
deferring the balance to the time of his retirement, when presumably
he will have less income and the amounts received will therefore be
subject to lower tax rates. Within certain limits the Code expressly
permits this to be accomplished through the use of pension, profitsharing, stock bonus or annuity plans that meet precise statutory and
administrative requirements.2 9 s Such plans, if they qualify 299 for the
special tax treatment, afford marked advantages to both the employee
and the employer.300
F.2d 401 (D.C. Cir. 1933). See also Mim. 6779, 1952-1 Cum. BULL. 8, modified by
I.R.-Mim. 51, 1952-2 CuM. BULL. 65.
297The receipt of income by way of discharge of indebtedness is now a firmly
established principle of tax law. Treas. Reg. §1.61-14(a); cf. Mahana v. United
States, 88 F. Supp. 285 (Ct. Cl. 1950).
29S8The statutory framework is found in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§401-04. The
term plan is a word of art and implies a permanent as distinguished from a temporary program. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1 (b) (2). In general a pension plan is a plan
providing "for the livelihood of the employees or their beneficiaries after the retirement of such employees through the payment of benefits determined without
regard to profits." Treas. Reg. §1.401-1 (a) (2) (i). See also id. §1.401-I (b) (1) (i). A
profit-sharing plan is an arrangement "to enable employees or their beneficiaries
to participate in the profits of the employer's trade or business .... " Treas. Reg.
§1.401-1 (a) (2) (ii); see also id. §1.401-1 (b) (1) (ii). A stock bonus plan is similar
to a profit-sharing plan, "except that ... benefits are distributable in stock of the
employer, and . . . the contributions by the employer are not necessarily dependent
upon profits." Id. §1.401-1 (a) (2) (iii). See also id. §1.401-1 (b) (I) (iii). The statutory
requirements relating to employee annuity plans are set forth in INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, §403. A trust is usually the vehicle for administration of the plan. See id.
§401 (a) (1)- (3); Treas. Reg. §1.401-1 (b) (5). But see INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §403,
relating to annuity plans.

299A qualified plan is one that meets the statutory requirements of

INT.

REV.

1954, §401, and the administrative requirement of the corresponding
regulations and certain rulings. See Rev. Rul. 57-163, 1957-1 GuM. BULL. 128.
A detailed discussion of these plans is
300INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§401-04.
CODE

OF

not possible in this brief article. See Alexander, Advantages and Disadvantages of

Pension, Profit-Sharing and Stock Bonus Plans, N.Y.U.
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From the standpoint of the employee, employer contributions
under a qualified plan do not give rise to employee tax liability at
the time such contributions are made.30' A highly paid managerial
employee may gain three other major advantages from a qualified
plan. First, if the entire amount to which the employee is entitled
upon employment termination or retirement is paid to him not later
than the end of his first taxable year after the year in which his employment is terminated, amounts received, to the extent that they
are taxable, are taxed only at favorable capital gains rates.30 2 Further30 3
more, if the employee receives securities of the employer corporation
as a part of such a lump sum distribution, the amount of appreciation
in value of the securities that has occurred after their acquisition by
the fund is excluded from the employee's income.30 4 Second, a fund
1251 (1956); Block, Deductibility of Employer Contributions to Qualified Pension
and Profit-SharingPlans, N.Y.U. 13TH INST. ON FED. TAx. 409 (1955); Bomar, Requirements for Qualification of Plans (Compensation Problems: Pensions and
Profit-Sharing),N.Y.U. 13TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 395 (1955); Hodgkin, Taxability of
Benefit Payments Under Qualified Pension and Profit-SharingPlans, N.Y.U. 13TH
INsT. ON FED. TAx. 429 (1955); Levin, Recent Developments in Pension and Profit
Sharing, N.Y.U. 16TH INST. ON Fm. TAX. 23 (1958); Slowinski, Profit-SharingPlans
for Small Companies, N.Y.U. 15TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1099 (1957).

3OlTreas. Reg. §1A02 (a)-1 (a) (1) (i). The trust under a qualified plan must be
of such a nature as to be tax exempt under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §501 (a). If
the trust does not qualify for tax exempt status the employer's contribution to the
trust will be taxable income to the employee at the time it is made unless the employee's beneficial interest in the trust is forfeitable. Id. §402 (b). See also Rev. Rul.
56-673, 1956-2 Cum. BULL. 281. But see INT. RIV. CODE OF 1954, §402 (d). The
amount of employer contributions that is taxed to the employee is treated as consideration paid by the employee, which operates to reduce his tax when he later
receives distribution. Id. §§72 (c) (1), 72 (f), 402 (a) (2), 403 (b); Treas Reg. §1.A02 (a) 1 (a) (1) (iv).
302INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, §402 (a) (2); Treas. Reg. §§1.402 (a)-I (a) (6), 1.402 (e)-l.
In the event that the employee continues to render services to the employer, a
lump sum payment, even though pursuant to the provisions of a qualified trust,
will not be accorded capital gain treatment. Estate of Frank B. Pry, 19 T.C. 461
(1952), aff'd, 205 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1953). See also Rev. Rul. 56-214, 1956-1 Cums.
BUL. 196. Similarly, lump sum payments made to an employee pursuant to a
qualified annuity plan upon his complete separation from service may be accorded
capital gain treatment to the extent that such distribution exceeds the employee's
cost basis. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §403 (a) (2); Treas. Reg. §1.403 (a)-2 (a). But see
Treas. Reg. § 1A02(d)-I relating to certain plans instituted prior to Oct. 21, 1942.
30 3
1n general the term securities is defined to mean shares of stock and bonds
or debentures issued by a corporation with interest coupons or in registered form.
INT. RFv. CODE OF 1954, §402 (a) (3).
30
4INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §402 (a) (2); such unrealized appreciation that is
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is established that assures payment of the deferred income when the
time arrives; the employee is substantially relieved of concern about
the future ability of the employer to pay retirement benefits, since
the employer's contributions are held by a fiduciary for the benefit
of the employee. It should be emphasized that the employee is not
taxed on employer contributions even though he has a vested interest in the fund, no part of which can, in general, revert to the
employer.30 Third, amounts that are attributable to employer contributions and payable under the plan to an employee's beneficiaries
after his death are excluded from the employee's gross estate for
federal estate tax purposes.

30 6

From the standpoint of the employer, the deferral of employee
compensation under a qualified plan does not defer the corresponding
deduction; the employer is entitled to a current deduction for amounts
contributed to meet deferred compensation obligations, although
such contributions are deductible, subject to elaborate statutory limitations, s0 7 only if together with other compensation paid to participating employees they constitute no more than reasonable compenexcluded from the lump sum distributee's taxable income forms no part of his basis
for the securities received. Treas. Reg. § 1.402 (a)-I (b)(1). The recipient takes the
securities with a substituted cost basis, Treas. Reg. §1.402 (a)-I (b)(2); and upon a
subsequent sale the distributee is taxed at favorable capital gain rates to the
extent that the realized gain does not exceed the excluded net unrealized appreciation. Any gain in excess of that amount is treated as either long-term or shortterm gain depending upon the holding period. Id. § 1.402 (a)-I (b) (1). But see INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, §1014 (a).
3O5INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §401 (a) (2). Under a qualified plan the rights of
covered employees must vest at a determinable time. Treas. Reg. §1.401-1 (b) (I) (ii);
Rev. Rul. 57-163, 1957-1 CuMt. BULL. 128, 147.
306INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §2039 (c); similarly an employee's arrangement to
have benefits paid to a surviving beneficiary is not considered a transfer subject
to gift tax to the extent that the survivor benefits are attributable to employer
contributions. Id. §2517; see S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 228 (1958).
3O7INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §404 (a), sets forth ceiling limitations with respect
to the employer deduction for contributions made to the various plans. Generally, the cost of annuities purchased under a qualified annuity plan and the
cost of funding a pension trust to cover the normal current and future actuarial
cost of the included employees is permitted. Id. §§404 (a) (1) (A), (B), (C), 404 (a) (2).
Excess contributions may be carried over and deducted within limitations in succeeding years in which contributions are less than the maximum. Id. §404 (a) (1) (D).
In the case of a profit-sharing or stock bonus trust the employer deduction is
limited to 15% of the compensation paid to employees covered by the trust. Id.
§404 (a) (3). An aggregate ceiling limitation is placed on the amount deductible
for contributions made to a combination of plans. Id. §404 (a) (7).
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sation.308 Generally, the deduction is permitted only in the year in
which the contribution is paid.30 9 In the case of a contribution to a
pension, profit-sharing or stock bonus trust, the contribution must
be made in a taxable year of the employer that ends with or within
a taxable year of the trust for which the trust enjoys income tax ex0
emption as part of a qualified plan.31
A qualified non-trusteed plan for the purchase of annuities for employees may provide similar benefits with respect to deferral of employee income,311 capital gains treatment in certain instances 312 and
employer deduction for premiums paid; 31 but the trusteed plan holds
greater opportunity for growth through the receipt and accumulation
31 4
of tax exempt income.
Some employers prefer the profit-sharing plan to the pension plan.
Under it the employer has no obligation to make contributions unless
there are profits, 3'5 whereas the actuarial cost of a pension plan must
S0sTreas. Reg. §1A04 (a)-I (b); INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §162 (a) (1). The deduction is authorized by §404, and the reasonableness test of §162 is superimposed on
all the §404 requirements; see R. P. Farnsworth & Co. v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d
490 (5th Cir. 1953); Charles E. Smith & Sons Co. v. Commissioner, 184 F.2d 1011
(6th Cir. 1950). See also Alexander, Advantages and Disadvantages of Pension,
Profit-Sharingand Stock Bonus Plans, N.Y.U. 14TH INsT. ON FED. TAX. 1251, 1267,

1286 (1956).
3oTreas. Reg. §1.404 (a)-1 (c). For exceptions to this rule see INrT. REv. CODE OF
1954, §404 (a) (1),(2), (3),(5),(6); compare Rev. Rul. 57-419, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 264,
with The Chesapeake Corp., 17 T.C. 668 (1951), acq., 1952-1 CUM. BULL. 1.
310A trust exempt from income taxation under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §501 (a),
can lose its exempt status if it engages in certain prohibited transactions. Id.
§503 (a), (c); see Alexander, Tax Status of Pension Trusts: Requirements for Maintaining Exemption, N.Y.U. 13T INST. ON FED. TAX. 435 (1955). If the trust is not

exempt, the employer contributions may be income immediately to the employeeOF 1954, §402 (b), or be disallowed as employer deductions, Treas. Reg. §IA04 (a)-12.
3
IlINT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §403 (a) (1).
a12Id. §403 (a) (2); see note 302 supra.
3 3
1 1NTr. REv. CODE OF 1954, §404 (a) (2); see Rev. Rul. 55-193, 1955-1 CuM. BULL.
266; Rev. Rul. 56-633, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 279.
324INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §501 (a), exempts qualified trusts from income
taxation, although unrelated business income of such trusts may be taxed. Id.
§§502, 503, 511, 515. See also note 310 supra, concerning trusts that engage in
prohibited transactions.
315See I.T. 3660, 1944 Cum. BULL. 136; Treas. Reg. §§IA01-1 (b) (1) (ii), 1A011 (b) (2). Despite Lincoln Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1951),
holding a single contribution plan to be a valid profit sharing plan, the Treasury
maintains that there must be more than a single or occasional contribution; the
beneficiaries, INT. REV. CODE
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be maintained regardless of profit. Furthermore, the employer may
not have to commit himself to contribute to a profit-sharing trust
pursuant to a predetermined formula3 16 that would require specific
contributions in profit years.
An employee plan will not qualify for the tax advantages indicated
above if it is "discriminatory in favor of employees who are officers,
shareholders, persons whose principal duties consist in supervising the
work of other employees, or highly compensated employees." 317 The
rule against discrimination in favor of special employees, together
with the reasonable salary requirement relating to the deduction of
employer contributions,18' may reduce or defeat the usefulness of
qualified plans for compensating top executives in large corporations. However, such plans are often useful in the close corporation;
the antidiscrimination provisions present no obstacle if all the corporation's employees are within the class for which the special tax
benefits are desired.

319

Nonqualified Plans. Deferred compensation arrangements outside
the qualified area encounter equally complex and unfortunately more
obscure rules of law and may leave the participants with greater uncertainty regarding the tax consequences.32 0 Here, either the employer
may be entitled to current deductions for payments to such a plan, in
which case the employee is subject to immediate tax, or employee
deferment is accomplished, in which case there is no deduction for
the employer and the employee has no assurance of ultimate payment.
employer contributions must be recurring and substantial, otherwise the plan may
not continue to qualify. Treas. Reg. §1.401-1 (b) (2). See also Seligman, ProfitSharing Formula Still Desirable Despite New IRS Rule; Other New Developments,
5J. TAXATION 258 (1956).

31Ibid.
3171NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §401 (a) (3) (B); in order to qualify, such plans must
not be a subterfuge for the distribution of profits. Treas. Reg. §§1.401-1 (b) (3),
1.401-3,-4; see also id. §1.404(a)-I (b). See Gordon, Discrimination Problems in the
Drafting and in the Operation of Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans, N.Y.U. 14TH

INST. ON FED. TAX. 1153 (1956). A guide to qualification requirements is provided
in Rev. Rul. 57-163, 1957-1 CuM. BULL. 128. See also Rev. Proc. 56-12, 1956-1 Cum.
BULL. 1029.
318See note 308 supra.
319See Lurie, Qualified Pension and Profit-SharingPlans for Small Companies,
N.Y.U. 12TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 327 (1954); Slowinski, supra note 300.
320See, e.g., discussion, WASHINGTON and ROTHSCHILD, COMPENSATING THE CORPO-

EXECUTIVE cc. 7, 8 (rev. ed. 1951). See also Long, Deferred Compensation for
Executives, 24 TENN. L. REv. 285 (1956).
RATE
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The major advantages available under a qualified plan cannot all be
accomplished in the case of a nonqualified plan.
An employer may make payments into a trust for the sole benefit
of management employees and obtain current deductions for the payments only if the employees' rights in the fund are nonforfeitable 321
and if such payments when added to current salary payments constitute reasonable compensation.3 22 Here, the employee is assured of
ultimate receipt; however, such an arrangement affords no tax deferment to the employee, since, if his rights in the trust are vested,
the employee must include the amount of employer contributions in
gross income in the year in which they are made.323 In this light the
employee may be better off with a direct payment of salary, since
then at least he will have the cash with which to pay his increased
tax liability.
If, however, the employee is given only a forfeitable interest in
a trust or in annuities purchased by an employer for his benefit, he is
not taxed at the time of the contributions to the trust or the payments
of annuity premiums3 24 but is taxed instead only as amounts are
actually distributed or made available to him.3 25 Furthermore, if
"the employee's beneficial interest in the contribution is forfeitable
32
1INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §404(a)(5); Treas. Reg. §1A04(a)-12; cf. id.
§402(b)-l. See also William M. Bailey Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 574 (3d Cir.
1951), affirming 15 T.C. 468 (1950); George Von Hoffmann, 10 T.C. 314 (1948),
acq., 1948-1 Cum. BuLL. 3; Treas. Reg. §1.402(b)-i (a)(2)(i).
3
22INr. REV. CODE oF 1954, §§162, 404(a); Treas. keg. §lA04(a)-12; cf. Charles
E. Smith & Sons Co. v. Commissioner, 184 F.2d 1011 (6th Cir. 1950); Commissioner
v. Surface Combustion Corp., 181 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1950).
323 NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §402 (b); Treas. keg. §1.402 (b)-I (a) (1), (2); see, e.g.,
E. T. Sproull, 16 T.C. 244 (1951), aff'd, 194 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1952). Similarly, if
an annuity contract is purchased by an employer for an employee under a nonqualified plan and if the employee's rights in the contract are nonforfeitable, employer premium payments will be included in the employee's gross income. INr.
REv. CODE OF 1954, §403 (c). See also Rev. Rul. 55-691, 1955-2 Cums. BULL. 21; Rev.
Rul. 55-713, 1955-2 Cum. BULL. 23; Rev. Rul. 57-528, 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 263. Cf.
United States v. Drescher, 179 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1950).
324Compare Julian Robertson, 6 T.C. 1060 (1946), with Hackett v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1946), affirming 5 T.C. 1325 (1945).
325 Nr. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§402 (b), 403 (c). Such receipts are taxed under id.
§72 relating to annuities. "If . . . the distribution . . . consists of an annuity
contract [as opposed to payments under such a contract or from a trust], the
amount of the distribution shall be considered to be the entire value of the contract at the time of distribution, and such value is includible in the gross income
of the distributee ...." Treas. Reg. §1A02 (b)-I (b). See note 330 infra.
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at the time the contribution is made even though his interest becomes
nonforfeitable later, the amount of such contribution is not required
to be included in the income of the employee at the time his interest
becomes nonforfeitable."326
Thus, an employer may defer employee compensation even under
a nonqualified plan by making the employee's rights therein forfeitable. 32T However, the employee is not assured of ultimate payment
even though a fund is created from which payment can reasonably be
anticipated. There is no opportunity for the employee to obtain
3
long-term capital gain treatment on lump sum distributions.

28

Finally,

the employee is faced with the possibility that the entire commuted
value of his rights in the retirement fund may be taxed to him as
ordinary income in the year in which he reaches retirement age, if
his share becomes available to him then without restriction. 329 This
danger is minimized if there are restrictions upon the distributee
employee's right to make withdrawals from or receive his share of the
fund that continue in effect at the date of his retirement.330
To the uncertainties and disadvantages of the nonqualified plan
listed above there should be added a crucial point concerning the employer's deduction, which eliminates the nonqualified funded plan
326Treas. Reg. §1.402(b)-l(a)(1); see also id. §1.403(b)-I(a), setting forth a
parallel rule with respect to annuity contracts purchased under a nonqualified
annuity plan. But cf. Morse v. Commissioner, 202 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1953), indicating
a major distinction between no rights and forfeitable rights.
3278ee Treas. Reg. §1.402(b)-1. See also, e.g., Harold G. Perkins, 8 T.C. 1051
(1947), acq., 1947-2 CuM. BULL. 3; Julian Robertson, 6 T.C. 1060 (1946).
328See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§402(a)(2), 403(a)(2); Treas. Reg. §§1.402(a)1(a) (1) (ii), 1.403 (a)-2 (a). See also, e.g., Harry K. Oliphint, 24 T.C. 744 (1955),
aff'd on other grounds, 234 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1956); note 302 supra. But see note
339 infra.
329The theory here would be constructive receipt; see Treas. Reg. §1.451-2; cf.
Howard Veit, 8 T.C. 809 (1947), acq., 1947-2 CuM. BULL. 4; Richard R. Deupree, I
T.C. 113 (1942); Adolph Zukor, 33 B.T.A. 324 (1935), nonacq., XV-1 CuM. BULL.
48 (1936); Howard Veit, 8 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 919 (1949). For a more detailed
evaluation of this problem see Bergen, Income Tax Aspects of Non-Qualified
Deferred Compensation Plans, N.Y.U. 16TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 91 (1958); Childs,
Deferred Compensation Plans for Executives, 31 TAxEs 1007, 1014 (1953). See also
344 infra.
330INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§402 (a) and 402(b), relating to taxability of employee beneficiaries under qualified and nonqualified trusts, respectively, state:
"The amount actually distributed or made available to any distributee . . . shall
" Cf. Rev. Rul. 55-423, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 41, holding that a parbe taxable ..
ticipant's interest in a qualified trust is not made available to him if there are
substantial conditions or restrictions on his right of withdrawal. See also, e.g., Rev.
Rul. 55-424, 1955-1 CUM. BULL. 42; Rev. Rul. 55-425, 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 43.
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from serious consideration as a deferred income device. "If an amount
is paid during the taxable year to a trust or under a plan and the
employee's rights to such amounts are forfeitable at the time the
amount is paid, no deduction is allowable for such amount for any
taxable year. " 33 1 The right to a deduction in such cases is forever
lost.33 2
The discussion thus far has been primarily concerned with funded
or trusteed plans. Deferment with some assurance to the employee of
ultimate payment may be attempted in ways other than through the
use of trusts. An employer may purchase an annuity contract naming
an employee as the beneficiary but reserving the right to change the
beneficiary. This will accomplish deferment but defeat the employer's
deduction, which is allowed only if the rights of the employee are
nonforfeitable at the time such payments are made. 3"3 Thus, again,
the employer's deduction is lost if the effort to defer compensation is
achieved.3. 4
Another alternative suggests itself. What about an annuity taken
out, paid for, and owned exclusively by the employer, an annuity in
which the employee has no rights, forfeitable or nonforfeitable, but
written for his life? Under such an arrangement no income is realized
immediately by the employee, nor is any deduction currently allowed
the employer, who, however, may take such steps to amass funds for
deferred payments to the employee at his retirement date.335 What
are the tax consequences if, shortly after the employee retires, the
33Treas. Reg. §1.404(a)-12 (emphasis added). See also INT.
§404 (a) (5).
332Cf. Draper &Co., 5 T.C. 822, 841 (1945).
333
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § §404 (a), 404 (a) (5).

REV. CODE

OF

1954,

3341bid.; for the tax effect upon the employee, if deferment is frustrated, see
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §403 (c). See also Treas. Reg. §1.403 (b)-1 (a); Hackett v.
Commissioner, 159 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1946), affirming 5 T.C. 1325 (1945). The
purchase of an annuity contract by the employer for an employee and delivery
in the same year to the employee constitutes taxable income to the employee to
the extent of the employer payments. Oberwinder v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 255
(8th Cir. 1945); Renton K. Brodie, 1 T.C. 275 (1942). See also Treas. Reg.
§1A02 (b)-1 (b). The employee may realize income even though the employer does
not deliver the policy to the employee and even if the employee has no right
to assign, accelerate, or commute his interest in the annuity. United States v.
Drescher, 179 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1950). Here the theory is expressed in terms of economic benefit to the employee. Hackett v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 121 (1st Cir.

1946).

335See Casale v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957); Lefevre, Deferred
Compensation Plans, N.Y.U. 15TH INsT. ON FaD TAx. 1081, 1084 (1957).
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employer delivers or assigns the annuity policy to him? They may
be disastrous even if the annuity cannot be assigned by the employee
and cannot be surrendered by him for cash so that his rights are
limited to the receipt of the annuity payments pursuant to the terms
of the contract.
In Morse v. Commissioner336 Chrysler Corporation had purchased
an annuity contract for one of its older employees, who was ineligible
to participate in a qualified retirement plan. The annuity contract
was purchased in 1941 for a single premium of $37,000 and provided
for payments of $3,000 annually to Chrysler for the life of the employee and for ten years certain. The employee, who had no rights,
forfeitable or nonforfeitable, in the policy, retired at the end of 1942.
In 1943 he received payments under the annuity contract which
Chrysler had assigned to him in that year. However, he could not
surrender, assign or otherwise commute his rights under the policy.
On these facts, as opposed to the situation in which the employee is
recognized to have had some prior rights, although only forfeitable
rights, the court held that the employee received the policy as income in the year it was assigned to him. That is, his income for the
year was not the amounts received under the policy but instead the
full cost of the policy to the employer, minus small amounts received
by the employer prior to the assignment to the employee. 33 7 If in
this case the annuity had been purchased under a qualified plan and
the facts were otherwise the same, the employee would have been
taxed only on the amounts received and on such amounts only in
3s
accordance with the Code provisions on annuities.
The use of straight contractual arrangements between employer
and employee to defer payment of compensation may hold better
prospects for success and mutual benefit 39 In this situation, of course,
336202 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1953), affirming 17 T.C. 1244 (1952); cf. United States
v. Drescher, supra note 334.
337This opinion is not persuasive in attempting to distinguish the rule in the
regulations that an employee whose rights are forfeitable does not realize taxable
income when his rights in such a contract, trust, or plan become nonforfeitable.
Treas. Reg. §1.402 (b)-1 (a) (1). The regulations under the Int. Rev. Code of 1939
were substantially the same, Treas. Reg. 118, §39.22 (b) (2)-5. See Seidel, The Morse
Case -Taxation Neutralizes a Retirement Program, 31 TAXES 350 (1953); Young,
Deferred Pay Plans - Qualified and Non-Qualified Plans, N.Y.U. 13TH INST. ON FED.
TAX. 457, 460 (1955).
338INT. REV. Cova OF 1954, §403 (a) (1); Treas. Reg. §1.403 (a)-l (a). See also
Treas. Reg. §1.A02 (a)-I (a) (2).
339See WASHINGTON and ROTHSCHILD, op. cit. supra note 320. In certain limited
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the employee must rely upon the employer's ultimate ability to pay,
and the employer must be content to take a deduction later when
payments are made pursuant to the terms of the contract. Such a contract, however, may offer benefits in the form of special treatment for
executives and other highly paid employees that cannot be accomplished under a qualified plan or under a funded nonqualified plan. 40
An employer may agree to pay the employee annual amounts beginning at the time his full-time services terminate; and, as consideration for the employer's promise, the employee may agree to remain
in the employ of the employer for a certain period of years, to perform
additional services after termination of formal employment, such as
consultation and advice, and neither to divulge trade secrets nor to
engage in competitive employment. 341 This type of contract may
achieve the combined objectives of deferred income for the employee
and eventual deduction for the employer when amounts are paid to
the employee,342 although it does not give the employee assurance
that needed fundswill be available. It has been held that the promise
to pay compensation at a future date to a cash basis employee does
situations, not discussed in the text, the employee may be able to obtain the
benefits of favorable capital gain treatment from such contractual agreements.
Such benefits are attainable if a contract, in force as of Aug. 16, 1954, provides
for payment after retirement of a percentage of future profits for a period of not
less than 5 years, and provides for the right of the employee to assign his rights
under the contract. An assignment by the employee of his rights under such a
contract will result in long-term capital gain if (1) made after 20 years' employment, (2) made at least 12 years after the right of assignment arises, and (3) the
total proceeds from such assignment are received within one year after retirement.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §1240. See Lyon, Capital Gains Benefits Connected with
Executive Retirement, N.Y.U. 12TH INsT. ON FED. TAX. 365, 367 (1954); Young,
supra note 337, at 463.
34OSee Cornfield, Executive Deferred Compensation, 36 TAXES 557, 558 (1958);
Lefevre, supranote 835; Long, supra note 320.
34 'See, e.g., May D. Hatch, 14 T.C. 237, 288 (1950), rev'd on other grounds, 190
F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1951). See also WASHINGTON and RoTHscHIL , op. cit. supra
note 320, at 182.
342See, e.g., Commissioner v. Oates, 207 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1953), in which retired insurance agents received renewal commissions accruing after retirement,
pursuant to the terms of preretirement contracts, in fixed monthly installments.
It was held that income was realized only as the amounts were actually received.
The employer's deduction is permitted in the year of payment, irrespective of
accounting method, Treas. Reg. §1A04(a)-12. The liability to pay in the future
is contingent and therefore there is no current accrual; see I.T. 1891,111-1 Cum.
BuLL. 132 (1924). See also S. Naitove & Co., 8 B.T.A. 589 (1927), aff'd, 82 F.2d 949
(D.C. Cir. 1929).
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not constitute current income to him. 3 43 However, an arrangement

such as this is not without perils; one risk is the doctrine of constructive receipt.3

44

Though a nonnegotiable promise to pay money in the

future may not result in current income, 345 an employee's unrestricted
right to receive such money upon the passage of time or upon the
happening of an event might well give rise to income to the employee
when the time elapses or the event occurs. 34 6 If an agreement to defer
payment is made after the right to payment arises, the doctrine of
constructive receipt may apply to make the employee immediately
taxable. 347 One cannot defer income by rejecting it when tendered.
Thus an effective contract for deferred income must be executed before the right to payment arises. Only then can the employee logically
argue that he has not received taxable income even constructively until he actually receives payment. 348 It has been suggested, however,
343The employee realizes income only when his right to such payments matures
in accordance with the terms of his contract. Commissioner v. Oates, 207 F.2d 711
(7th Cir. 1953); Howard Veit, 8 T.C. 809 (1947), acq., 1947-2 CuM. BULL. 4. See also
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §451 (a); Freeman v. United States, 71 F.2d 969 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 293 U.S. 621 (1934); Jackson v. Smietanka, 272 Fed. 970 (7th Cir.
1921). For a philosophical argument contra see Eisenstein, A Case of Deferred

Compensation, 4 TAX L. REV. 391 (1949).

344This doctrine, of judicial origin, taxes income to the taxpayer, whether it
is actually received or not, when the taxpayer is free to enjoy it and it is subject
to his unfettered command. See Treas. Reg. §1.451-2. E.g., Dillis C. Knapp, 41
B.T.A. 23 (1940); William Archibald Hedrick, 7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 561 (1948). See
also 2 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§10.01 et seq. (rev. ed. 1955); Zarky,
Problems in Constructive Receipt and Deferral of Income, N.Y.U. 13TH INST. ON
FED. TAX. 53 (1955).
345Cf. Perry v. Commissioner, 152 F.2d 183 (8th Cir. 1945); Cassatt v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 745 (3d Cir. 1943).
346See, e.g., Richard R. Deupree, I T.C. 113 (1942); note 344 supra. But see
Hyland v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1949), affirming 7 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 236 (1948); Frederick John Wolfe, 8 T.C. 689 (1947), aff'd without opinion,
170 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1948).
347Richard R. Deupree, supra note 346; see, e.g., Hineman v. Brodrick, 99 F.
Supp. 582 (D. Kan. 1951); Joseph Frank, 22 T.C. 945 (1954). But cf. J. D. Amend,
13 T.C. 178 (1949). See also Rev. Rul. 58-162, 1958-1 Cum. BULL. 234. If there is
a fund established for making payments, the employee's vested interest is income;
see K. R. Kingsbury, 31 B.T.A. 1126 (1935), acq., XIV-1 CuM. BULL. 11 (1935).
(7th Cir. 1953), involving a
348See, e.g., Commissioner v. Oates, 207 F.2d 711
contract between an insurance company and its general agents entered into prior
to retirement, providing for payment of renewal commissions accruing after retirement to the respective agents after their retirement in fixed monthly installments, irrespective of when the insurance company collected the commissions. It
was held that income is taxable to the retired agent only upon actual receipt of
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that there is danger in a contract that provides simply that the employee will be entitled to receive a certain sum of money annually
for life or for a period of years upon remaining in the employ of the
employer for a stated period of time. 349 Caution dictates that the
agreement be carefully drafted to impose, in addition to time-ofemployment requirements, substantial continuing conditions upon
the retired employee's right to receive deferred compensation, such as
his agreement not to compete,3 50 not to divulge trade secrets, and to
351
render advisory services to the employer.
If an employer seeks to assure his ability to pay the deferred compensation to the employee by purchasing annuity contracts on the life
of the employee, the employer must be the sole owner and beneficiary
of such contracts. In these circumstances the employee will not be
taxed currently on the employer contributions,3 52 but the income
earned by such investments will be taxed to the employer.3 53 Once
again, however, there is the danger that the annuity arrangement may
be treated as a trust, and if it is a nonqualified trust and the employee's
rights are forfeitable the employer's deduction is lost forever.354
To the patient employer willing to defer his deduction, a carefully drafted deferred compensation contract may mean a currently
contented employee and an eventual deduction for the amounts paid
to the employee. 355 Depending on the terms of the contract, reasonpayment from the company. See Howard Veit, 8 T.C. 809 (1947), acq., 1947-2
CuM. BuLL. 4; Howard Veit, 8 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 919 (1949); cf. Rev. Rul. 55-425,
1955-1 Cum. BuLy- 43.
349See Allison, Executives' Pensions Without Section 165, N.Y.U. 81n INST. ON
FED. TAX. 451,461 (1950).
35oCf. Duran v. Commissioner, 123 F.2d 324 (10th Cir. 1941).
35'See, e.g., General Smelting Co., 4 T.C. 313 (1944), acq., 1945 CuM. BuLL. 3;
for further discussion of this aspect see Ahern, Executives' Deferred Compensation,
N.Y.U. 7TH INsr. ON FED. TAx. 858 (1949); Blodgett, Deferred Compensation of
Executives, N.Y.U. 6TH INST. ON FED. TAx. 764, 804 (1948). See also WASHINGTON
and RoTscmiLD, op. cit. supra note 320, c. 7.
3
52See, e.g., Casale v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957).
3 3See INT. RIv. CODE OF 1954, §61 (a). Portions of the amounts received by
the employer under such an annuity or endowment policy would be taxable to it
pursuant to id. §72.
354Treas. Reg. §IA04(a)-12; see Cornfield, supra note 340.
35STreas. Reg. §1A04(a)-12. Though the compensation must be reasonable in
amount and thereby satisfy the provisions of INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §162 (a)(1),
the deduction is permitted by id. §404(a)(5); cf. Rev. Rul. 55-212, 1955-1 CUM.
BuLL. 299. See also General Smelting Co., 4 T.C. 313 (1944), acq., 1945 Cum. BULL.
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ableness of the deferred compensation may be decided with reference
to the extent of current services at the time of payment - consultation, advice and agreement not to compete on the part of the employee - or upon the basis of services previously rendered by the employee during the years of formal employment,356 or upon both. But,
of course, if the deferred compensation payments are found to be
unreasonable, the employer will not be entitled to a deduction for the
amounts found to be in excess of reasonable compensation. 357
Other CompensationDevices
Bargain Purchases. Compensation paid in the form of property is
taxable as ordinary income.35 8 The form of payment was expressly
irrelevant under the 1939 Code, and the deletion of the phrase in
whatever form paid from the corresponding provision of the 1954
Code359 effects no change in the law. 30° Thus, although compensation
paid in property other than cash may give rise to valuation problems,
it is clear that the recipient has taxable income measured by the fair
market value of the property received.s3r
356Even though payments are made for past services, they are deductible if, together with salary payments previously made, they constitute reasonable compensation. Lucas v. Ox Fibre Brush Co., 281 U.S. 115 (1930). See also Seavy & Flarsheim Brokerage Co., 41 B.T.A. 198 (1940), acq., 1940-1 CUM. BULL. 4.
3
571NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §162(a)(1); see General Smelting Co., 4 T.C. 313
(1944), acq., 1945 CuM. BULL. 3; cf. Commercial Iron Works v. Commissioner, 166
F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1948); Tumwater Lumber Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 65 F.2d
675 (9th Cir. 1933); Compeco Dye Works, Inc., 3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 778 (1944).
See Childs, supra note 329, at 1014; Lefevre, supra note 335. See also "Further
Comments on Compensation," infra.
S58Treas. Reg. §1.61-2(d)(1); see, e.g., Mose Duberstein, 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
16 (1958); Samuel Savell, 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1241 (1952). Though it is possible
to effect a gift, Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34 (1937), which does not
constitute income, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §102, it is particularly difficult in an
employer-employee setting to reach a realistic conclusion of a gift. Thomas v.
Commissioner, 135 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1943). But ci. Schall v. Commissioner, 174
F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1949); Rev. Rul. 55-422, 1955-1 CUm. BULL. 14. For more de-

tailed discussion of this phase of the problem see 1
§§6.03 et seq. (rev. ed. 1956).
59Compare Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §22 (a) with

TAXATION
3

MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME
INT.

REV.

CODE

OF

1954,

§61 (a)(I).
360S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 168 (1954); Treas. Reg. §1.61-2 (d) (1).
See also Treas. Reg. §1.61-2 (d) (4).
S6oSee, e.g., Whitlow v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1936); Rodgers
Dairy Co., 14 T.C. 66 (1950), acq., 1950-2 CuM. BULL. 4. The employer's tax ac-
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Suppose that the employer, instead of transferring property outright to an employee, simply permits the employee to purchase property at a bargain price, that is, at a price substantially below the fair
market value of the property. Usually a purchase of property is not
a taxable transaction for the purchaser, 62 but the Treasury takes the
position that "if property is transferred by an employer to an employee for an amount less than its fair market value, regardless of
whether the transfer is in the form of a sale or exchange, the difference between the amount paid for the property and the amount of its
fair market value at the time of the transfer is compensation and shall
' 6
be included in the gross income of the employee." 3
The courts have been reluctant to follow the Treasury's bargain
purchase doctrine as applied to options given to employees to purchase stock in an employer corporation for less than the market price.
At one time the decisive factor appears to have been whether the
employer intended a spread between option price and fair market
value of the stock to constitute compensation.36 4 If the employer's
counting may not be so simple, since in addition to the deduction of the amount
paid, in terms of the fair market value of the property transferred, O.D. 570, 3
Cum. BULL. 144 (1920), INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §162 (a) (1), the employer may
also be considered as having realized gain or loss in the amount by which the fair
market value of the property transferred exceeds or is less than the employer's
basis for the property so transferred. Irr. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§1001, 1011-12; see
Helvering v. Edison Bros. Stores, 133 F.2d 575 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S.
752 (1943). However, if the property transferred consists of stock of the employer
corporation, no gain or loss is recognized to the employer. In contrast to its
position on services as property under §351, Treas. Reg. §1.351-1 (a) (1)(i), the
Treasury treats services as property under §1032, Reg. §1.1032-1 (a).
362The purchase price paid by the purchaser becomes his cost for purposes of
determining his gain or loss on a later disposition of the property. See INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, §1001, 1011-12. See also, e.g., Palmer v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 63
(1937).
363Treas. Reg. §1.61-2(d)(2). In this instance upon a subsequent sale the
employee uses as his basis for determining gain or loss the amount actually paid
for the property plus the amount that he included in income as compensation.
With respect to the tax effect on the employer, see note 361 supra.
364See, e.g., Salvage v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1935), aff'd and
remanded on another ground, 297 U.S. 106 (1936), in which an employee was
permitted to purchase 1,500 shares of stock of the employer at par, $100 per share,
when the stock had a fair market value of $1,164 per share. The court of appeals
accepted without serious question the finding of the Board of Tax Appeals that
the spread of $1,064 per share was not intended as compensation to the employee.
See also Omaha Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 75 F.2d 434 (8th Cir. 1935); GardnerDenver Co. v. Commissioner, 75 F.2d 38 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 763 (1935).
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objective was to enable an employee to acquire a proprietary interest
in the business to increase his incentive, and no compensation was
intended, the employee was held to realize no income regardless of the
spread between the price at which the employee was permitted to
purchase the interest and the fair market value of the stock at the
exercise date. 365 In Delbert B. Geeseman3 66 the employer granted
the employee the right to purchase 800 shares of common stock in the
employer corporation at $40 per share. The option price was later
reduced to $30 after the fair market value of the stock had fallen to
less than $40. When the employee exercised the option the stock
was worth about $70 per share. The spread of $40 at the exercise
date was held not to constitute compensation to the employee, since
it was concluded that the employer intended to instill in the employee
a "proprietary attitude toward the company."3 67 Such an intent was
found even though the employer deducted the spread of $40 as compensation.36 8 The judicial adoption of the proprietary interest approach was followed by partial administrative acceptance of the
newly developed criterion. The Treasury abandoned the flat rule
that the "employee shall include in gross income the difference between the amount paid for the property and the amount of its fair
market value" 69 and substituted a rule that could co-exist with the
rule evolved by the courts based on the subjective intent of the employer.37 0 The regulations recognized the proprietary interest test
from 1939 to 1946,371 when the original categorical rule, which appears
s5Charles E. Adams, 39 B.T.A. 387 (1939), acq., 1939-1 CUM. BULL. 1; Gordan
M. Evans, 38 B.T.A. 1406 (1938), acq., 1939-1 CUM. BULL. 11; Delbert B. Geeseman, 38 B.T.A. 258 (1938), acq., 1939-1 CUM. BULL. 13.
36638 B.T.A. 258 (1938).
36TId. at 264.
368See also Estate of Lauson Stone, 19 T.C. 872, afl'd, 210 F.2d 33 (3d Cir. 1954).
But see Otto C. Schultz, 17 T.C. 695 (1951); Ray A. Noland, 12 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 1003 (1953).
369T.D. 3435, II-1 CUM. BULL. 50 (1923).
370This was accomplished by modifying T.D. 3435 by adding, "to the extent
that such difference is in the nature of - . . compensation." T.D. 4879, 1939-1
CUM. BULL. 159.
371T.D. 5507, 1946-1 Cum. BULL. 18; Treas. Reg. 118, §39.22(a)-l. See also I.T.
3795, 1946-1 CuM. BULL. 15, permitting a parallel or corresponding deduction to
the employer. The reason for the amendment in 1946 is not entirely clear, since
Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945), upon which the amendment was predicated, does not support the categorical position. In that case the employer granted
an option to the employee that was admittedly compensatory in nature. At the
date the option was granted the option price was not below the fair market value
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in the current regulations,37 2 was reinstated.

This matter is of interest here as a facet of the problem of providing adequate compensation for executive employees, because one
effort to defer compensation has taken the form of providing such
employees with stock in the employer corporation by granting options
to them to acquire stock at a price substantially below the fair market
value. If this device is successful, not only is the realization of income
postponed but the ultimate gain on a sale of the stock is taxed only
at favorable capital gains rates. 373 This result suggests the reason for
the commissioner's persistence in this area of executive compensation.
Of course a straight purchase of the corporate employer's stock at
market value is without immediate tax consequence either to the
employer or the employee; 374 there is no economic benefit accruing
to the employee in such a case, and there exists no feature of compensation, deferred or otherwise. When an element of compensation
creeps in, tax problems arise.
Notwithstanding the commissioner's position, the courts have
until recently adhered to the subjective test of whether compensation
was intended or whether instead the employer's purpose was to create
3 75
a proprietary interest in the employee.
of the stock, which was stock of another corporation. At the date the employee
exercised the option, however, the value of the stock was far in excess of the fixed
option price. In holding that the spread between option price and fair market
value of the stock constituted taxable compensation to the employee, the Supreme
Court did not render a decision at variance with the decisions in prior cases. The
Court did perhaps solidify the rule that when the option is in fact compensation,
the amount of compensation is measured by the spread between option price and
fair market value of the stock at the time the option is exercised. However, the
Court left open the question of whether in a proper case the option itself might
have value and, to that extent, be the measure of compensation.
372Treas. Reg. §1.61-2 (d) (2).
373See, e.g., Delbert B. Geeseman, 88 B.T.A. 258 (1938), acq., 1989-1 Cum. BuLL.
18. In that case the proprietary nature of the option was given judicial acceptance,
and the spread of $40 was not taxed. Nevertheless, the employee had a cost basis
of $30 per share-the option price; accordingly, upon a subsequent sale of such
stock, the employee would realize gain to the extent of the excess of the sales price
over his cost, INT. REy. CODE OF 1954, §§1001-02, 1012, which gain would be taxable
to him at favorable capital gains rates. Id. §§1201 et seq.
37 4See INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, §1032 (a); Palmer v. Commissioner, 802 U.S. 63
(1937).
375See, e.g., Commissioner v. Straus, 208 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1953); Charles E.
Sorensen, 22 T.C. 821 (1954); Abraham Rosenberg, 20 T.C. 5 (1953); Robert A.
Bowen, 18 CCH Tax Ct. Mere. 668 (1954); Donald B. Bradner, 11 CCH Tax Ct.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1958

71

Florida Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 4 [1958], Art. 4
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
In Commissioner v. LoBue376 the Supreme Court had to decide
whether a so-called proprietary interest option constituted taxable
income to the employee. The employer corporation adopted a plan
in 1944 whereby 10,000 shares of its common stock would be made
available to certain key employees over a period of three years. The
option price was $5 per share, and the fair market value of the stock
at the time the plan was adopted was 54.50 per share. LoBue was
granted an option in the next year, 1945, to purchase 150 shares of
stock, in 1946 an option to purchase an additional 150 shares, and
in 1947 an option to purchase forty additional shares. In all three
instances the options were not transferable and, being granted to provide incentive to key employees, were proprietary in nature. On the
dates LoBue received the $5 options, the stock had a fair market value
of $8, $19 and $19, respectively. In May, 1945, LoBue gave the corporation his note for $750 for the purchase of the 150 shares allotted to
him in that year, and similarly, in 1946, he gave his note in the amount
of $750 for his 1946 allotment of 150 shares. In February, 1947,
LoBue paid $200 in cash to the corporation in exercise of his 1947
allotment of forty shares. LoBue paid his two notes in the total
amount of $1,500 in May, 1946, and received then the 300 shares
allotted under the first two options. At the time the notes were given
the stock had a fair market value of $13 and $19 respectively. At the
time the notes were paid the stock had a fair market value of $30.
The taxpayer reported no taxable income with respect to the grant
or the exercise of the options. The commissioner asserted a deficiency
and measured the gain that he contended was compensation by the
difference between the option price and the fair market value of the
shares when the cash was paid. The Tax Court and the Court of
Appeals ruled in favor of LoBue, on the basis of the proprietary interest test.377 The Supreme Court, reversing, held that the employer's
intent to confer a proprietary interest on key employees is not determinative of the question. "When assets are transferred by an employer
to an employee to secure better services they are plainly compensation." 378 Holding that the spread at the date of exercise of the options and not at the date the options were granted constituted taxable
Mem. 566 (1952), aff'd, 209 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1953); James M. Lamond, 5 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 51 (1946).
376351 U.S. 243 (1956).

377Commissioner v. LoBue, 223 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1955); Philip J. LoBue, 22
T.C. 440 (1954); see text accompanying note 365 supra.
378351

U.S. 243, 247 (1956).
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compensation to the employee, the Court remanded the case to the
Tax Court to determine the question of whether the options were
exercised at the dates when LoBue gave his promissory notes to the
corporation or when he paid the notes. On remand the Tax Court
held that the options were exercised upon the delivery of the notes
in 1946 and 1947 by LoBue3"9 Since LoBue, the principal question
remaining unsettled is the point of time at which the spread is to
be measured for purposes of computing the employee compensation. 38
It will be observed that, if expectations are realized, even an option
to purchase at market value at the date the option is granted can
have onerous results in terms of ordinary income to the employee
upon exercise of the option.
The amount of compensation taxable to the employee at the time
the option is exercised is reflected in the employee's basis for the stock
acquired-8 1 and is deductible by the employer in the same amount also
38 2
at the time of exercise.
Recent suggestions that the LoBue result may be avoided, at least
in part, by an employer who is willing to grant a freely negotiable
option to key employees 38 3 rest partly on dicta in the Commissioner
v. Smith38 4 and LoBue opinions,38 5 which can also be traced back to
McNamara v. Commissioner.- 6 In the McNamara case the options,
a79Philip J. LoBue, 28 T.C. 1317 (1957), aJJd, 256 F.2d 735 (3d Cir. 1958). See
also James S. Ogsbury, 28 T.C. 93 (1957), af'd, 258 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1958). But see
Proposed Treas. Reg. §1.421-6 (b) (1), in which the commissioner takes the position
that employee compensation is measured by the spread between option prices and
fair market value of the stock at the time the stock is transferred to the employee,
pursuant to an exercise of the option.
3s0See note 379 supra.

3L8Proposed Treas. Reg. §1.421-6 (c) (1).
382Id. § 1.421-6(d); however, in order to be deductible, the spread constituting
the compensation must be reasonable in amount when added to other employee
compensation. INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 162 (a) (1).
383See Casey, Deferred-Compensation Plans Today: Their Status, Their Forms,
and Their Uses, 6 J. TAXATION 216 (1957); Grossman and Herzel, Employee Stock
Options, 1958 U. IL.. LAW%FORUm 45; McDowell, Tax on Spread in Unrestricted
Employee Stock Options, 34 TAxzs 209 (1956); Mills, Recent Developments in the
Taxation of Executive Compensation, 34 TAxEs 882 (1956); Note, 5 J. TAxATION
84 (1956).
384324 U.S. 177, 182 (1945).
385351 U.S. 243, 249 (1956).
386210 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1954). See also Stock Option, Not Profit from Its
Exercise, Is Compensation, 1 J. TAXATION 42 (1954); Sabin, The Non-Restricted
Employee Stock Option- An Executive's Delight, 11 TAX. L. R.v. 179 (1956). See
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unlike those involved in LoBue, were freely assignable and subject
to no restriction or condition concerning disposition by the employee.
The employee included in income the fair market value of the options
in the year received, and in the same year the employer deducted
that amount as compensation. Later in 1946 and 1947 McNamara
exercised the options.

Against the commissioner's contention that

the spread between the option price and the value of the stock at the
dates of exercise constituted taxable compensation to the employee,
the Court of Appeals held that the only compensation involved was
the option itself, the value of which had already been reported for
tax purposes. In other words, there may be tax advantage now in an
affirmative effort to set up an option in such a way that it will be
recognized as compensation at the time it is granted. However, this
is a speculative matter, and the decided cases serve as only a very
uncertain guide for accomplishing a McNamara result in the future. 3s7
As an alternative for use in the event the employer is unwilling
to grant an unconditional option free of restrictions, several recent
cases 388 have prompted the suggestion 33 9 that the employer issue an
option, itself not freely alienable, that permits the employee to puralso Commissioner v. Estate of Lauson Stone, 210 F.2d 33 (3d Cir. 1954), in which
the president of the corporation purchased 100 stock warrants for $10 each, permitting him to buy 10,000 shares of stock in the corporation at a price that exceeded fair market value of the stock by $1 per share. The employee included
in gross income the sum of $5,000, the amount he determined to be the excess of value over the amount he paid for the warrants that were sold. The
corporation deducted $5,000 from income in the year of purchase. The warrants
were freely assignable, and in the next year the employee sold 89 of the warrants
at quite a sizable gain and reported his gain as capital gain. Notwithstanding the
fact that the employer deducted an amount equal to the gain reported by the
employee, the court held such gain to be capital gain; the warrants themselves
constituted the compensation. See also Estate of James S. Ogsbury, 28 T.C. 93
(1957), afJ'd, 258 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1958). But see Proposed Treas. Reg. §1.4216 (b) (2).
3S7An attempt to ascribe a fair market value to stock, or even an option, in
the case of a close corporation would be difficult if not impossible; see Note, 11
TAX. L. Rav. 179, 187 (1956). But see Greenberger, Valuation Problems in Dispositions of Property, N.Y.U. 14TH INST. ON FFD. TAX. 409, 419 (1956). See Proposed
Treas. Reg. §1.421-6 and Treas. Reg. §1.61-2 (d) (2).
3asHarold H. Kuchman, 18 T.C. 154 (1952), acq., 1952-2 Cust. BULL. 2; Robert
Lehman, 17 T.C. 652 (1951). See also MacDonald v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 534
(7th Cir. 1956); Phil Kalech, 23 T.C. 672 (1955), acq., 1955-2 Cus. BULL. 7. But cf.
Charles E. Sorensen, 22 T.C. 321 (1954).
s89See Mills, Recent Developments in the Taxation of Executive Compensation,
34 TAXES 882, 889 (1956). See also note 383 supra.
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chase stock in the employer corporation, but imposing substantial
restrictions upon the employee's retention and disposition of the stock
acquired by its exercise. In such cases, the restrictions have been held
to render impossible a determination of market value of the stock at
the time of exercise, defeating the application of the LoBue decision.
The contention is that the exercise of such an option can give rise
to no taxable income to the employee. 390 Although there is authority
against imposition of the tax at the time the restrictions on retention
or disposition of the stock are removed or lapse, 3 9 1 the Treasury takes
the opposite position. 3 2 Perhaps the safest course to follow is one
that provides for immediate transfer of stock to the employee for
93
which he pays fair market value in the form of long-term notes.
Obviously in order for such a plan to be financially attractive to the
employee he must anticipate that the value of the stock will accelerate
quickly, and for the plan to gain recognition at face value the employee must be unconditionally liable for the discharge of his obligations. Although such a device is founded on speculation and an adventurous spirit, it is not completely unrealistic in an expanding
economy, 394 and it may insulate against the LoBue possibility. Of
course if this alternative is used there is no employer deduction, since
the transaction is simply a sale for value.
Restricted Stock Options. Since

1950,395

Congress has provided

special statutory rules for the tax treatment of so-called restricted

39OSee, e.g., Harold H. Kuchman, 18 T.C. 154 (1952), acq., 1952-2 Cum. BULL. 2.
391Cf. Robert Lehman, 17 T.C. 652 (1951).
392See Proposed Treas. Reg. §1.421-6(b)(1), providing that "if the person to
whom the property [stock] is transferred does not acquire full ownership of the
...[stock] at the time of such transfer (that is, the . .. [stock] is transferred
subject to restrictions which substantially affect its value), the employee realizes
the compensation at the time... (... such restrictions lapse), and the amount of
such compensation is the difference between the amount paid for the . . . [stock]
and the fair market value of the ... [stock] at the time such person acquires full
ownership." See also Note, 5 J. TAXATION 84 (1956), and articles cited in note
383 supra.
39
3See note 379 supra.
394See, e.g., BRYSON and LrnvRE, TAX AsPEcts oF ExEctrrxvns' COMPENSATION
65 et seq. (P.L.I. 1955). See also Ekman, Arrangements for Deferring Compensation
Other Than Stock Options and Pension or Profit-SharingPlans, N.Y.U. 14TH INsT.
ON FED. TAX. 1123 (1956).

395See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 130A.
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stock options ss

These rules do not pre-empt the option area 397

but do offer a great degree of certainty when applicable.
In general the employee realizes no taxable income upon either
the granting or the exercise of a restricted stock option.398 Income
is deferred until the stock obtained under the option is disposed of
by the employee, 39 and even then all or at least a portion of the gain
realized may be subject only to favorable capital gains treatment 40 0
if precise statutory requirements relating to disposition are observed.
4 0°
If the stock is held by the employee for the requisite holding period 1
upon a disposition of such stock the employee is considered to have
received ordinary income only to the extent of the lesser of (1) the
amount by which the fair market value of the stock at the time the
option was granted exceeded the option price, or (2) the amount by
which the fair market value of the stock at the date the stock is disposed of exceeded the option price.402 The statute treats the amount
so determined as compensation to the employee in the year of disposition of the stock, and this same amount is added to the employee's
396INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §421; the statutory restricted stock option is defined
by id. §421 (d); the rules relating to the treatment of the employee upon exercise
of the option and sale of stock so acquired are provided in id. §§421 (a). (b), (f).
397The statutory restricted stock option rules are not exclusive; "options which
do not qualify as 'restricted stock options' will continue to be taxed as under
existing law." S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1950).
3981n order to qualify as a restricted stock option, the option must not be
transferable by the employee, except at death; at the time it is granted the
option price must be at least 85% of the fair market value of the stock subject to
the option; and the option by its terms may not be exercisable after the expiration
of 10 years from the date on which it was granted. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§421 (d) (1). In general the restricted stock option provisions do not apply unless
the optionee is an employee of the granting corporation at the time of exercise or
the option is exercised within 3 months after termination of employment. Id.
§421 (a).
399The term disposition "includes a sale, exchange, gift, or a transfer of legal
title." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §421 (d) (4); but the term does not include a transfer by will or intestacy.
40 0
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §421 (b).
40The stock acquired pursuant to an exercise of the option may not be disposed of within 2 years from the date the option is granted or within 6 months
after the stock is transferred to the exercising employee.

INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,

§421 (b), (f); see Treas. Reg. §§1.421-5 (a) (2), 1.421-5 (e) and Proposed Treas. Reg.
§1.421-6 (b) (6).
0
4 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §421 (b) (1). Id. §421 (b) (2) provides rules relating
to variable price options under which the option price fluctuates with the fair
market value of the stock subject to the option. See id. §421 (d) (7).
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basis for his stock for purposes of determining the amount of the gain,
if any, to which the capital gains rates apply.403 The following ex40 4
amples appear in the regulations:
"Example (1). On June 1, 1954, the X Corporation grants
to E, an employee, a restricted stock option to purchase a share
of X Corporation's stock for $85. The fair market value of the
X Corporation stock on such date is $100 per share. On June
1, 1955, E exercises the restricted stock option and on that
date the X Corporation transfers the share of stock to E. On
January 1, 1957, E sells the share for $150, its fair market value
on that date. E makes his income tax return on the basis of the
calendar year. The income tax consequences to E and X Corporation are as follows: (i) Compensation in the amount of $15
is includible in E's gross income for 1957, the year of the disposition of the share. The $15 represents the difference between
the option price ($85) and the fair market value of the share
on the date the option was granted ($100), since such value is
less than the fair market value of the share on the date of
disposition ($150). For the purpose of computing E's gain or
loss on the sale of the share, E's cost basis of $85 is increased
by $15, the amount includible in E's gross income as compensation. Thus, E's basis for the share is $100. Since the share
was sold for $150, E realizes a gain of $50, which is treated as
long-term capital gain; (ii) The X Corporation is entitled to no
deduction under section 162 at any time with respect to the
share transferred to E.
"Example (2). Assume, in example (1), that E sells the
share of X Corporation stock on January 1, 1958, for $75, its
fair market value on that date. Since $75 is less than the option
price ($85), no amount in respect of the sale is includible as
compensation in E's gross income for 1958. E's basis for determining gain or loss on the sale is $85. Since E sold the share
for $75, E realized a loss of $10 on the sale, which loss is
treated as a long-term capital loss."
An even more favorable result is attainable if at the time the option is granted the option price is at least 950 of the fair market
value of the stock. In this case, no part of the proceeds from a subse3

1954, §421 (b).
404Treas. Reg. §1.421-5 (b) (3), Examples (1), (2).
4O INT. REv. CoDE oF
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quent sale of the stock is treated as compensation if the stock is held
for the requisite period,405 and any gain from the sale is treated as
long-term capital gain.406
The special provisions of the restricted stock option section do
not apply if the employee disposes of his stock within two years from
the date on which the option was granted or within six months from
the date on which he acquired the stock pursuant to an exercise of
the option. 407 If an employee exercises a restricted stock option but
dies prior to the running of the requisite holding period, his death
is not a disqualifying disposition that defeats the application of the
special provisions for failure to hold the stock for the required period.
However, his death is the occasion for recognition of ordinary income
in accordance with the rules discussed above concerning the measure
of compensation. No compensation is recognized in the case of 95%
options, as is always true.408 If the option price was less than 95%
but at least 85% of the value of the stock at the time of the grant
there is included in the employee's income for the period ending with
his death the amount by which the option price is exceeded by the
lesser of (1) the fair market value of the stock at the time of death,
or (2) the fair market value of the stock at the time the option was
granted. 40 9 A disposition of the stock by the executor, administrator,
or legatee is not a disposition by the decedent; 410 and upon such a
sale of the stock gain or loss is measured in accordance with usual basis
provisions that relate to the fair market value of the stock at the
41
date of the employee's death. '
Suppose that without exercising the option the employee dies
during the time within which the option may be exercised. In this
case the provisions relating to restricted stock options apply to a
limited extent, but requirements relating to holding period and employment do not apply to the estate, heir or legatee who may exercise
the option. 412 An exercise of the option by the estate, heir or legatee
is treated as if it were an exercise-by the employee; 41 3 and even if the
405See note 401 supra.
406See Treas. Reg. § 1.421-5 (a) (4), Examples.
407See note 401 supra.
4
osSee Treas. Reg. §1.421-5 (a) (4).
409INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §421 (b) (1). See also id. §421 (b) (2); note 402 supra.
4
lOTreas. Reg. §1.421-5 (a) (2).
4111d. §1.421-5(b) (2); INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §1014(a); see Treas. Reg.
§1.421-5 (b) (3), Example (6).
412INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §421 (d) (6) (A).

41slbid; accordingly, the exercise of the option by the estate will not give rise to
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stock so acquired is disposed of within two years after the granting
of such option or within six months after the transfer of the stock
pursuant to the exercise of such option, the tax consequences are generally the same as in the case of a disposition by the employee after
expiration of the requisite periods. 414 The differences are: (1) if an
amount is required to be included in the gross income of the estate
or beneficiary as compensation, a deduction may be available as a
result of the inclusion of the value of the option in the gross estate of
the deceased employee; 415 and (2) upon a disposition of the stock
acquired by exercise of the option, the basis of such stock is determined in general by reference to the option price of the stock
plus the value of the option itself at the date of the employee's
416
death.
Some of the tax advantages seemingly inherent in the use of restricted stock options may appear less substantial upon closer analysis.4'7 If the option is a restricted stock option within the provisions

of the Code outlined above, the employer is permitted no deduction
at any time.4' 8 This and two additional factors may make the restricted
stock option useless to some corporations. In the case of an employee
owning more than 10% of the total combined voting power of all
any taxable income. Id. §421 (a) (1); see note 398 supra.
414Treas. Reg. §1.421-5 (d) (1).
4151NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §421 (d) (6) (B); see Treas. Reg. §1.421-5 (d) (3). Such
deduction is permitted in accordance with INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §691 (c). For a
detailed discussion see Guterman, Stock Options of Deceased Executives, N.Y.U.
14r'H INST. ON FED. TAx. 1085 (1956).
416Pub. L. No. 85-320, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), repealing INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, §1014(d), adding id. §421(d) (6) (C), effective with respect to employees
dying after Dec. 31, 1956. A detailed explanation of the new provision appears
in S. REP. No. 1183, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); see Grossman and Herzel, supra
note 383, at 57.
417For a more detailed discussion of the technical aspects of restricted stock
options see Dean, Employee Stock Options, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1403 (1953); Grossman and Herzel, supra note 383; Lentz, Restricted Stock Options- Problems of
the Executive, N.Y.U. 14TH INST. ON FED. TAx 1053 (1956), Stock Ownership PlansOptions, Warrants, Leverage Stock, N.Y.U. 13TH INsT. ON FED. Tax. 499 (1955);
Lyon, Employee Stock Purchase Arrangements, 31 TAxrs 1021 (1953); Rudick,
Executives' Compensation, Including Stock Option Arrangements Under the 1954
Code, U. So. CAL. 1955 TAX INsT. 655.
41sINT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, §421 (a) (2). The price paid for the stock pursuant
to the option is considered to be the total price received by the corporation for
the stock. Id. §421 (a) (3). This, of course, gives rise to no gain or loss to the
corporation. Id. § 1032 (a).
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classes of stock of the corporation granting the option, the option will
not qualify unless at the time the option is granted the option price
is at least 110% (instead of 85%) of the fair market value of the stock
subject to the option. 419 This percentage requirement will usually
rule out the use of the restricted stock option by a close corporation.
Furthermore, even if there were no such percentage rule, in order to
qualify as a restricted stock option the option price must be fixed in
terms of the fair market value of the stock at the date the option is
granted.420 In the case of corporations whose stock is not actively
traded, valuation problems may make it difficult to show compliance
with the market value requirement.421 Such companies can, however,
probably make use of stock options outside the restricted category,
since in that area the difficulty in accurately establishing a fair
market value for the stock, though a problem, does not have the
42
crucial significance that it has in the case of restricted stock options. 2
Fringe Benefits. Although compensation is generally income regardless of the form in which it is paid, the Code either expressly or
by implication permits employers to confer economic benefit on em42 3
ployees in several ways without the usual tax consequences.
The statute expressly excludes from an employee's gross income
meals and lodging furnished by the employer, 424 if in general the
410INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §421 (d) (1) (C); furthermore, the option by its terms
must expire within 5, instead of 10, years. This provision has its own constructive
ownership rules pursuant to which stock owned by members of the stockholder's
"family" is considered to be owned by the stockholder for purposes of computing
the requisite 10% voting ownership. Id. §421 (d) (1) (C) (i). See also id. §421 (d)(1) (C) (ii).
420INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § §421 (d) (1) (A), 421 (e). See notes 398, 406 supra.
421But see Bergen, Restricted Stock Options for Executives of Closely Held
Corporations, N.Y.U. 11TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 145 (1953). See also Treas. Reg.
§1.421-2 (a) (5).
422See Cox, Stock Arrangements for Executives, N.Y.U. 16TH INST. ON FED. TAX.
105 (1958). See also Rustigan, Stock Options, N.Y.U. 15TH IN T. ON FED. TAX. 1117
(1957).
423See Landman, The Taxability of Fringe Benefits, 33 TAXES 173 (1955). See
also Bittker, The Individual as Wage Earner, N.Y.U. 11TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1147
(1953); Gordon, Health and Welfare Plans - Other Fringe Benefits, N.Y.U. 13TH
INST. ON FaD. TAX. 521 (1955); Jacobs, Glamorous Fringe Benefits, 36 B.U.L. REV.
151 (1956); Mintz, Executive Expense Accounts and Fringe Benefits: A Problem
in Management, Morality and Revenue, 1 J. TAXATION 2 (1954); Osmond, The
Corporate Executive and the Business Expense Deduction, 33 TAXEs 68 (1955).
424INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §119. "This section applies only to meals and lodging
furnished in kind. Therefore, any cash allowances for meals or lodging received
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meals are furnished for the convenience of the employer and are
furnished on the business premises of the employer (and in the case
of lodging if such lodging is required to be accepted as a condition
of the employment). 25 Accordingly, meals and lodging furnished by
a hotel on its premises to the business manager who is required to
be present on the premises are received by him tax-free notwithstanding the obvious economic benefit to the employee. 426 Costs incurred
by the employer in this respect are deductible as an ordinary and
427
necessary business expense.
If an employee incurs business expenses on behalf of his employer 2s for which he is reimbursed, the transactions probably will
not affect the employee's tax liability. Although he must include
the amount of employer reimbursement in income,4 2 9 the expenses
by an employee will continue to be includible in gross income ... to the extent
that such allowances represent compensation." H. R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. A39 (1954). See also H. R. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1954).
Similarly the regulations specify that "the exclusion .. . applies only to meals and
lodging furnished in kind, without charge or cost to the employee." Treas. Reg.
§1.119-1 (c) (2). However, a recent case refused to follow the "in kind" provisions
and permitted an employee to exclude the rental value of lodging otherwise qualifying within the provisions of §119, even though the employer withheld it from
his pay. The employee was permitted to report only the net salary received.
Boykin v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 249 (8th Cir. 1958). But see Rev. Rul. 58-545,
1958-45 INT. REV. BULL. 11. Moreover, it is doubtful that supper money paid by
the employer with respect to an employee who works late will be taxable to the
employee. O.D. 514, 2 Cum. BULL. 90 (1920). See also Mim. 5023, 1940-1 CUm.
BuLL. 14.
425A similar result was reached prior to 1954 in the absence of express statutory
provision. E.g., Arthur Benaglia, 36 B.T.A. 838 (1937); Mina. 6472, 1950-1 CuM.
BULL. 15; see Gutkin and Beck, Some Problems in "Convenience of the Employer,"

36 TAxEs 153 (1958).
4268ee, e.g., Arthur Benaglia, 36 B.T.A. 838 (1937). See also G. G. Papineau,
16 T.C. 130 (1951), nonacq., 1952-2 Cum. BULL. 5; Henry M. Lees, 12 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 472 (1953).
4271Tr. REv. CODE OF 1954, §162 (a). If the meals and lodging are taxed to the
employee because of failure to comply with §119, the employer's costs may still
be deductible as compensation, subject to the requirement of reasonableness. Reynard Corp., 30 B.T.A. 451 (1934); Henry B. Peacock, Jr., 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
1252 (1956); E. M. Godson, 5 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 648 (1946); cf. Rodgers Dairy
Co., 14 T.C. 66 (1950), acq., 1950-1 Cure. BULL. 4.
42sSuch expenses are deductible by the employee; see Sclumidlapp v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1938); Note, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1508 (1953).
429Cf. Treas. Reg. §1.62-1 (f) (1).
Recently the Treasury has taken steps to
obtain sufficient information with respect to reimbursed expenses of employees.
Id. §1.162-17.
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are deductible from the employee's gross income, 43 0 and if the expenses equal the amount of reimbursement the result will be a
wash. Thus, it is possible for the executive to entertain, 43 belong to
clubs4 3 2 and even safari to Africa 43 without adverse tax consequences;
and the same result follows even if such expense is paid directly by
the employer. 4 In this area the boundaries are very poorly defined.
Certainly many employees receive economic benefits tax-free, but it is
435
difficult to say at what point such benefits become taxable.
If an employee is moved by his employer to another post, the move
being primarily for the employer's convenience, amounts received by
the employee to reimburse him for the expense of moving do not
increase the employee's tax.' 3 The doctrine has been extended to
cover amounts received by an employee from his employer as reimof his
bursement for a loss that the employee sustained on the sale
437
residence when he was required to move to a new location.
4301NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§162(a), 62. Such expenses must, of course, be
"ordinary and necessary" business expenses. For a study of this and related aspects
of the problem see Osmond, supra note 423. See also Bailey, Compensation with
the Fringe on Top, N.Y.U. 16TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 75 (1958).
431Use of yachts, E. E. Dickinson, 8 B.T.A. 722 (1927), acq., VII-1 CUM. BULL.
9 (1928); Charles J. McLennan, 4 CCH Tax. Ct. Mem. 672 (1945); cI. Richard A.
Sutter, 21 T.C. 170 (1953), acq., 1954-1 CUM. BULL. 6; dinners and cocktails, James
Schulz, 16 T.C. 401 (1951), acq., 1951-2 CUM. BULL. 4. The dividend-stockholder
question is not reached here; cf. Thomas W. Briggs, 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 440
(1956). With respect to the commissioner's requirement of proof, see Rev. Rul.
54-195, 1954-1 CuI. BULL. 47. See also Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d
Cir. 1930), setting forth a rule of reason to be used in the absence of adequate
proof of such expenses. See also Treas. Reg. §1.162-17.
43Johnson v. United States, 45 F. Supp. 377 (S.D. Cal. 1941), rev'd on other
grounds, 135 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1943). See also R. G. Bock, 9 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
709, (1950).
433Sanitary Farms Dairy, Inc., 25 T.C. 463 (1955), acq., 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 8.
434See, e.g., Sanitary Farms Dairy, Inc., supra note 433; cf. SST 302, 1938-1
Cum. BULL. 456. See also Fred W. Leadbetter, 39 B.T.A. 629 (1939); Hal E. Roach,
20 B.T.A. 919 (1930), nonacq., X-1 CUm. BULL. 91 (1931). But see Rodgers Dairy
Co., 14 T.C. 66 (1950), acq., 1950-2 CuM. BULL. 4. For more detailed discussion of
this phase of the problem see Landman, supra note 423; for a recent summary
discussion of various forms of fringe benefits see Murphy, Introduction to Man-

agement Compensation, 1958 U.

ILL. LAW FORUM 1, 11.

435See Jacobs, Glamorous Fringe Benefits, 36 B.U.L. REv. 151 (1956).
436Rev. Rul. 54-429, 1954-2 CUM. BULL. 53. However, if a prospective employer
pays moving expense as inducement to employment, such expenses are compensation to the employee. United States v. Woodall, 255 F.2d 370 (10th Cir. 1958);
Rev. Rul. 55-140, 1955-1 CUM. BULL. 317.
437Otto Sorg Schairer, 9 T.C. 549 (1947). But cf. LeGrand v. United States 105
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An employer can confer tax-free economic benefits upon employees
by way of accident, health 438 and wage continuation plans.439 A
specific provision of the Code excludes from employees' income 440
employer contributions to accident or health plans for the benefit
of employees and their wives and dependents. In addition, amounts
actually received by an employee or his family under such a plan, as
reimbursement for medical expenses that have not been deducted by
the employee, do not constitute taxable income to the employee.44 " A
final provision in the accident and health area, concerning employer
wage continuation plans, permits the employee to exclude from gross
income amounts received by him as wages or payments in lieu of
wages up to $100 for each full week for a period during which the
442
employee is absent from work on account of injury or sickness.
In this area of disability, accident and health insurance (or like
benefits paid directly by the employer) there is no requirement that
the plan be nondiscriminatory. The term plan is defined in the regulations in very general terms, which require little formality. 443 The
definition makes it clear that an employer may take out accident and
F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Ohio 1952); Jesse S. Rinehart, 18 T.C. 672 (1952).
43 8

INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§105 (b), 106.
439Ad. §§105 (c), (d), 106.

4401d. §106.
4411d. §105 (b). Similarly gross income does not include amounts received
through accident or health insurance funded by the employer or amounts received
directly from the employer pursuant to a plan to the extent that such amounts
are payment for injury to or loss of a member or function of the body of the
employee, his spouse, or a dependent of the employee and are unrelated to the
period during which the employee is absent from work. Id. §105 (c).
4421NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §105 (d); in general the provision is inapplicable
in the case of sickness for the first 7 days of absence unless the employee is hospitalized; see Treas. Reg. §1.105-4. Absence from work on account of illness of
other family members will not qualify under this provision; see Rev. Rul. 55-283,
1955-1 CuM. BULL. 17.
443Treas. Reg. §1.105-5 provides: "In general, an accident or health plan is
an arrangement for the payment of amounts to employees in the event of personal injuries or sickness. A plan may cover one or more employees, and there
may be different plans for different employees ....
An accident or health plan
may be either insured or noninsured, and it is not necessary that the plan be
in writing or that the employee's rights to benefits under the plan be enforceable. However, if the employee's rights are not enforceable, an amount will be
deemed to be received under a plan only if, on the date the employee became
sick or injured, the employee was covered by a plan (or a program, policy, or custom having the effect of a plan) .... and notice or knowledge of such plan was
reasonably available to the employee ..
"
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health insurance exclusively for the benefit of its managerial employees
without affecting the taxable income of such employees. 44 4 Furthermore, contributions or direct payments for these purposes are deductible by the employer even though they are not income to the
44
employee beneficiaries. In another part of this article, the question was raised whether a
corporation's purchase of insurance on the lives of controlling shareholders constitutes a dividend. 4 46 The question raised here is whether
an employee realizes income as compensation if an employer pays insurance premiums on insurance policies on the life of the employee.
Several possible circumstances must be differentiated.
(1) If the employer purchases insurance on the lives of individual employees who have the right to designate the
beneficiaries (or if the estates of such employees are the
beneficiaries), the payment of premiums constitutes additional compensation to the insured employees. 4 7 Accordingly, such insurance coverage will not ease the tax
burden of the corporate executive, but the employer may
448
deduct the premium payments.
(2) If the employer owns the policy and is the beneficiary,
the employee realizes no income by reason of the employer's payment of premiums;4 49 however, in this case
the employer is not entitled to deduct the amount of the
premiums. 45 0 Here, of course, there is no economic benefit
to the employee as such, but if he is also a shareholder his
benefit may be substantial.

45 1

444Ibid; for more detailed discussion see Gordon, supra note 423.
445Treas. Reg. §1.162-10 (a), (c).
446See "General Principles Peculiarly Applicable to Close Corporations" supra.
447Frank D. Yuengling, 27 B.T.A. 782 (1933), af'd, 69 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1934);
N. Loring Danforth, 18 B.T.A. 1221 (1930); George Matthew Adams, 18 B.T.A. 381
(1929). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2 (d) (2).
448NT. REv. CODE OF

1954, §162 (a); however, the compensation when added to

other compensation must be reasonable in amount, G.C.M. 8432, IX-2 CuM. BULL.
114 (1930). It should be noted that the amounts of the premiums must be included in the gross income of the insured employees even though the corporate
deduction is disallowed; cf. A.R.R. 6035, II-1 CuM. BULL. 102 (1924); G.C.M. 6952,
VIII-2 CuM. BULL. 192 (1929). See also notes 329 and 334 supra.
449Cf. Prunier v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1957).
450INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §264; however, upon the death of the insured
employee the proceeds are not taxable to the employer, id. §101.
45Prunier v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 818 (1st. Cir. 1957).
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(3) Instead of individual policies of life insurance, an employer may purchase group life insurance protection for
its employees. The commissioner has ruled that in the
case of group life insurance, the payment of premiums
by the employer will not constitute taxable income to the
covered employees even if such employees may designate
the beneficiaries of the policies or if the proceeds are
payable to the estates of the insured employees, provided
that the employees' rights in the insurance are forfeitable
upon separation from service and the insurance protection
is simply term insurance. 52 Furthermore, the payments
453
by the employer are deductible as a business expense.
Thus, in general, an employer may provide group term
insurance protection for his employees as a tax-free economic benefit the cost of which can be deducted from the
454
employer's gross income.
The tax consequences of death benefits paid by an employer to
452Mim. 6477, 1950-1 Cum. BULL. 16, 17: "The value of any permanent insurance . . .in which the right of an employee changes from forfeitable to nonforfeitable in case of subsequent separation from service is considered a premium
paid for a permanent form of insurance at the time of the change, and such
value .. . is required to be included in his income for the year in which the
change occurs." Cf. Rev. Rul. 56-400, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 116. See also Treas.
Reg. §1.61-2(d)(2); G.C.M. 16069, XV-1 CuM. BULL. 84 (1936).
45 3
INT. R.v. CODE OF 1954, §162; L.O. 1014, 2 CUM. BULL. 88 (1920).
454In recent years a new concept providing similar advantages to the employee
has developed in the tax law, descriptively termed "split-dollar" life insurance. In
general this alternative to group term insurance envisages the payment of premiums
by both employer and employee and in substance results in the employer making
an interest-free loan to the insured employee. Here a policy of life insurance is
taken out, with the employer paying the premiums equal to the amount of the cash
surrender value of the policy; the employee pays the balance of the premiums. The
employer is the beneficiary of the policy only to the extent of the cash surrender
value. The employee's designated beneficiary receives the death proceeds upon
the death of the employee insured, less the amount of such proceeds payable
to the employer, which in effect is the repayment of a loan. Though the employer is entitled to no deduction for the premiums paid, the device permits
the employee to receive a true economic benefit without any adverse tax consequences. See Rev. Rul. 55-713, 1955-2 CuM. BULL. 23; for a more detailed discussion of split-dollar life insurance, see Becker and Sloan, Split-Dollar and BankFinanced Insurance Plans, 35 TAXEs 842 (1957); Redeker, Split Dollar Insurance,
N.Y.U. 15TH INsT. ON FED. TAx. 249 (1957). See also Blake, Fringe Benefits Programs,
36 TAxEs 858 (1958).
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his employee's survivors have been the subject of much administrative vacillation.455 Are such payments taxable income although paid
to one other than the one who performed services for the employer,
or a nontaxable gift?456 Does it matter whether they are paid voluntarily or pursuant to a contractual agreement? 45s Should they be
treated the same as the proceeds of a conventional insurance policy?45s
Present Code provisions generally exclude from the recipient's gross
income such employee death benefits up to $5,000 for each employeedecedent regardless of the number of his employers who make such

45sCompare I.T.

3329, 1939-2 CuM. BULL. 153, with I.T. 4027, 1950-2 CuM. BULL.
MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §6.07 (rev. ed.

9. For brief discussion see 1
1956).

4 56

In resolving this question the courts have in general looked to the intention
of the employer; see, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 129 F. Supp. 759 (D. Mass. 1955).
The commissioner has asserted that death benefits paid to an employee's survivors
are taxable income even though such payments are voluntary and no services were
rendered by the recipient if in fact services were rendered to the employer. I.T.
4027, 1950-2 CuM. BULL. 9. However, the courts in general have been more liberal;
see, e.g., Rodner v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Estate of Arthur
W. Hellstrom, 24 T.C. 916 (1955). A deduction by the employer of the amounts
paid has not prejudiced the recipient; such payments nevertheless have been
held gifts. See Estate of Arthur W. Hellstrom, supra.
457"The requirement under the 1939 Code that the benefits be paid under a
contract has been eliminated." S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 180 (1954).
Compare Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §22 (b) (1) (B), with INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§101 (b). Though not all voluntary payments are gifts. Cf. Fisher v. United States,
supra note 456. The fact that a death benefit payment is voluntary has been judicially catalogued as an important factor pointing toward a finding of gift.
Bounds v. United States, 59-1 U.S. Tax Cas. f9159 (4th Cir. 1958); Estate of John
Hekman, 16 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 304 (1957); Estate of Ralph W. Reardon, 14
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 577 (1955); Ruth Hahn, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 308 (1954).
Payments made under an enforceable obligation are not based on generosity and
are therefore probably income to the recipient. Flarsheim v. United States, 62
F. Supp. 740, and companion case at 743 (E.D. Mo. 1945), afl'd, 156 F.2d 105 (8th
Cir. 1946); Rodner v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 233, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (dictum);
cf. Bausch's Estate v. Commissioner, 186 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1951). See also Allinger
v. United States, 58-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9949 (E.D. Mich. 1958); T.I.R. No. 87, 6
CCH 1958 STAND. FED. TAX. REa.
6662.
45 8Gross income does not include amounts received under a life insurance contract if such amounts are paid by reason of the death of the insured. INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, §101 (a) (1). This provision is not applicable in the case of payments
to an employee's survivors. Id. §101 (b). A similarity between life insurance generally and employee death benefits has not gone unnoticed; see Nelson, The New
$5,000 Death Benefit, 31 TAxEs 629 (1953).
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payments. 459 But outside the express statutory provisions much un46
certainty persists. 0
Further Comments on Compensation
Throughout the above discussion mention has been made of the
rule that compensation is deductible by the employer only to the
extent that it is reasonable in amount. 61 An interesting argument
has been made that the reasonableness requirement is not a limitation
at all on the deductibility of salaries actually paid and that the
interpretation treating it as limiting the deductibility of salary pay462
ments for services rendered is a misinterpretation of the statute.
However, this position has been rejected,463 and the reasonableness
requirement is established as a limitation on the allowable deduction
for compensation. 464
45

0INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §101 (b), limits the aggregate exclusion to $5,000
per employee; see H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A30 (1954). Furthermore,
the provision makes no reference to contractual payments; see H.R. RE. No. 1337,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 180 (1954); cf.
Rodner v. United States, supra note 457. The exclusion is inapplicable to payments in which the employee had a nonforfeitable right immediately before his
death, unless the total sum is payable pursuant to INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§402 (a) (3), under a qualified plan and is paid to the recipient within one taxable
year by reason of the employee's death. In such case the beneficiary can exclude
$5,000 from income and report the excess over that amount as capital gain. Id.
§101 (b) (2) (B). This exclusion does not apply to amounts received by a beneficiary
under a joint and survivor annuity contract if in general the employee had the
right to receive annuity payments prior to his death. Id. §101 (b) (2) (C). The
statutory exclusion does not apply, of course, to payments constituting uncollected
salary. Treas. Reg. §1.101-2 (a) (2); see INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §691.
46OThe primary and confused issue is whether INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §101 (b),
pre-empts the area of employee death benefits; see Bounds v. United States, 59-1
U.S. Tax Cas. 19159 (4th Cir. 1959) (dictum); notes 456, 457 supra; see Groh,
Voluntary Payments to an Employee's Widow, 36 TAxas 333 (1958). See also

H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra note 459; see generally Beck, Family Benefits and Family
Security: Employee Death Payments, N.Y.U. 13TH INST. ON FED. TAx. 471 (1955).
4 1
6 INT.

REv. CODE OF

1954, §162(a), allows as a deduction all ordinary and

necessary business expenses, including "a reasonable allowance for salaries or

other compensation for personal services actually rendered." (Emphasis added.)
462See Griswold, New Light on "A Reasonable Allowance for Salaries;" 59
HARv. L. REv. 286 (1945), The Deduction of a Reasonable Allowance for SalariesThe Undefined Power of the Commissioner, 56 HARv. L. REv. 997 (1943).
463Em.

H. Mettler & Sons, 8 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 329 (1949), aff'd, 181 F.2d

848 (9th Cir. 1950).
46

4See 4 MERTENs, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§25.61,.68 (1954).
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The question whether salaries are reasonable is most likely to
arise in cases involving small or closely held companies.4 65 If a corporation that is taxed as such (that is, not as a pseudo corporation)
is able to distribute profits in the guise of salaries,4 16 this will reduce
the taxable income of the corporation and thereby minimize the
effects of practical double taxation. 467 Deductible salary payments
escape the corporate tax, whereas dividends are nondeductible corporate distributions. In either event, salary or dividend, the recipient
has generally the same tax consequence, since what he receives is
3
ordinary income, although dividends qualify for a small exclusion4 8
and a limited tax credit.469

As early as 1929 the Supreme Court sustained the commissioner's
disallowance of approximately 75% of one million dollars paid as
compensation to members of the board of directors of a corporation
in addition to their regular salaries. The Court reasoned that the
amount was so greatly in excess of compensation usually paid to corporate directors that there was a strong inference that the corporation
was distributing net profits disguised as salary. Accordingly, the
Court allowed the deduction of only a small fraction of the additional
sums paid, as reasonable compensation.

47

0

It should be noted that the question of reasonableness, although
most likely to arise in the case of employee-owners, is not limited to
salary payments to employees who are also shareholders of the corporation. The reasonableness limitation has been invoked in cases in
which the employee is neither an owner nor related to the owners of
47 1

the business.

The question whether compensation is reasonable in amount
465See Treas. Reg. §1.162-7 (b) (1).
466See "Close Corporations," "The Pseudo Corporation" supra.
46
7See Lowndes, Taxing the Income of the Close Corporation, 18 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 558, 560 (1953).
8

46 INT. REV. CODE OF

1954, §116.

469Id. §34.

47OBotany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282 (1929).
4 71
1n Patton v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 28 (6th Cir. 1948), the employee worked
for a partnership as a bookkeeper and was paid a salary, which was measured
in terms of partnership profits. The court held the salary to be unreasonable for
a year in which the partnership business was unexpectedly good. But cf. Treas.
Reg. §1.162-7(b)(2), indicating that contingent compensation will not be held
unreasonable if salary is unusually large in comparison to what would otherwise
be paid if under the salary contract the contingent salary formula is reasonable

as such. See id. § 1.162-7 (b) (3).
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is a factual one with respect to which the corporation seeking to
sustain a claimed salary deduction must bear the burden of proof.
The myriad judicial opinions dealing with the reasonableness issue
provide a guide to the factors that may be significant. The courts
have considered the expertise or qualifications of the employee472 the
amount of time devoted by the employee to the job,4' 7 3 the amount of
compensation paid by other firms in the industry for similar jobs or
position,474 the size and complexity of the business, 47 5 the relationship between the compensation paid and the corporation's gross or
net income, 476 general economic conditions, 477 and the relationship
between the compensation paid and the amount of stock owned by
the employee. 478 A payment that has been disallowed as a salary
deduction cannot be labeled something else and deducted as another
type of business expense; the Tax Court has refused to allow a deduction as additional rent for premises rented from the president of
a corporation after the amount had been disallowed as unreason4 9
able compensation. 7

472W. Horace Williams Co. v. Lambert, 56-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9839 (E.D. La.
1956); American Pitch Pine Export Co., 8 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 976 (1949), aff'd,
188 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1951).
473Wilshire-La Cienega Gardens Co. v. Riddell, 148 F. Supp. 938 (S.D. Cal.
1956); Millspaugh Bldg. Corp., 9 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1151 (1950), aff'd, 192 F.2d

887 (2d Cir. 1951).

4
74Bluegrass Plant Foods, Inc., 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mern. 271 (1958); R & J
Furniture Co., 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1058 (1956).
475F. E. McGillick Co., 30 T.C. , No. 120 (1958); Pfeiffer Brewing Co., 11
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 586 (1952).
47
6Penn Needle Art Co., 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 504 (1958); Pauluhn Elec. Mfg.
Co., 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mfem. 625 (1952).
477University Chevrolet Co. v. Fabs, 55-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9430 (S.D. Fla. 1955);
Hunt Foods, Inc., 17 T.C. 365 (1951), aff'd on other grounds, 204 F.2d 429 (9th
Cir. 1953).
47sSan Marco Shop, Inc. v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1955); Long
Island Drug Co. v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1940); John P. Wagner, 17
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 569, 615 (1958).
47DRoehl Construction Co., 17 T.C. 1037 (1951).
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